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Abstract
This thesis is an ethnographic account of the modem readymade garment industry in 
Nepal which is at the forefront of Nepal’s modernisation and entry into the global trade 
system. This industry was established in Nepal in 1974 when the United States imposed 
country-specific quotas on more advanced countries and flourished with Nepal’s 
embrace of economic liberalisation in the 1990s. Post 2000 however, it faced two severe 
crises: the looming 2004 expiration of the US quota regime which would end the 
preferential treatment of Nepalese garments in international trade; and the local Maoist 
insurgency imposed serious labour and supply chain hurdles to its operations.
Such a common scenario saw different responses from the differing caste and ethnic 
groups operating within the garment industry. Bahun-Chhetris, the new business elites 
who had recently joined the industry aided by newly acquired finance, knowledge and 
skills, could only produce homogenous garments which would not survive the local and 
global crises. Marwaris and Buddhist Newars, the old business elites with differing 
political and cultural legacies, went on to produce specialised garments and successfully 
capture secure and profitable market niches. They achieved this either by using the 
material knowledge and networks accumulated over generations, or by invoking their 
cultural identities to legitimise their authority over the semiotics used to distinguish their 
products.
I examine Douglass North’s theory on institutions and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory on 
cultural capital to examine the relationship between formal and informal economic 
processes, and understand the way they transform throughout economic development. 
The habitus of transactional knowledge, structure and rules that prevailed in the 
conventional economy widened once it was exposed beyond its original boundaries. The 
new habitus has in turn drawn from the culture, history and politics of the old habitus as 
it set out to embrace new opportunities and threats. Such a transformation of the habitus 
has important distributional effects on the existing social structure and power balance 
between various communities within an economy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis focuses on the experience of modem business entrepreneurs in Nepal in the 
context of local and global transformations. Using the readymade garment industry as a 
case study, the thesis analyses the differences in the mental models of factory owners 
from various castes and ethnicities, and the implications of these models in the ways in 
which the different businesses are organised. I go on to show how entrepreneurs have 
developed differing business strategies in the context of the two specific challenges that 
the industry confronted in the new millennium, further highlighting the cultural as well 
as the material determinants of the factory owners’ actions.
The export garment industry has been one of the most significant and also most 
controversial industries in Nepal. Even though it is still in its formative years, the 
industry has undergone a premature demise owing to hostile international policy changes 
as well as domestic political disruptions. Its rapid growth in the 1980s and 1990s 
occurred at a time when the country was undergoing far-reaching political, cultural and 
economic transformations; its sudden downfall after 2000 was brought about by Maoist- 
led labour unionism as well as by the international Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
crisis, which I will discuss in detail in the succeeding subsections. The industry is 
notable for the exceptional rapidity with which it grew and for the dynamism it embraced 
throughout its turbulent growth. However, this industry should also be studied for the 
insurmountable crises it underwent -  as part of a process through which important 
structural transformations emerged in Nepal’s politics and economy.
The thesis draws from an ethnographic study of the readymade garment industry 
including detailed accounts of three of the factories. I not only worked in these three 
factories for eighteen months, but also socialised quite intimately both with the owners 
and their workers, participating in their religious and social rituals as well as in their 
business networking. At times when the factories shut down owing to political strikes, I 
opened up my residence where the factory owners, supervisors, and workers sometimes 
spent entire days exchanging factory issues and gossip. Once I became a familiar face in 
this circle, I undertook a survey of twenty-two factories where I informally interviewed 
the owners and managers to understand the nature of their products, their production 
processes and company organisations, and to record their growth trajectories. I also 
spent several weeks with the executives and clerks in the Garment Association of Nepal
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(GAN) discussing broader policies and politics that affected the industry. When the 
opportunity arose, I later worked with the Nepali Embassy in the United States to lobby 
the case for subsidising Nepali garments in the American market. Since then, I have 
closely followed the political, economic and cultural changes of the past several years in 
Nepal both from within and outside the country.
1. Local institutions affecting the industry
The growth of the garment industry is directly attributed to Nepal’s departure from 
economic protectionism and its embrace of economic liberalisation, including the 
removal of entry and exit barriers into the domestic market, curtailing of tariff and non- 
tariff barriers on international trade and dismantling of the public subsidies to firms, etc. 
Economic liberalisation in Nepal was closely associated with the fall of the partyless 
Panchayat regime, which had been regarded as ‘suited to the soil of Nepal,’ and was 
known for being more patriotic than pluralistic. The collapse of the Panchayat regime 
increased the scope and depth of the engagement of international financial institutions 
(IFIs) in Nepal’s economic policymaking. The IFIs were not involved directly with the 
garment industry per se, but they dictated a series of broad changes in the country’s 
economic policies through their policy-based lending to the Nepali government. This 
process of economic liberalisation allowed the garment industry to make advances that 
otherwise would not have been possible.
The dismantling of the barriers to owning and running garment factories increased the 
number of factories several-fold. While most of the factory owners had been content to 
manufacture one or two types of garment before liberalisation, as local competition grew 
after more factories joined the industry, many began to diversify their products and 
markets. As the bar on technology and standards rose, factories increasingly 
incorporated specialised business services into their own operations, investing 
significantly in better machines and production mechanisms. With regard to labour, the 
industry soon discarded a primordial juwadi system to adopt a more scientific and cost- 
effective ‘chain’ system (see Section 3 of Chapter 4 for detailed discussions on factory 
operations in mass manufacturing). In terms of products, the industry gave rise to rare 
examples of the manufacturing of ‘niche’ garments where the producers circumvented 
the pressures of cost reduction by designing creative products and exploiting previously 
untapped segments of the global market (see Chapters 5 and 6 for detailed case studies 
on niche production).
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The collapse of the Panchayat regime marked not only a reversal of economic 
protectionism and the opening up of the economy for international trade and investment, 
it was also a landmark as far as political liberalism was concerned. The ending of the 
regime gave rise to a myriad of political, occupational, cultural and social organisations 
concerned with advancing the roles of various interest groups in national politics and 
economics. On the one hand, business associations, including GAN, emerged as an 
important pressure group, forcing the State to reform bureaucratic procedures relating to 
industrial operations that had earlier bestowed special privileges on the political elites; on 
the other, through the thickening web of labour unions, the political parties increased 
their roles not only in national but also in grassroots politics (see Chapter 9 for detailed 
discussions of business associations and labour unions). It would be correct to say that 
while economic and political deregulation brought about a rapid growth of the 
readymade garment industry, at the same time it failed to uproot the structural 
insecurities inherent in the industry to which it finally fell prey.
The significance of the garment industry lay less in the numbers it employed but more in 
its catalysing of the structural transformation of Nepalese industry. The garment industry 
opened up new avenues for entrepreneurs and workers from various castes and ethnic 
groups of Nepali society. Historically, Nepal had followed a caste- and ethnicity-based 
occupational system within which the vocation of private entrepreneurship attracted only 
the relatively small merchant and trader caste groups. It is true that several non-merchant 
and non-trader castes including the Bahun-Chhetris and the Janajatis pursued 
entrepreneurship and artisanship after the scrapping of the caste-based muluki ain (penal 
code)1 in 1951; however, Nepal’s industrialisation remained so narrow-based in the 
1960s and 1970s that there were no industries that could absorb the new cohort of non­
caste entrepreneurs and workers. It is also true that the readymade garment industry 
initially demonstrated a strong Indian dominance both in its capitalisation and 
organisation; however, as it adapted to the forces of ‘Nepalisation’ and globalisation 
(Shakya, 2004) in the early and mid-1990s, it also attracted Nepali entrepreneurs not only 
from amongst those of Marwari origin but also from the ruling elites Bahun-Chhetris and 
the indigenous groups such as Gurungs, Lamas, Newars, etc. Further, as regards to
1 Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Nepal maintained a caste-based social 
order enforced through a series o f (unwritten) legal codes. Jung Bahadur Rana, the founder o f the 
dictatorial Rana regime, had these legal codes reformed, written and centrally compiled as the muluki 
ain in 1852. Hofer (1979)’s translation and analysis found that it showed significant progress from the 
earlier codes but still legitimised a caste-based social order.
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labour, the industry offered openings to the Nepali hill workers of all caste and ethnic 
origins who migrated to the Kathmandu Valley to escape from the brewing insurgency in 
the mountains (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on relations between caste and 
ethnic communities throughout Nepal’s political history).
In the garment industry, the relative stability of the late 1990s was overtaken by hostile 
political developments at the turn of the millennium, and the industry was taken hostage 
by circumstances beyond its control. It is true that the armed Maoist conflict initially 
won no support from the relatively privileged garment industry workers, and the extent 
of the damage to factories was limited to random strikes and disruptions in the factory 
supply chains. However, the effect of the second Maoist national convention of 2001 
which officially adopted the hard line ‘Prachanda path’ and decisively shifted their 
attention from the rural periphery to the urban centre, was detrimental for the garment 
industry (see Chapter 9 on the impacts of Maoist insurgency on the garment industry). 
The chain system of labour management in the garment industry had anonymised the 
workforce and left them under loose control; the labour unionism of the mainstream 
political parties was porous at best and unresponsive to garment workers’ needs at worst. 
It was then, not a surprise that the Maoists soon infiltrated and proselytised the garment 
labour force leaving the factories simply non-functional (see Chapter 9 for a detailed 
discussion on factory owners’ negotiations with the Maoists). The political and cultural 
transformations that the industry has undergone opened up a whole new perspective on 
the study of the cultural embeddedness of economic relations, and its implications for the 
emerging political equations in Nepal.
2. Global institutions affecting the industry
The garment industry was initially criticised as an industrial ‘dowry’2 from India. 
Indeed, in as much as the capital, labour, raw materials, technology and machinery all 
initially came from India, it hardly allowed for any significant value added from within 
Nepal. The Indian garment businessmen looked upon their ‘flight’3 to Nepal as a 
temporary and nominal escape from the country-based garment quotas being imposed on 
India by its largest importer, the United States. The gradual Nepalisation of the industry 
was driven as much by the tightening of the American checks on the rules of origin as by 
proactive efforts of Nepali businessmen to participate more fully in factory operations.
2 During conversations with factory owners.
3 During conversations with officials o f Department o f Industries.
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The United States gradually tightened its measures on ‘rules of origin’ such that the 
origin of the final assembling was no longer sufficient, but exporters had to demonstrate 
that the primary and secondary inputs had also been produced within the exporter 
country. The Nepali entrepreneurs took advantage of such measures to put more 
pressure on their Indian counterparts in converting the garment factories from mere 
assembly zones to full-fledged production plants.
The United States’ imposition of item-specific quotas for selected developing countries 
was a part of the 1974 global Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which not only spelled 
out precisely how many pieces of garment each country could export to the United 
States, but also developed an elaborate enforcement mechanism for its monitoring on a 
day-to-day basis. Based solely on the discretion of the United States, country quota 
levels could rise up to six per cent per year. Because this initial quota system seemed 
quite restrictive, several caveats were added to make it more flexible. For example, 
quotas could be transferred among product categories, unused quotas could be carried 
over to the next year, and even borrowed from the next year. This system of quota 
restrictions led to the development of country-based quota markets: if factories exceeded 
their own quota allotments, they could go on to the open market and buy extra from firms 
or individuals that had accumulated export quotas under prior agreements. When 
countries used up their quota allotments, they often moved their operations to 
neighbouring countries if the latter still had some quotas left.
The United States had conceptualised the MFA approach in order to reduce the rate of 
increase of East Asian and Indian garment exports to its market, intending thereby to 
redirect surplus exports to smaller and poorer countries whose exports were very small. 
It was anticipated that the quota privilege might lay the foundation for a broader 
industrialisation process in small and least developed countries. Such intentions 
manifested themselves very well in the distribution of the MFA quotas within the South 
Asia region. While three other South Asian countries -  Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka -  were the immediate winners in terms of quota distribution, Nepal’s gains were 
more far-reaching. Nepal was given the highest South Asian ‘quota per capita’ of 2.3 
pieces per head, on the grounds that industrially the country was the laggard among all 
its neighbours in the region. The MFA, of course, offered regular incentives to local 
Nepali entrepreneurs as was anticipated. What was not anticipated was the possibility 
that the MFA restrictions would displace a large segment of the Indian garment industry
9
since the quota ceiling offered to India was much lower than its level of exports at that 
time. The displaced Indian garment factories quickly re-established themselves across 
the 1271 km long free border with Nepal which had always offered preferential treatment 
to Indian capital and labour. The fact that the garment industry was a sector rarely 
entered by local businessmen made Nepal an obvious choice for the displaced Indian 
garment factories.
The Multi-Fibre Agreement came into existence in 1974. It was conceived as a 
temporary tool but it received four extensions -  in 1977, 1981,1986 and 1994 -  which 
increased its entrenchment and raised hopes for a longer future. However, an agreement 
signed in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994 gave birth to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) effective as of January 1,1995. The birth of the WTO led to the replacement of 
the MFA by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) which was intended to rid 
the international textile trade of any protection or regulation that was likely to undermine 
the free-market principles. A ten-member body under the ATC promptly took office to 
initiate work on the abolition of the MFA in four stages. Subsequently, a full phase-out 
of existing quotas was scheduled for January 1,2005 which meant that Nepal would lose 
the implicit cost subsidies of up to 43% per cent (Bimbaum, 2000: 34) which had made it 
competitive in the global market despite high production costs.
The leading players in international trade increasingly regarded the replacement of the 
MFA with the ATC as non-negotiable, and developing countries became more or less 
resigned to this. In Nepal, 40 out of 252 garment factories, mostly those without direct 
contacts and stable relationships with the importers, had left the field by 2002 and others 
were following suit. This gave greater space to those who persevered in an industry 
often referred to as a nibhna lageko diyo4 (a lamp soon to die out), indicating its short 
life ahead but also inferring that the lamp shone at its brightest just before it went out. 
While the factory owners appeared calm and optimistic, as I got to know them better, 
they told me that the MFA phase-out was like a ‘sword hanging above the head’. Indeed, 
when I returned to Nepal for a follow up visit in 2006, more than ninety per cent of the 
garment mass manufacturers -  though not the few producers of specialised garments -  
had already closed down.
4 During conversations among the factory owners.
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3. Caste and ethnicity in garment economics
As it became clearer over the years that the MFA-granted access to the global market for 
the readymade garment industry was destined to end within less than a decade, the 
garment entrepreneurs began to explore alternatives to mass manufacturing. The 
problem with mass manufacturing was that their products were, as they were bound to 
be, so homogenous across the world that the only way one could differentiate or compete 
with others was strictly on price. As they became more conversant with global 
developments in the industry, there was a general consensus among the Nepali garment 
producers that, as one of the executives of the garment association put it, ‘in order to 
survive the MFA, we must produce the kinds of garments to buy which our buyers would 
not look at the prices’.
The most notable variant of mass manufacturing that emerged in Nepal was the 
production of ethno-contemporary garments. Given that the Nepali fashion designing 
industry comes nowhere close to its international or even regional counterparts, Nepal’s 
garment designs had to embody distinctive cultural symbolism for them to appeal to a 
global clientele. The select few producers of specialised garments did precisely that, 
while many more who aspired to do so, found themselves unable to venture beyond their 
comfort zones despite their realisation that their current enterprises were doomed to fail 
beyond the end of the MFA. In particular, any use of original or improvised use of 
cultural symbols and materials, without exception so far, has come from the ‘authentic’ 
bearers of that local culture within the broader national culture. In other words, the 
specialised garment makers who designed garments that capitalised on symbolism 
deriving from Nepal’s medieval history as contributors to Tibetan Buddhism, without 
exception, were the Buddhist Newars. Similarly, those who conveyed the richness and 
vibrancy of exotic textiles, colours and embroideries, have inevitably had ethnic 
connections with the flatlands of southern Nepal and northern India. I did not find a 
single exception where members of one caste or ethnicity had capitalised on the culture 
of another. The castes and ethnicities whose local culture did not (yet) have an 
international audience, including the Hindu ruling elites or the Bahun-Chhetris, were 
unable to move from the world of mass manufacturing to the world of niche production.
Partly as a corollary of this statement, and partly in contradiction to it, there is another 
discussion running through my thesis: the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence 
of competition. Within this line of discussion, North (1990b), while dismissing the
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accompanying neoclassical assumption of frictionless exchange process, reaffirmed the 
robustness of the ideas of scarcity and competition. The successful producers of 
specialised garments, who were few, were those who survived the rigours of cost and 
design-based competition. The remainder of their fellow caste/ethnicity members later 
went back to either the world of their traditional vocations or that of mass manufacturing.
Directly related to the question of which castes and ethnicities emerged as specialised 
garment producers is: what changes emerged within their individual caste and ethnic 
orders after they began to produce niche products for outsiders -  and in this process, 
allied themselves with non-caste financiers, technicians and service providers? The 
niche producers tried to offer what they believed was the best that might appeal to the 
global clientele, and while doing so, they tried to make themselves into what they 
thought their buyers valued and desired. They made efforts to remain personally loyal to 
their foreign buyers in the way they would be loyal to family and kin; they built homes 
and factories that had Western comforts yet resonated cultural architectural distinctions, 
they entertained their buyers in the personal spaces of their homes and social rituals and 
stepped into the buyers’ spaces of Westem-style business dinners and drinks. Above all, 
they made every possible effort to choose to work with buyers who embodied the best of 
their own cultural expectations in terms of partnership and ‘brotherhood’. Such 
complexities of ‘modem’ and ‘cultural’ which were central to product specialisation
4
among Nepali garment manufacturers and exporters is also part of this thesis’ remit.
3. The thesis and the research methodology
My work is an ethnographic study substantiating the theory of institutions which broadly 
falsifies the neoclassical claim that there exists a unique prescription for economic 
growth of universal application (North, 1990b). This is done through highlighting two 
core shortfalls of the neoclassical theory, namely, the assumptions of instrumental 
rationality and frictionless transactions. Two important schools of thoughts have 
developed within the theory of institutions. The ‘new’ institutional economics, or NIE, 
differs from the newly revived old institutional theory on two counts: first, NIE treats 
‘institutions’ deterministically thereby losing a more important aspect of institutions 
which has to do with their inherent informality; and second, it overemphasises economist 
rationality, neglecting North’s caution that economism has led NIE studies astray.
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The original institutionalist theory has recently been placed within a framework for the 
analysis of economic organisation. Whitley’s (1999) comparative-business-systems 
framework studies the variations in economic organisational structures across societies, 
and attributes these to the transactional differences arising from the varied mental models 
of entrepreneurs in different societies. The premise of trust is implicit in the discourse on 
divergent capitalism in that trust is one of the key societal constituents which might 
contribute to reduction of transaction costs, but it does not necessarily evolve in a 
neoclasically rational pattern. However, there is a shortcoming in that the institutionalist 
concept o f ‘mental models’ is one-dimensional. I argue that it is Bourdieu’s discussion 
of cultural capital, situated in the discipline of sociology (1984) that has problematised 
the institutionalisation of class distinction, social networking and values within and 
beyond economic organisation. Bourdieu’s definition of cultural capital extends the 
logic of economic analysis to ostensibly non-economic forms of power and courses of 
action which he expresses through concepts such as embodied capital (which requires 
pedagogical action and investment of time and social connections), objectified capital 
(such as in books and art objects whose use necessitates a cultural distinction of taste), 
and institutionalised capital (attained and reproduced through the educational credential 
system). Bourdieu uses these concepts to form a central argument on ‘habitus’ or class- 
specific dispositions that are internalised through early socialisation in family and peer 
groups with which individuals negotiate their positions in societies. Habitus is not an 
innate capacity but a ‘structured structure’ and a mix of the various forms of capitals, 
tastes and values. It is fairly resistant to change and is a static concept, but there is also 
an ongoing adaptation process that occurs as it encounters new situations, however slow 
and unconscious it may be, which Bourdieu calls ‘defensive strategies’.
In my analysis of the cultural capital within the otherwise mundane worlds of the 
readymade garment industry, I show the slow process of the broadening of the habitus of 
entrepreneurs that encouraged them to abandon their traditional vocations to venture into 
the new opportunities offered by the readymade garment industry. Drawing from the 
anthropological and sociological studies undertaken among the business entrepreneurs, 
including Singer (1972), Rudner (1994) and Fukuyama (1995), my analysis revolves 
around the following questions: what is the relationship between formal and informal 
economic processes and how are they transformed as the economy modernises; what 
happens to the transactional knowledge and networks, motivations and preferences, and 
the values and norms that prevailed in the original society, once it expands beyond its
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original frontiers; and how does such a transformation, in turn, affect the existing 
economic, political and cultural structure and the power balance between various groups 
within the society?
My methodology is primarily an ethnographic one. I worked as an unpaid employee in 
the three garment factories which I later developed as my case studies of the economic 
organisation among three different elite castes and ethnicities. I started out as a 
voluntary ‘thread-cutter’ along with other unskilled workers who cut off hanging threads 
after garments had been stitched but before they were sent for finishing. In Arya-Nepal, 
a mass manufacturer, I was soon able to migrate to the office of the Production Manager 
situated adjacent to and overlooking the main stitching floor from where I kept a close 
ear on the news and gossip brewing among both the owners and workers. Occasionally, I 
undertook minor tasks like ‘time analysis’ which required standing for hours on the 
stitching floor to time each sub-process of production and submit reports to management 
on the average time required for production. At other times I was an obedient observer 
simply taking notes of owners’ and supervisors’ informal discussions. In Rongoli, a 
specialised producer, I split my time between the owners’ office and the designers’ 
workshop. With the owners, I was a simple observer who would listen as they negotiated 
the prices and purchases of fabrics with weavers, traders and prospective fabric suppliers. 
With the designers, who were always experimenting with colours and designs, I was a 
live mannequin modelling and commenting on their ideas, and a messenger running to 
and fro between them and the tailors, embroiderers and storekeepers. In Swakan- 
Chhemu, I shared a room with the fashion designer and the graphics designer, adjacent to 
the owners’ rooms on the top floor, and I undertook secretarial tasks such as designing 
brochures and commercial advertisements. When their fashion designers and buyers 
came to Kathmandu, I took them on tours and interpreted during their conversations with 
tailors and embroiderers. These tasks still left me plenty of time to interview and 
socialise with workers on lower floors.
As they got to know me better, owners and workers increasingly came to my residence 
for ‘time-pass’ when the factories were shut down owing to political strikes which 
sometimes went on for several days at a time. This was an excellent opportunity for me 
to immerse myself into the world of garments as an ethnographer, as well as to broaden 
my base from the immediate anchoring in my three case studies. Using my newly 
acquired identity as an affiliate with Arya-Nepal3,1 found my way into twenty-two other
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mass manufacturing garment factories. After satisfying their concerns and suspicions 
about my possible connections with labour or environmental activists critical of the 
industry (and seen as being out to ‘kill’ the industry), I interviewed the owners and 
managers in these factories about the nature and scope of their products, and the various 
organisational mechanisms they employed over time. Some of my interviewees were 
also the elected executives of the business association of the garment entrepreneurs, 
which indirectly opened doors for me at the Garment Association of Nepal.
I produced a preliminary report based on my survey which recorded the growth trajectory 
of the garment industry and answered some obvious questions about the origin of capital, 
management and labour in this industry. This earned me a nominally paid consultancy 
from GAN and the Nepali Embassy in the United States when they set out to lobby for 
subsidising Nepali garments in the American market. I spent approximately three 
months of my fieldwork in this lobbying and informally interviewing the executives and 
clerks in GAN. I wrapped up my official fieldwork in March 2006, but I have continued 
to follow the political, economic and cultural changes in the country closely.
The core of my thesis comes from the comparison of products and markets, organisations 
and networking and motivations and preferences of the three case studies. Their 
economic boundaries, constitutions and development are my focus of analysis. I extend 
this to study under what conditions particular kinds of factories become established, or 
counterfactually, what are the conditions that bar other kinds of factories from being 
formed. An observation of such conditions leads me to my core argument, which is that 
the institutions contributing to such developments are a complex whole that includes not 
only the economics of market and politics but also ostensibly non-economic elements 
such as caste and ethnicity as well as the values, knowledge and networks associated 
with these. And subsidiary to these are the nature of businessmen’s relationships with 
their employees, contractors, customers, competitors and the State.
Each of the companies in my case studies was owned by members of caste and ethnic 
groups whose predominance amongst Nepal’s business enterprises was apparent. (See 
case study Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for detailed discussions on their cultural, political and 
economic histories). My first case study, Arya-Nepal, was representative of the garment 
mass-manufacturers who constituted more than ninety per cent of the garment industry in 
Nepal before the MFA expired. Arya-Nepal was run by Bahun-Chhetris who later began
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to employ ‘scientific’ and Taylorist production methods after the kin-based juwadi 
system ceased to be economically effective. Although they suffered from cut throat 
competition arising from exclusive negotiations on costs and were aware of the MFA- 
related challenges looming on the horizon, they continued to remain a mass manufacturer 
of cheap and homogenous garments until the very end. This was more out of necessity 
than by choice. After the CEO of Arya-Nepal tried and failed to persuade the owner of 
specialised garment producer Rongoli, a close friend of his, to do business with him 
either as a partner or as a supplier, Arya-Nepal’s existence was fully dependent on its 
uncompromising financiers from Punjab and opportunist buyers from the United States. 
As members of the ruling caste, however, the Arya-Nepal owners had privileged access 
to the State bureaucracy regulating business enterprises.
Swakan-Chhemu, comparable to Arya-Nepal in size but contrasting in its product range 
and organisation, was owned and run by Buddhist Newars. Swakan-Chhemu produced 
specialised garments still employing the old machines and the kinship-based juwadi 
labour system. Although they did not have specialised skills in modem fashion design, 
they embodied the grand history of the Nepal-Tibet trade of medieval times, and were 
known to international Tibet activists and philosophers as contributors to Tibetan 
Buddhism. As a result, they received subsidised finance, dedicated designing 
contributions and privileged market access from European followers of Tibetan 
Buddhism. The family head of the Swakan-Chhemu owners was a renowned local leader 
who used his political connections to develop business networks both locally and 
internationally. This gave the family the kind of unique knowledge and insights that was 
the privilege of very few of the Newar business elites. Several other Newars who were 
also keen to pursue similar business opportunities did not have similar access to political 
connections, with the result that they either remained in the traditional industries of the 
old economy or, if they moved to the new industries, remained on their peripheries.
Rongoli was, by contrast, a smaller factory producing specialised garments, owned and 
run by Hindu Marwaris who had migrated to Nepal from India. The Rongoli owners not 
only excelled in their knowledge of the art and trade of textiles through their family 
vocation, but also maintained a dense, web-like network of kin, castemen and friends all 
over India. These attributes helped them to design superior garments that competed well 
in global niche markets despite the fact that their machines were outdated and their 
operations old-fashioned. They recruited their workers on considerations of personal
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loyalty, managed them on a case by case basis that was time consuming and extremely 
complicated, and when satisfied, retained them by asserting the factory’s ‘ownership’ of 
their labour and weaving a web of relational obligations.
In general, deregulation of the local market and integration with the global market 
increased the number of contenders and thus generated competition, which was expected 
in turn to constrain investment in economically inefficient activities while encouraging 
activities in which the economy had a comparative advantage5 over others. While 
countries more favourably located within the main routes of global supply chains were 
better suited for large-scale manufacturing of cheap and homogenous garments, Nepal’s 
geographic location gave it a pronounced comparative advantage in higher-value and 
creative garments. Within the country, however, Nepal’s liberalisation efforts, which 
eventually led it to the world of niche manufacturing, have resulted in a form of cultural 
dualism in which a strong niche has been opened up for the old business elites -  the 
Marwaris and Buddhist Newars -  coupled with loss of State protectionism and absence 
of compensating opportunities for the ‘new’ Bahun-Chhetri business elites. The old 
business elites’ associations with the niche markets came not only from their human 
capital of business-specific knowledge and skills, and their social capital of useful social 
networks, but largely from their cultural capital of motivations, understandings and 
dispositions. Not all members of the old business elites successfully managed the 
transition from the older, local market to modem global markets, but more importantly, 
none from the new business elites even ventured out anywhere close to the trajectories 
that led to the global niche markets. The new business elites were largely found confined 
within the infant business ventures which became less and less profitable over time as 
State and international protections were scrapped. While the transitory quota privileges 
assigned in the garment industry under the MFA may have offered uniform business 
opportunities for all, its expiration was definite, and beyond it entrepreneurs had to rely 
solely on their global competitiveness. Hence, improvisation of their cultural products to 
adapt them to modem tastes for distinction seemed to be the economically efficient 
business strategy for garment factory owners in Nepal.
5 ‘Comparative advantage’ is the term David Ricardo developed to argue that countries should not 
worry much about what they can produce cheapest but compare themselves with other countries 
operating in the global market, and produce only those commodities that they can produce cheaper 
than their trade partners.
17
Similarly, anonymous chain systems of labour organisation as well as chaotic labour 
unionism are unlikely to be efficient in the long run in a society where personal and 
business loyalties are tied to culturally nuanced relational obligations rather than pure 
monetary calculation or legal prescription. Cynicism about the chain system was 
apparent among the niche producers who did not have the same constraints of volatility 
and cost, and who had higher expectations of labour in regard to both loyalty and skill. 
There was also a clear emphasis on the role of cultural institutions in factory organisation 
as Maoist labour unionism and business extortionism focused on the garment industry, 
easily sidelining the labour unions led by the mainstream political parties. In general, the 
superiority of those who could exploit their cultural capital in the creation of goods and 
control of the production process seemed to have left behind those who could not do so 
and who hence remained hostage to transitory subsidies occasionally dished out by the 
national and global bureaucracies.
Additionally, the renewed importance of cultural capital in developing products and 
organising production for the global market brought about important changes in the 
existing social structure and power balance between various social groups within the 
Nepali economy. The old elites formed alliances with international financiers, designers 
and buyers, where entrepreneurs’ positions were structurally different from those in their 
old alliances with individuals within the society. There were conflicts of values, 
preferences and interests. Because business entrepreneurs were very often dependent on 
their international counterparts for their financial and market access, careful checks were 
undertaken -  and rightly so — of the motivations and dispositions of the foreign 
counterparts with whom they were likely to do business. Such checks far surpassed 
strictly economic calculation. Once the conditions were met and the alliances were 
stable, the measures these entrepreneurs employed to maintain these also were less 
business-like and more family or kin-like.
This thesis is arranged in four sections. Under Section 1, Chapter 1 has introduced the 
subject of the thesis. Chapter 2 will reconstruct the political, economic and cultural 
history of Nepal, which helps explain the contemporary relations of the caste and ethnic 
groups discussed and will situate the history of the development of the garment industry. 
Chapter 3 provides the conceptual and theoretical framework. The second section 
(Chapters 4, 5, and 6) sets out the three case studies and discusses the cultural capital 
inherent in each case in detail. The third section (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) develops the
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analytical argument of the thesis. Chapter 7 will examine the relevance of Bourdieu’s 
discourse on restructuring of social classes for the widening and modernising ‘field’ of 
specialised garment manufacturing in Nepal. Chapter 8 will discuss the industrial 
organisation in the garment industry following Whitley’s comparative-business-systems 
approach. Chapter 9 will offer an account of the functioning of business and labour 
associations in the context of the growing internal and international crises, and argue that 
politics, economics and culture are not neatly compartmentalised but are deeply 
entangled with each other. Chapter 10 is the fourth section, which will conclude the 
thesis.
19
Chapter 2: Reconstructing the history of factories, politics and 
culture
Setting aside minor exceptions, it is a largely taken-for-granted fact of life among 
Nepalis that everyone has a caste or ethnic identity which is not only known to the 
person involved but also to everybody around him or her, thus propagating for centuries 
a unique political and cultural hierarchy encompassing all aspects of life, be it religion, 
State-building, politics or business entrepreneurship. Hence, more specifically, the 
question of business enterprise development is one that historically has been closely 
interconnected with that of political and societal systems. Here, I explore the particular 
outcomes -  at the factory, industry and national levels -  of the interplay between local 
cultural politics of caste and ethnicity and global influences of foreign trade and 
liberalisation, through successive waves of integration into the world system. It is also 
the less frequented story of the three important castes and ethnicities that have 
reconstituted themselves, variously, as the old and new business elites in Nepal within 
the enterprises of late capitalism. Drawing on these records, my aim in the present 
chapter is to trace the changing relations of production and culture in the readymade 
garment industry, as Nepal first, embraced political and economic pluralism, and second, 
began to reengage with the old order of caste and ethnicity within the renewed order of 
local politics and global trade.
1. The State evolves, 1560-1951 (and a stage set for old entrepreneurs)
King Prithvi Narayan Shah (1723-1775), under whose rule the Nepali State was unified 
in 1769, famously compared Nepal’s geopolitical situation to that of a ‘yam balanced 
between two boulders’. This view was in sharp contrast to the one maintained by his 
predecessors -  the Malla or the Newar dynasty that had ruled the core of the then 
fragmented Nepal kingdom for over five centuries. On the one hand, the Newars had 
maintained a close cultural, political and economic relationship with Tibet, especially 
following the marriage of the legendary Nepali princess Bhrikuti to the Tibetan emperor 
Srong Btsan Sgam Po, which opened the doors for Nepal’s export of Buddhist 
philosophy and art to Tibet. On the other hand, they had little or no relationship with the 
Indian subcontinent south of their border. Their successors, the Shahs, initiated a 
political and cultural relationship with India, although this translated little into economic 
transactions between the two countries. Nepal had no competitive advantages in regard 
to the vast Indian economy, although it had a strong geographic advantage in being
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Tibet’s only gateway to the world. Not surprisingly, Nepal’s economic borders remained 
sealed in the south through the thick, malaria-infested forests of Charkose Jhadi even 
after the Shah dynasty rule took root and the medieval laws on international trade 
maintained a sole focus on Nepal-Tibet trade.
Medieval Nepal’s geographic advantage lay in the fact that the lowest two of the dozen 
passes that went into Tibet from the southern plains -  Kuti and Kyirong -  passed via the 
Kathmandu Valley. Frequent skirmishes occurred between Nepal and Tibet on the terms 
of use of these two passes. Finally, a legendary Newar ruler, Bhim Malla, brokered a 
deal in 1650 which not only gave Nepal unlimited rights to live in and trade permanently 
from Lhasa and Kuti, but also a monopoly over minting Tibetan coins. The 1650 treaty 
also mandated that Tibet conduct all of its trade, including that with Sikkim and Bhutan, 
through Nepal (Rankin 2004: 90; Slusser 1982: 70; Snellgrove and Richardson 1968: 
146). Nepal exported artefacts, spiritual books, spices, embroidery, cotton and jewellery 
to Tibet in return for gold, silver, precious stones, musk, silk and salt. The overall trade, 
however, continued to be legitimised by the exchange of art, philosophy and culture.
Although the Newars from the Kathmandu Valley monopolised trade with Tibet, they 
were not a homogenous group. Gellner and Quigley (1999: 13) have discussed the 
‘double-headed’ caste hierarchy among the Newars, which maintains two competing 
sacerdotal groups—the Hindus and the Buddhists—each claiming ritual leadership of an 
otherwise unitary hierarchy. Given that the medieval Nepal-Tibet trade was legitimised 
by Buddhist art and culture, it better suited the Newar Buddhists whose ecclesiastical 
vocation overlapped with their economic one.6 This remained true even after King 
Prithvi Narayan Shah’s conquest of the Kathmandu Valley and transfer of State power 
from the Newars to the Shahs (Chhetris). Non-Buddhist and non-Newar traders did not 
gain access to the Nepal-Tibet trade simply because it fell outside their vocational ambit 
and they lacked the cultural capital essential to it (Lall, 1999). The archives of the 
official correspondence between Nepal and Tibet confirm that Tibet had played an active 
role in ensuring that non-Buddhist and non-Newar traders from Nepal could not
6 An obvious exception to this would be the Hindu Shresthas from Sankhu who participated in the 
Tibet-Nepal trade along with the Buddhist Newars. However, it should be noted that they were a 
minority among the Tibet traders and joined the trade only after the route had already become well 
established, taking advantage o f their geographic location. Sankhu is known to be Kathmandu 
Valley’s gateway to the Tibet route. Leaving aside Sankhu Shresthas, Nepal-Tibet trade largely 
consisted o f  the Buddhist trader castes -  Shakyas, Bajracharyas and Urays. See Lewis p. 38-79 in 
Gellner and Quigley (1999).
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penetrate this trade (Acharya, 1999). Reacting to such an exclusion, the Shah kings 
issued a State decree that all Buddhist Newar traders must perform the ritual of jaat 
litkayagu (regaining their caste) from a Hindu Bahun upon conclusion of their trip to 
Tibet where they had supposedly consumed yak or cow meat, the animal deeply revered 
by the Hindus. The caste-regaining ritual went on for months, throughout which the 
traders were forbidden from entering their own homes or meeting any of their family and 
the caste community. As Shah rule deepened its roots, the Newars, especially Buddhist 
Newars found themselves more and more marginalised. Certainly no regular 
intermarriage took place between the Newars and the Bahun-Chhetris (Gellner and 
Quigley 1999: 10).
Tibet and Nepal fought three violent wars after the Shah dynasty displaced the Newar 
rulers. The first Nepal-Tibet War of 1786 was waged to settle disputes over the purity of 
Tibetan coins minted in Nepal. The second war of 1791 stemmed from disputes arising 
from the fact that Nepal had given protection to Syamarpa Lama, a high profile Tibetan 
political refugee in Nepal. A third war was fought in 1855 in the aftermath of Tibet’s 
(and China’s) refusal to support Nepal in its resistance to an assault from the British East 
India Company in the south. Tibet’s response to Nepal’s plea for support against the 
British had clearly shown that it retained a grudge against the Shahs for displacing the 
Newar rulers from the Kathmandu Valley.7
Nepal’s comparative advantage over the Tibet trade began to dwindle in the late 
nineteenth century. Geographically, the British opened a new route via Sikkim in 1877 
and subsequently linked it with a railroad between Daijeeling and Kolkata in 1881. 
Politically, Sir Francis Younghusband’s Tibet expedition of 1904 -  ironically assisted by 
the contemporary Rana regime of Nepal -  imposed a new treaty on Tibet to end Nepal’s 
legal monopoly over Tibet’s foreign trade and initiate trade with the East India Company 
(Acharya, 1999:233 and Whelpton, 2005:77). Further, as the Chinese invaded Tibet in 
1950 and closed borders with Nepal in 1959, the Nepal-Tibet trade came to a standstill
7 ‘... We Tibetans do not get involved in affairs of other countries. We had been trading and 
coexisting harmoniously when you attacked the Malla Kings o f Kathmandu kingdom and defeated 
them. We did not get involved because we respect the affairs o f other countries. Likewise, whatever 
issues with your southern neighbours, you must solve them with your own diplomacy and resources... ’ 
(Translation from Tibet archives in Acharya 1997: 208). These statements evoke a sense o f irony 
when read in the context that Tibet did provide financial aid to the Newar rulers in their war against 
King Prithvi Narayan Shah.
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(Rankin, 2004; Patterson, 1962; Fretchette, 2003).8 With it came the demise of the glory 
of the Buddhist Newar traders, who gradually slipped into the political and economic 
shadows and whose plight was equated to that of the lost Nabobs of Lucknow (Malla, 
1992: 24).
By the mid-1880s, British India was exerting such an overwhelming influence on Nepal 
as to put its independence in question. With British help, the Rana family had confined 
the Shah kings and become the de facto rulers in Nepal, and they (the Ranas) resisted 
Indian (British) influence very little. Further, the Indian railway revolution and the 
industrial gains the British brought to India in the late nineteenth century affected Nepal 
profoundly. The demand for inputs for Indian infrastructure projects prompted the ruling 
Ranas to initiate various business ventures and finally to declare an ‘open border’ 
between the two countries. As a result, Indian consumer goods began to find their way 
into the Nepalese market through railway links built close to the Nepal-India check-posts 
of Nepalganj (far west), Biratnagar and Birganj (east) and Janakpur (centre). The 
demographic situation on the Nepal-India border, or the Terai belt, began to develop in 
ways which would store up trouble for the future.
In return for the loyalty of the Ranas, including their military support in quelling the first 
Indian Sepoy mutiny in 1857, the British returned two bordering districts in the far west, 
Kanchanpur and Kailali, to Nepal. Being flat and warm, this land was much more fertile 
than the hills. Although the Ranas were concerned only with expanding their personal 
revenue base, Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana called this piece of land the naya 
muluk (new nation), and it inspired him to conceptualise an ambitious industrialisation 
package to build the first cohort of industries in Nepal (Whelpton, 2005:77). Still under 
the overwhelming Indian (British) influence, the Ranas officially issued a pragyapan 
patra (State letter of invitation) in 1875 to invite thirty Marwari businessmen from North 
India to establish various commercial manufacturing and processing plants as well as to 
develop distribution networks in Nepal for Indian consumer goods.9 The first modem 
industry in Nepal—a jute mill—was established in 1936 by Radha Kissen Chamaria, a
8 The number o f Newar trade houses in Tibet fell from 2000 in 1888 to 500 in 1907, and again to only 
42 in 1923. The weakening trade was brought to a complete end by the Chinese occupation o f Tibet in 
1950, when as Rankin has noted, the last Newar merchant from Sankhu left Tibet (2004: 99).
9 Similar caste-based formal policies have been seen in Nepal as early as the seventeenth century. 
Siddhi Narsingha Malla had invited a priest clan from South India to serve as the designated priests in 
Pashupatinath T emple. The arrival of the Rajkamikars as confectionary producers and Rajopadhyaya 
Brahmans and Kayasthas as Hindu priests further supported caste-based policies prevalent in medieval 
Nepal.
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Kolkata Marwari, in joint partnership with Juddha Shamsher Rana, Prime Minister at the 
time. In 1942 two paper mills were established in joint partnership with the Ranas and 
the Marwaris (Gaige, 1975). Processing plants for matches, cigarettes, rice and 
vegetable oil were established in the same area soon afterwards, mostly to fill the 
shortages caused by World War II, and were again jointly owned by the Marwaris and 
the Ranas. The Marwaris remained in Nepal as a minority group, comprising a mere 0.2 
per cent of Nepal’s population (Whelpton 2005: 9), but importantly, because of the 
proximity to the infrastructure developed in the southern belt of Terai after deforestation 
removed the natural border of the Charkose Jhadi forests, the crucial control over the so- 
called ‘open-border’ between Nepal and India remained in the hands of the Marwaris 
along with other local residents of Terai, i.e., the Madheshis (see Section 4 of Chapter 4).
It would be safe to say then that the macroeconomic and social policies both before and 
after the unification of Nepal were dominated by caste-based decrees. The bulk of 
Nepal’s social policies were guided by Manusmriti, an ancient Hindu doctrine that was 
modified from time to time, in which occupations were to be decided by birth and 
reinforced by strict State laws on commensality and consexuality. The muluki ain (penal 
code)10 of 1854 was the first written legal document and came across as a somewhat 
liberalised version of the caste-based division of labour that had prevailed in the Nepali 
society over centuries. Although it claimed to encourage people to pursue their chosen 
occupation, the ain not only maintained the status quo on commensality and conviviality 
rules but also made it legally mandatory that citizens report any violations of caste-based 
norms that might occur within their families and communities (Hofer, 1979:197).11 Not 
surprisingly, caste-based politico-economic job division remained intact in Nepal and 
until the fall of the Rana regime in 1951, only two vaishya caste groups, the Newars and 
the Marwaris, contested for entrepreneurial monopoly over the country.
2. The State modernises, 1951-1990 (and a stage set for the garment industry)
The modem State of Nepal dates back to 1951, when the popular political movement 
jointly led by an alliance between the Shah monarch and peoples’ political parties 
overthrew the Rana regime. This change of regime led to some economic and political 
modernisation, and gave rise to a formal institutional structure of governance. Although
10
11 Spouses and parents were obliged to inform against family members if the any o f the latter infringed 
upon commensality rules. This shows the extent to which the State interfered with private lives o f  
people, hence engineering the economic and political structure o f  society.
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the new constitution and the laws did away with blatant provisions which were 
discriminatory to various castes and ethnicities; these same new laws gave a new role to 
the State in revenue collection and distribution, thereby leaving space for implicit 
differentiation in its treatment of various caste and ethnic constituencies.
The immediate conditions for the historic political uprising that ousted the Rana regime 
were set by the departure of the British from India, who earlier had been the primary 
supporters of the Ranas, but the background for this uprising was woven through decades 
of marginalisation of the Shah kings and oppression of the Nepali people. The rift within 
the Rana family, especially after they divided themselves into rolewalah (legitimate and 
in line to the throne) and berolwalah (not contestant to the throne), further weakened 
their regime. The disenfranchised Shah King Tribhuvan was an accomplice in the 
underground popular democratic movement although this could never be legally proven 
by the Ranas even when they were searching for pretexts on which to further increase 
their control over the Shah Kings. The Ranas reacted to the popular movement by 
brutally suppressing it at all levels. However, the muluki ain was so powerful an 
institution at that time that they could not do away with caste-based treatment even when 
responding to such serious charges as treason. For example, when the secrets of the first 
political party, Praja Parisad, were uncovered, all captured leaders were either publicly 
hanged or shot to death, but Tanka Prasad Acharya, a Bahun, had to be spared. The 
common law had categorically defined bramha-hatya, or murder of a Bahun, to be a sin 
more hideous than even a proven case of treason. As James Fisher (1997) has argued in 
his seminal work on the ‘living martyrs’ of Nepal, the principles of caste-based purity 
and pollution widely dictated the contemporary common law that prevailed under the 
Rana regime. Not surprisingly, the first generation of political leaders who survived the 
brutal oppression of the Rana regime was almost exclusively Bahuns, a legacy that 
continues to haunt Nepal after several decades.
The tri-partite agreement brokered by Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi in 1951 between 
the Ranas, King Tribhuvan Shah and the political parties formally transferred power and 
helped form a coalition government which officially ended the Rana rule in Nepal. A 
new constitution was drafted and promulgated in 1959. In spite of popular demand for 
an election of a constituent assembly, the constitution was written by a commission
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appointed by King Mahendra12 and all political parties were banned except for the 
monarchist Panchayat Party. The new constitution annulled the caste-based muluki ain 
and denounced caste-based discrimination for the first time, but also declared Nepal a 
Hindu kingdom where a Hindu monarch would be the defacto and de jure  head of State. 
A specific provision was made that killing of a cow or ox would be considered 
manslaughter. Further, a clause was added providing that the sanatan (customary) laws 
would be recognised by the court -  thereby implicitly tolerating the caste-based 
discrimination still widely being practiced. These developments supported the notion 
that the post-1951 Panchayatocracy dwelt in a cultural paradox where the State 
disregarded the institutions of caste and ethnicity but did not dismantle them; in fact, 
these were to soon re-manifest in a different avatar within the modem governance 
structure and make a smooth transition to modernity.
In a national election that followed soon after the promulgation of the new constitution, 
the numerically inferior Bahun-Chhetris won an overwhelming majority while the 
Janajatis (hill tribes) and low caste people were grossly underrepresented. This paved 
the way for the passage of the controversial Civil Service Act of 1956, which was widely 
criticised by the representatives of the Janajatis for being pro-Hindu and pro-Sanskrit 
(Seddon, 2001: 87-91). On entrepreneurship, the Business Companies Act of 1951 was 
of key importance in the modernisation of economic governance in Nepal. Over ninety 
new private joint stock companies were registered under this Act between 1952 and 1964 
which should be seen as significant progress. The Act, in theory, encouraged all castes 
and ethnicities to join business enterprises, but in practice it failed to attract the janajatis 
and lower-castes into doing business simply because they did not have access to the 
resources required. Instead, the new elites quickly tapped into the opportunity opened up 
by lucrative public subsidies and incentives offered to business enterprises. Other than a 
few Newars, Thakalis and Lamas, the new elites who became business entrepreneurs 
were the Bahun-Chhetris who had accumulated large fixed assets during the Rana regime 
through bakhsis (gratuities) and dakshina (spiritual offerings) but had been hesitant to 
put these into commercial ventures because of the caste-related stigma attached.
The 1970s and 1980s saw a rapid increase in State discretion with regard to business 
enterprises. The first three National Economic Plans -  of 1956, 1962 and 1965 -
12 By this time, King Mahendra had taken over the rule upon the death ofhis father King Tribhuvan in 
1955.
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explicitly declared State protection for cottage and small industries, and implicitly sought 
to protect all other industries from foreign competition. The Industrial Act o f 1974, on 
the one hand, standardised the definitions and procedures in various business laws and 
controlled enterprise proliferation through quotas and licenses; and on the other, dished 
out generous State subsidies in forms of banking and tax regulations. The Industrial Act 
of 1981 announced an even more generous, non-discretionary six-year tax holiday for all 
cottage industries. This was to be followed by a series of yet other subsidies and 
incentives, including a discretionary tax exemption for industries producing or 
distributing essential goods and infrastructure. A Nine-Point Export Promotion 
Programme was introduced in 1984 that allowed exporters access to concessional credit; 
the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC), a government-controlled capital 
investment entity was directed to compulsorily allocate ten per cent of its investment in 
export industries. The nature of the State protection of various industrial sectors 
however did little to correct the caste and ethnic biases that had influenced State 
allocation of resources for centuries; if anything, it exacerbated this by letting the 
subsidies be captured by the new elites within the status quo.
It was only to be expected that the best protected industries went into the hands of the 
ruling elites while marginalised caste and ethnic groups proliferated in the least protected 
industries. For example, the trans-Himalayan trade, which was once a grand cultural 
trade, had by then shrunk into an insignificant bartering of salt and other basic necessity 
goods, and was now dominated by rural Newars and Sherpas. In contrast, the National 
Salt Trading Corporation, a modem lucrative parastatal that had gained the monopoly 
over distribution of essential commodities throughout the nation, was dominated by the 
Marwaris and the Bahun-Chhetris (Zivetz 1992: 67; Upreti 1999: 134). Rankin (2004: 
105) showed that while several of the old business elites, the Sankhu Newars, primarily 
worked in the informal sector, they avoided joining the formal economy where they 
could no longer avoid State bureaucracy. Quigley (1985a) showed that the Dhulikhel 
Newars were extremely risk-averse in having to interact with State institutions. A large 
number of Newars in the heart of the Kathmandu Valley owned micro businesses that 
remained outside the reach of State regulation. The capitals invested in these businesses 
almost always came from within families,13 and the profits earned were distributed 
amongst household members without using any legal documents or procedures.
13 Quigley (1984: 291) specified that the Sakhu Newars mostly kept their business (or monetary) 
transactions within their large joint families, and when this was not possible, entered into relational
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The Marwaris controlled most of the large enterprises in the late twentieth century that 
had to do with India, including the cross-border transportation industry -  be it exports of 
edibles and medicinal herbs or imports of mechanical and luxury goods, food and 
clothing. Other Marwari business strongholds included retailing of Indian textiles, 
clothing, machinery, etc. Even today, the Marwaris continue to have an implicit 
advantage in dealing with the so-called ‘open border’ between Nepal and India which 
remains a black hole of bureaucratic cobwebs and criminal mafia which are only tips of 
the iceberg that is Nepal-India foreign policy (see Section 4 of Chapter 4). Culturally, 
the Marwaris were recognised for their business acumen and strong networking skills; 
moreover, as Whelpton (2005: 145) argued, they were the visible outsiders and 
minorities who constituted less than 0.2 per cent of the total population who would never 
pose any real threat to the Bahun-Chhetris who remained the de facto political elites. In 
fact, the Bahun-Chhetris themselves were increasingly discarding their conventional 
vocation of priesthood and academia, and had begun to enter into business from the 
1960s onwards. They were also forming business partnerships with the Marwaris to 
pursue emerging entrepreneurial avenues in several sectors.
The new entrepreneurial opportunities for Nepal had to do with its opening up to the 
world, for tourism and artefact trade, adventure travel and development. These offered 
generous benefits for the Bahun-Chhetris (as travel operators and development activists), 
Newars (as artefact and handicraft traders) and other Janajatis such as Sherpas and 
Gurungs (as mountaineering and travel guides). More importantly, the opening up also 
laid the foundation for modem garment manufacturing in Nepal which is the industry 
that lies at the core of my thesis: In 1981, Shah Safari, a Seattle-based distributor of 
Indian ethno-contemporary garments, owned by two ethnic Indian entrepreneurs of 
Kenyan nationality,14 came to Nepal in search of cheap and loyal franchising. They did 
not set up their own factory but opened a buying house which contracted and trained 
fifteen young Nepali entrepreneurs to produce garments following their designs. By 
1982, the number of trainees had doubled. Add to these several others who also began to 
work for Shah Safari under the recommendation and supervision of the original 
contractors, and the number of garment factories in Nepal soon exceeded fifty.
contracts with strangers (though within the community) while carefully avoiding mixing business with 
social rituals within kin.
14 Raj Shan and Akhil Shah were brothers and long-time business partners.
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Apart from one Newar and one Janajati,15 all of the trainees the Shah Brothers chose to 
invest in were Bahun-Chhetris. None were Marwaris. The logic I was given for this was 
that while they wanted people who were well educated with good management skills, 
and who were easy for them to communicate with, they did not trust those associated 
with India not to give out their business secrets elsewhere. This logic is not very clear 
because the Shah Brothers did move their production bases first to Ahmadabad and then 
to Lucknow after they closed their buying house in Nepal in 1988. The argument I was 
given for the latter was that the Shah Brothers did so thinking they could actually draw 
from the rich textiles and traditional designing worlds of those cities. In this, they were 
not successful. Eventually, Shah Safari closed down its clothing chain in the early 1990s 
to focus on their business in sports accessories chains. Back in Nepal, as global and local 
awareness of MFA provisions grew, garment buyers operating from Indian and East 
Asian, as well as American cities, had already begun to initiate business with garment 
manufacturers operating from Nepal, including several former Shah Shafari contractors.
With rare exceptions, all of the garment factories in the mid-1980s were located in 
Baneswor, a neighbourhood with an area of less than one square kilometre, fast emerging 
at that time as a hub for newcomers to the Kathmandu Valley, mostly from southern 
Nepal and northern Indian regions. Almost all of these factories were ‘dependent’ 
partnerships with manufacturers and businessmen from India. Since investments, 
technical know-how and purchase orders all came exclusively from India during this 
period, Nepali partners had hardly any role in factory operations (Zivetz, 1992: 182). 
Most of the Nepali partners served the bureaucratic purpose of having to have a Nepali 
partner as per the Industrial Act of 1981, and almost all of them were either Bahun- 
Chhetris or Marwaris (see Subsection 4a for a discussion on caste and ethnicity in the 
garment industry).
From the mid-1980s, as Nepali partners of the garment factories began to take a keen 
interest in the opportunities offered by the industry, some significant changes both in its 
ownership and labour force structure began to emerge. Over the years, the Nepali 
entrepreneurs had developed some familiarity with production and trading components 
of the business through their limited exposure as sleeping partners. In any case, the 
industry at that time focused on basic and homogenised products which involved
15 This person who came from the eastern high Himalayas and had a Lama surname, had important 
political connections with the ruling Bahun-Chhetris.
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repetition of set tasks that could be picked up through watching and doing. As Nepalis 
within and outside business partnerships with the Indians became more interested in the 
industry, investment skyrocketed, following what can be called a herd mentality rather 
than a pragmatic business rationale. There were also several cases of false registration of 
ghost factories, whose only intention was to hoard MFA quotas with the intention that 
these could subsequently be sold to exporters from Nepal or India. Owing to such 
factors, the number of registered garment factories exceeded 700 by 1990.
3. The State liberalises (and the garment industry takes the centre stage)
In 1990, the Panchayat system was overthrown by what has come to be called the 
janandolart (the people’s movement). At one level, there were street demonstrations for 
several months with forty-one official martyrs before King Birendra agreed to legalise 
political parties and allow a new constitution. At another level, the Nepali monarchy had 
so angered India over an arms deal with China that in 1989 India responded by sealing 
the Nepal-India border until Nepal virtually ran out of daily necessities such as petrol, oil 
and sugar for three months. After the success of the 1990 janandolart the new 
constitution promulgated in 1991 defined Nepal as a ‘multi-ethnic, multilingual, 
democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical 
Kingdom’. Ethnic and religious activists were very disappointed that the word Hindu 
still remained; nonetheless, the addition of the word ‘multi-ethnic’ was a genuinely new 
departure. Soon after, in 1992, the new government issued a new Industrial Act which 
spelled out a radical programme embracing economic liberalisation. Although Nepal had 
signed two important policy lending contracts with the World Bank and the IMF in 1986 
and 1989 agreeing to deregulate the domestic market and international trade from State 
interference, it was not until the change in political regime that it truly began to 
implement them.
On an ethnic front, the 1990 movement gave rise to an entirely new situation, which can 
be compared to a rapid and not wholly predictable process o f ‘ethno genesis’ similar to 
what happened in India during the time of independence, and for rather similar reasons 
(Whelpton, 2005; Pfaff-Czamecka, 1999; Gellner, 2003). The formerly marginalised 
castes and ethnicities felt that they had been liberated by the demise of the Panchayat 
ideology that had claimed that all Nepalis were the same while in practice 
institutionalising high caste Bahun-Chhetri (or Parbatiya) supremacy. For the first time, 
national radio and television was allowed to broadcast news in multiple ethnic languages.
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It was no longer compulsory to wear the ‘national’ costume daura suruwal, essentially 
Bahun-Chhetri attire, while taking oath as a parliamentarian. Ethnic differences began to 
acquire increasing political salience, especially with the publication, for the first time in 
1991, of data on caste and ethnic group affiliation. The new rights freely to ‘be 
organised’ gave a new impetus to the already existing ethnic associations such as the 
Nepal Bhasha Manka Khala (for Newars), Dharmodaya Sabha (all Janajatis including the 
Newars), Kalyankarini Sabha (for the Tharus), etc. In 1990 a new national organisation, 
the Nepal Janajati Adivasi Mahasangh or Nepal Association of Indigenous Nationalities 
(NIFIN) was founded which brought 59 officially recognised ethnic groups under one 
umbrella and has been successful in attracting large grants from the British Department 
for International Development (DFID). Such proliferation of ethnicity-based 
organisations raised expectations of inclusion in State governance, which unfortunately 
were only poorly responded to by the State. For example, the 2001 census showed that 
the Bahun-Chhetris continued to have an overwhelming presence in public life. Despite 
constituting only 31 per cent of the population, they led all major political parties and 
took two-thirds of the jobs in the judiciary, universities and the civil service. The hill 
Janajatis with 22 per cent of the population had just 7 per cent of these jobs; the 
Madheshis from Terai, with 31 per cent of the population had only 11 per cent of these 
jobs and the Dalits with nearly 9 per cent of the population, just 0.3 per cent of the jobs.
The breeze of liberalism swept across all sectors, and the business enterprise sector did 
not remain untouched. A series of important legal and policy measures followed the 
liberal industrial policy of 1992, which took concrete measures to end the privilege of the 
political elites over entrepreneurial opportunities and public subsidies. Most of the 
subsidies were discontinued and entry/exit barriers and quota regulations were removed 
so that access to entrepreneurial opportunities was no longer confined to selected 
population groups. Further, the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act of 
1996 not only allowed one hundred per cent foreign investments in business ventures 
without having to find a Nepali business partner, but also eased controls on capital 
repatriation. The amendment of the industrial policy significantly simplified business 
registration and operation procedures and improved the overall business climate. Among 
others, Garment Association of Nepal, established in 1988, was reformed substantially in 
1992 and delegated powers of supervising the task of distributing MFA quotas to 
exporters which solved the problems of quota-hoarding by the elite. Further, an 
Industrial Promotion Board was set up in 1997 to ensure effective monitoring of the
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implementation of policies announced and provisions made. A series of business 
membership organisations evolved in time to facilitate further dialogue between the 
public and private sector on issues relating to entrepreneurship and business operations. 
This meant at least in principle that the new local business elites now had to compete not 
only with the old elites and the ‘non-’ elites but also with international entrepreneurs in 
running their businesses.
Even though the business laws were significantly modernised and made more 
transparent, the non-elite (and the less State-preferred old elite) castes and ethnicities 
continued to suffer from unfair treatment by the State on some occasions. For example, 
during my interviews with several garment businessmen in 2004,1 learned that it was 
common among the non-Bahun-Chhetri businessmen, especially those who could afford 
to do so, to subcontract the entire task of business registration, tax management and 
customs-related bureaucratic procedures to an outside contractor. Bahun-Chhetris, often 
retirees from the public civil service, were the ones providing such services to business 
houses. It was also common that non-Bahun-Chhetri businessmen did not receive State 
incentives even when they qualified for them. Where such incentives were negligible, 
the businessmen ignored them; where they were significant, they either approached the 
government through the business association or their designated subcontractors who had 
more influence on the public servants. It was only rarely that the Bahun-Chhetri 
entrepreneurs whom I interviewed subcontracted such tasks, nor did they complain about 
not being awarded the subsidies when qualified to receive them. The Marwari 
entrepreneurs also had few complaints about bureaucratic procedures and access to 
public subsidies. The Newar entrepreneurs, on the other hand, suffered gravely, and 
complained that the State bureaucracy was ghushyaha (bribe-taking) and pakshapati 
(discriminatory), and that any problems could be handled only by having thaha manu 
(kin and friends) in the system.
3a. Liberalisation brings sophistication16 to the process of garment-making
The most serious challenge the Nepalese garment industry faced when it became 
integrated with the global market after economic liberalisation was that of technology 
and standards. On one hand, the Indian-made and manually-powered tullu machines
16 Within the short span o f a few decades, the garment industry had transformed itself from an 
unorganised group o f  subcontractors undertaking simple production chores on behalf o f a single 
multinational buyer, to a full-fledged industry demonstrating a coherent production mechanism and 
commanding its own eclectic pool o f suppliers, service providers, subcontractors and buyers.
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which were initially being used no longer met the global standards, and hence had to be 
replaced with Japanese (Juki brand), German (Brother brand) or at least Taiwanese 
machines. On the other hand, main stitching had to be synchronised with specialised 
stitches such as ‘over-locking,’ ‘flat-locking,’ or ‘button-holing,’ which in turn meant 
factories could no longer hire contracted services of thekedars (or traditional middlemen) 
as they had traditionally done, but had to incorporate the workers and supervisors into 
mainstream factory operations. While the Indian machines cost no more than 40 US 
dollars, the Japanese machines cost about USD 400, and the specialised machines more 
than USD 900. Such a technological upgrade required more serious financial investment 
than business entrepreneurs could afford at that time.
Factory Organisation Before and After Liberalisation
r ..... ........ .... .......
Indicators Before Liberalisation
" - 1 ' 1 ....; ......... .
After Liberalisation
No. of machines per factory 
(avg)
91 309
Type o f machines Indian single-needle machines 
with manual power
Juki, Brother and some 
Taiwanese brands. Single­
needle, over-lock and flat- 
lock machines
No. o f workers per factory 
(avg)
158 417
Terms o f employment for 
workers
Juwadi. Workers paid and 
managed by contractor
Daily wages for unskilled 
workers; piece-rates for 
skilled workers; and monthly 
salaries for admin staff
Subcontracted functions Cutting, stitching, washing/ 
finishing, embroidery/ screen- 
printing, packing
Washing, embroidery and 
screen-printing in addition to 
regular tasks listed
Source: Scmi-structurcd interviews among 22 factories within Kathmandu, December 2003
Even with intensifying capital demands, the business prospects still looked very 
attractive at that time, and several entrepreneurs were able to either borrow money from 
or partner with financiers from Nepal and India to meet capital needs. The formation of 
the elite segment also marked a restructuring of the labour management structure and the 
overall production mechanism: Factories moved away from the semi-contracted and 
informal juwadi system to a more integrated and scientifically incorporated chain 
system.17 With such visible upgrades ongoing, the garment industry attracted a large
17 See Section 4c of Chapter 6 for detailed discussions on juwadi system and Section 3 o f Chapter 4 
for detailed discussions on chain system.
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number of new factories in the early 1990s: there were less than a hundred factories 
registered with GAN in 1988, but over seven hundred by 1992.
Production Before and After Liberalisation
Until Liberalisation After Liberalisation
Production item as per 
US-assigned categories18
347,348 (occasional cases o f 335,340,341, 
342)
347, 348, 335, 338, 339, 340, 
341, 342, 641, 642, 647, 648, 
841,835
Production items whose 
wholesale price exceeded 
USD 4
64% 45%
Average size of order 
(no. o f pieces)
16,790 80,853
Lead time required (no. 
of days)
87.5 77.5
Buyers Shah Safari, Kcllwood, F.W. Woolworth, 
Body Drama, Jcctish, Till’s, Children’s 
Place
GAP, Wal-mart, K-mart, Kohls, AMC. 
Target, JCPcnny, Zara, Miss Erica, Colby, 
May Dept. Store, Lee & Fung
Raw materials 
diversification
Mostly from India More from China than India
Source: Scmi-structurcd interviews among 22 factories within Kathmandu. December 2003
The mid-1990s marked a turbulent period in the garment industry in Nepal where cut 
throat competition on costs instigated a race to the bottom, forcing factories to either 
merge and scale up or leave the field. From 1067 factories in 1994, the number declined 
to 323 in 1995, 212 in 1997, and fewer still in later years. It is important to note, 
however, that the surviving factories were much larger in size than their predecessors: 
While an average factory owned 91 machines and employed 158 workers in the 1980s, it 
owned 309 machines and employed 417 workers in the late 1990s.19 The factories in the 
late 1990s had not only diversified their products and markets but also the sourcing of 
their inputs (see table). They no longer remained dependent on two staple garment items 
of #347/#348 (trousers and shorts), but had taken to manufacturing other garment items 
that were slightly more difficult to manage. The size of their purchase orders had
18 347/348 - trousers/shorts; 335 - coats; 338/339 - men’s and women’s knit-shirts; 340/341 - 
shirts/blouses; 342 - skirts. Codes starting with ’3’ denote cotton, ‘6’ rayon and ‘8’ silk.
19 The increase in the number of machines is even more noteworthy when taking into consideration the 
fact that the garment factories had abandoned traditional Indian machines to buy and install new 
Japanese, German or Taiwanese machines during this time and that each of the latter cost ten times 
that o f the former.
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increased four-fold and their ‘churning,’ ‘making,’ or ‘lead’ time had significantly 
reduced. But even then, prices had gone down and profit margins were shrinking: while 
more than 60 per cent of their production fetched over USD 4 per piece before 
liberalisation, only 45 per cent managed to do so after.
The garment industry headed to a steep downfall in the early 2000s as it became clear 
that the MFA would not be extended beyond December 2004. Speculation about a 
possible renewal -  drawn from prior experiences of its easy renewals in 1981,1986 and 
1994 -  proved wrong; and with that the industry was doomed to fail. As the domestic 
political situation also deteriorated in Nepal, investors began to pull out of the industry 
very rapidly. In 2001, there were less than 35 factories working at normal capacity. In 
February 2004, when I (formally) concluded my fieldwork in the factories, more than 80 
per cent of the exports recorded in the GAN register came from only eight factories with 
just occasional business from twenty-five others. Morale hit rock bottom as Cotton 
Comforts Pvt Ltd, the factory that had won the ‘best performer’ award consecutively for 
three years since 2000, shut down its operations in October 2005. When I visited 
Kathmandu in late 2006, there were less than ten factories in operation.
3b. Liberalisation also leads to a global niche market of ethnic-contemporary 
designs
Mass manufacturing factories do not tell the whole story of the Nepalese garment 
industry; it is also necessary to turn to the story of the select factories producing for 
international niche markets. The niche producers are the enviable thula-badas (bigger 
and better ones) of the Nepalese garment world. A rough comparison of two of my case 
studies from each world (Rongoli (niche) and Arya-Nepal (mass)) reveals that the niche 
producers are smaller, slimmer and more cost-effective rivals to the mass producers. 
Rongoli had fixed assets worth only thirteen thousand US dollars which earned them a 
profit of over eight hundred thousand US dollars every year. In contrast, Arya-Nepal had 
over three hundred thousand dollars worth of fixed assets that earned them less than three 
hundred thousand dollars every year. Other figures are listed below.
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A comparison between mass manufacturers and niche producers
Indicators Niche producer Mass manufacturer
Total turnover (USD, in 000) 1,680 5,760
Output (no. o f pieces, in 000) 84 960
Gross profit (USD, in 000) 840 288
Retail price per unit (USD) 35-180 10-30
Avg. cost per unit in the factory (USD) 
(fabrics, accessories and labour costs) 10 2.70
Average size of order (no. o f pieces) 700 40,000
Method of payment Advance payment Letter of credit
Fixed assets of the factory (USD, in 000) 13 313
No. o f people working in the factory 152 750
Source: Fieldwork, December 2002- 03
What can be bluntly said about niche garment exporters is the following. First, niche 
producers are far and few between: there were only five in 2001, and from what my 
respondents told me, only seven in 1994, at a time when there were 1,087 mass 
manufacturers. Second, five of the niche producers produced ethnic-contemporary 
garments.20 And third, every time ethnic materials and symbols were incorporated into 
modem garment-making, which marked the very essence of niche garments from Nepal, 
this was only done by the ethnic experts of such skills. In other words, all of the niche 
producers tapped into their culturally inherited skills and identities to legitimise their 
claim over the niche they captured. For example, when original or improvised forms of 
Buddhist Newar ethnic elements were incorporated into modem garments, it was only 
Buddhist Newars who did it. The Marwaris worked from their insights into traditionally 
produced cloth from various parts of India. One Hindu Newar factory marketed modem 
clothing with only slight touches of tastefully decorated elements from common Newar 
traditions of cloth-weaving, knitting and colouring.
What can also be said unequivocally about niche producers is that the process through 
which they have come to be the kind of producers they are is the longest and most
20 The remaining two niche producers operated on a very small scale and one had shut down after a 
factory accident. They produced colourful and funky ‘crazy’ hats and costumes for Western parties.
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complex in the garment industry. The niche producers had produced or sold traditional 
cloth, clothes, accessories or symbolic arts, to a series of succeeding social elites that 
dominated various phases and turns of the economy long before the new world of the 
exportable garment industry arose.21 And the way they currently organise their 
production bears a strong resemblance to what and how their caste/ethnic groups were 
producing before economic modernisation.22 In other words, today’s niche product has 
come about through a process of negotiation and renegotiation through which it has 
gradually evolved to its present form -  the kinds of ethno-contemporary clothes in 
demand amongst a Western elite clientele living thousands of miles away from their own 
worlds. While the problem of what Spivak ((1988) in Ortner, 1999: 18)) calls 
‘subaltemism,’ or unequal distribution of voice and interpretation in dialogues between 
the dominant and the dominated, bars the niche producers from meaningfully influencing 
the world of global buyers and consumers, their own worlds are continually being 
reshaped by their resistance.
One important manifestation of niche producers’ resistance can be seen in the way they 
have used global consumer movements to air their own voice. Niche production is 
driven fundamentally by the growing influence of the fair trade movement and cultural 
connoisseurship among middle class consumers in the global market -  a process 
unfolding alongside, but independently of, the worldwide web of mainstream garment 
trade dictated by economies of scale. Western consumers’ perceptions of Nepal as the 
Himalayan Shangri-La or a mystic land of both Hindu and Buddhist spiritualities have 
contributed profoundly to creating the kinds of niches Nepali exporters are currently 
tapping into. The first pioneers of such connoisseur taste, both among the wholesale 
buyers and retail customers of these niche products, indeed have been those who had 
developed the taste for Nepali landscapes, hospitalities and values before even 
developing the taste for Nepali niche garments. These producers, entrepreneurs and 
consumers created and tapped into opportunities for business as soon as industrial 
policies became more liberal and transparent with political and economic liberalisation.
21 For example, both o f  my case studies, Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu, have at times sold to hippie 
tourists and the development expatriates in the 1970s and 1980s; some o f their tailors worked for the 
Rana elites during the Rana regime.
22 See Chapter 6 where I argue that what and how Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu currently produce for 
the niche garment market have elements o f similarity with the old markets o f Indrachok and Boudha 
where the Marwaris and Buddhist Newars traditionally functioned.
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One niche producer associated with Nepal is worth special mention, not only because the 
owners were the first to envisage such an enterprise but also because they did so without 
having recourse to the local culture in the way local people did subsequently. Shah 
Shafari, the first and only garment buying house to be established in Nepal was also the 
first and only foreign niche producer in Nepal. The Shah family had emigrated from 
Bombay to Kenya in the early 1900s, where the family sold textiles in Mombasa, a 
coastal city overlooking the Indian Ocean. In 1975, the two brothers -  Raj and Akhil 
Shah -  formed their apparel company and began experimenting with identifying trends 
through the use of Indian cultural fabrics and silhouettes. They sold Indian garments, for 
instance, at a time when the Beatles had gone to India to visit the Maharishi and Western 
people had begun embracing loose garments and Madras plaid shirts. The clothing, 
festooned with bold, bright screen-print graphics, quickly became synonymous with 
1980s fashion, giving Shah Safari, at one point, a 25 per cent market share on the 
American West Coast for young men’s woven tops. Owing to the increasing scale of 
their production, however, Shah Safari closed its buying house in Nepal in 1988, and 
moved to the more rigorous production worlds of Lucknow and Ahmadabad in India.
Although most of the Nepali entrepreneurs aspired to design their own garments in the 
way Shah Safari did, and although this looked feasible to many Bahun-Chhetri garment- 
makers who knew (by then) as much about both garment-making and Hindu asceticism 
as the Shah brothers did, none could actually manage it. The majority of them 
experimented to a certain degree by creating garment designs that were ‘like’ Shah Safari 
garments, but this simply did not work because they were in no position to attract the 
Shahs’ original buyers spread through the large cities on the American West Coast. 
Worse still, a number of Indian garment-makers had already begun to expand their reach 
among the potential niche markets in various parts of the United States. The Nepali 
entrepreneurs faced a dead end in imitation production. Some of them chose instead to 
manufacture for the local market. India offered duty-free status to ‘luxury’ goods Nepal 
imported from a third country for domestic non-industrial consumption. Taking 
advantage of this policy loophole, some Nepali entrepreneurs imported high quality 
textiles from East Asia and designed teenage garments with fake Japanese and 
Singaporean labels to sell within the local market.
Other entrepreneurs developed business deals with Japanese garment importers who 
were interested in cottage-woven cotton fabrics in Nepal. There was a demand in the 
Japanese market for what they called kozak monto, a loose and hooded outfit made out of
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plain and coarse natural cotton. This engaged several Nepali garment-makers who were 
more interested in manufacturing (labour) time-consuming garments for high prices 
rather than competing in the market for cheap garments. The newly established Garment 
Association of Nepal (GAN) collaborated with the Rotary Club in Kathmandu to 
organise study tours for Nepali garment entrepreneurs to visit distributors’ outlets in 
major cities in Japan. Unlike many donor-driven study tours facilitated by the 
government bureaucrats which resulted in no tangible outcome, participants in the GAN- 
managed study tours did successfully develop business deals with the Japanese 
importers. However, these opportunities were soon captured by the business elites who 
also controlled the key official positions within GAN.
I summarise the previous paragraphs before I move to my next point on the 
comparability of niche producers with mass producers. In short, those that emerged as 
successful and established niche producers over the course of decades were those who 
explored new methods of bettering garment designs through the use of improvised 
traditional ethnic textiles, designs, colour combinations and silhouettes that would satisfy 
the followers of modem global fashion. These manufacturers almost always used their 
ethnic cultural capital to distinguish their designs from both local and global garments. 
They also almost always worked with one or few buyers, who in turn had chosen them 
carefully on the basis of their knowledge and interest in specific ethnic identities within a 
broader ‘Nepali’ identity, and their business relationships were developed over the 
course of decades. This rare group within the garment industry later metamorphosed into 
a guild of modem and sophisticated garment designers (see Chapters 5 and 6 for detailed 
case studies of two different kinds of niche manufacturing).
Can we really compare mass manufacturers with niche producers? The key question in 
the comparison of these two within a study of cultural differences in business 
entrepreneurship has to do with an underlying dilemma about whether and in what way 
niche manufacturers are present in the world of mass manufacturing, and vice versa. I 
will answer this question in two parts: the first concerns the breaking down of the 
‘material’ barriers between the two. The fact is that the opportunities and threats 
prevalent in mass manufacturing are also applicable to niche producers of readymade 
garments, because they both operate under a common policy and market perimeters. As 
the forces of liberalisation increasingly integrate their shop floors and markets, the 
material barriers between the two -  be it the distribution of local and global policy
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privileges, the bureaucracies of factory registration and MFA-quota administration, or 
the interface with suppliers, service providers, business and labour associations -  are 
virtually no more.
The second part involves ‘subjective’ barriers among the business entrepreneurs which 
were on the rise as concerns increased over the MFA crisis. The more desperate the 
mass manufacturers became to develop an exit strategy from the MFA-dependent sub 
sector of garment manufacturing, the more determined the niche producers became in 
guarding the secrets of their skills, knowledge and networks. For example, the niche 
producers barred the mass manufacturers from having physical access to the factory 
floors of niche production even whilst maintaining close friendships and collegial 
relationships. The fundamental separation of the conceptual worlds of differing castes 
and ethnicities and dismal progress in their subjective convergence even after their 
material worlds had converged, ensured that the traditional knowledge and skills of niche 
production remained fragmented among the caste/ethnic specialists. Yet, the mass 
producers have made strong efforts on the ground, and their collective aspiration has 
increased due to the local and global crises that have lately come to threaten their world. 
One of my respondents, Sameer- the production manager in Arya-Nepal -  is a testament 
to the mass producers’ aspirations and efforts to subjectivise the material convergence 
between the two sub sectors. In the meantime, the immediate fruitlessness of his 
personal struggles is also a statement about the deeper virtual chasms that continue to 
remain between them.
A late teenager from a priestly Bahun-Chhetri caste, Sameer entered the garment world 
as an apprentice in his father’s factory Arya-Nepal 1 in the 1980s, which later merged 
with a neighbouring factory to form Arya-Nepal2 in 1992. In his own words, he hardly 
had a ‘normal youth’ because he was already too busy carrying out factory chores at an 
age when his peers were ‘fooling around and having fun’. When the Nepal-India transit 
disputes created a shortage of petrol in Kathmandu for months, Sameer was busy 
queuing up for petrol and transporting the barrels on his bicycle to the machines of the 
then respected juwadi thekedars. When the government delegated the MFA quota 
administration to the GAN, he was the ‘face’ for Arya-Nepal2, managing all the 
paperwork and keeping everyone at GAN happy. When Arya-Nepal2 closed down in 
1999, he experimented with other jobs in the garment industry including day-jobbing for 
a Korean buying agent negotiating with the Nepali mass producers, but nothing led him
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to the world of niche production. As Arya-NepaB also began to develop worrying 
symptoms after 2002, he and Navin -  his CEO, did as much chakari (appeasing) as they 
could of the owners of Rongoli whom they knew well enough to spend several evenings 
together in a row just ‘talking about life and the world’. Not only was a business alliance 
not on offer from the Rongoli owners, but they were never even invited to the Rongoli 
factory floor. When Arya-NepaB did eventually close down in 2003, Sameer took a 
one-year diploma with a reputed textile and fashion designing institute, only to resign 
after obtaining the degree saying that, ‘...fashion designing for the local market is like 
going four hundred years backward. Today, both us (East) and them (West) buy clothes 
from each other, or at least, buy clothes that are supposed to be from each other.23 The 
only clothes locals buy locally are the traditional clothes that are those sold in (the old 
cloth market of) Indrachok, and only married women wear them. Ok, if you are lucky, 
some tourists might venture in for some souvenirs to take back home, but that is not 
enough business for a serious entrepreneur.’ The rest of the clothes consumed by urban 
elites and middle-class families are increasingly imported from East Asia and elsewhere. 
In the end, Sameer left the garment world altogether to start a tour operating company for 
backpackers where he is doing well so far (see Chapter 4 on Arya-Nepal for detailed 
contextualising of this narrative).
4. A counter-order emerges as the Maoists play the ethnicity card
The seeds for the Maoist movement were sown in the ‘third plenum’ held by Prachanda’s 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in March 1995 which foreswore the general 
elections and decided to take up arms (Thapa and Sijapati, 2004:36). They launched the 
People’s War on February 12,1996, with simultaneous attacks on police stations in the 
far western districts of Rolpa, Rukum and Sindhuli and on an agricultural bank and the 
Action Aid office in Gorkha. The Nepali Maoists had long observed ethnic differences 
and factored these into their strategic calculations, in a manner not very different from 
the Indian Naxalites’ attempts to establish bases in tribal areas. It was no coincidence 
that the Maoists made the Kham Magar regions of Rolpa and Rukum districts their base 
area. These areas had been under leftist influence from the 1950s onwards and the 
village of Thabang was already known as a communist stronghold in the Panchayat days. 
It was also shown in the number of media interviews Chairman Prachanda gave where he
23 His reference was to the fact that a lot o f Western brands sold cheaply in Kathmandu were not 
manufactured by Westerners but were fakes made in East Asian or South Asian factories.
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emphasised the expertise and commitment of the Nepali ‘Mongolian’ and ‘Chinese- 
looking’ ethnic groups in warfare and communism.
After their second national Maoist convention in February 2001, the Maoists adopted a 
new doctrine, the ‘Prachanda path,’ a combination of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism which 
advocated a dual strategy of simultaneous armed conflict and urban mass uprising. One 
of the slogans of the Second Convention was, ‘let us consolidate and expand our base 
areas and move forwards towards a people’s government in the centre’. The urban 
uprising was to be spearheaded by frontal organisations of students, women, farmers and 
factory labourers against the ‘feudal’ and ‘imperial’ elements of the status quo. The shift 
o f the Maoist attention from the periphery to the centre brought the urban industrial 
workers to Maoist attention. Malleable as they were, the Maoists successfully 
proselytised the workers in the garment, carpet and hotel industries towards a new labour 
unionism which left these industries non-functional (see Chapter 9 for details on the 
Maoist problem in the garment industry and the businessmen’s negotiation tactics). The 
internal factions emerging within the ruling Nepali Congress only exacerbated the 
situation. For example, GP Koirala had ousted KP Bhatterai from the government in 
March 2000, accusing him of failing to maintain law and order. His own proposal to set 
up a paramilitary force for national security and appoint regional administrators to quell 
the insurgency had been disapproved both by King Birendra and the parliament. In April 
2001, the Maoists gunned down over 70 policemen in what was one of the deadliest 
attacks, and the police chief formally admitted he could fight the Maoists no longer. 
Soon after, the Royal massacre happened on 1 June 2001 and the Maoists stepped up 
their attack simultaneously in several districts. Failing to mobilise the army, Koirala 
resigned to give way to Sher Bahadur Deuba. Prime Minister Deuba brokered a truce 
with the Maoists between July to November 2001, during which three rounds of peace 
talks were held, though all inconclusively.
In addition, the sporadic but momentous ethnic movements like that of the Terai put even 
more pressure on the State to no longer ignore the institutions of caste, ethnicity and 
regionalism. As seen during the recent Terai movement, the protestors openly dismissed 
the authority of not only the State police and senior political leaders such as GP Koirala, 
but the Maoists’ supreme command itself. Instead, a new political party, Madheshi 
Janadhikar Forum, quickly rose to fill the vacuum created by public desertion of the 
mainstream political parties and the Maoists. Such paradoxical developments
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emphatically nullified the Maoists’ capture of the ethnicity card at least in the Terai 
region. All these form a preliminary basis for research on the local dynamics of the 
Maoist order and an emerging counter-order which is increasingly being defined by their 
reintroduction of the old institution of caste and ethnicity in a modem global order. This 
is particularly so because the Communist and Maoist movements are globally noted for 
their opposition to ‘culture’ including caste/ethnicity-based institutions. It has to be said 
that determining what has already changed and what is emerging about the current epoch 
of ‘Maoism’ and ‘counter-Maoism,’ and what marks the pluralism of economic and 
cultural order that prevails at this time of historic transition in Nepal, is decidedly tricky.
4a. Caste and ethnic composition in the garment industry
So far, I have shown the strong interconnections in Nepal between economic, political 
and cultural histories. I have referred to the caste and ethnic implications of the grand 
shift of the readymade garment industry from India to Nepal and I have shown varied 
State preferences for different castes and ethnicities in Nepal throughout the medieval 
and modem politico-economies. Related to this, I have also discussed the two distinct 
sub sectors within the world of garment manufacturing, which use different sets of 
cultural capital and hence allow prevalence of different caste and ethnic groups across 
them. I have also flagged that emerging in Nepal is a sort of ‘counter-order’ where the 
old baggage of caste and ethnicity is being brought to the forefront by the new political 
forces that are the Maoists. The following chapters will demonstrate how business 
entrepreneurs from differing castes and ethnicities have coped differently with these new 
developments. But here I offer a broader description of the caste/ethnic composition of 
the garment industry.
I have already discussed the Panchayat State-building which favoured the Bahun- 
Chhetris and the Marwaris over the Newars in the allocation of State subsidies for newly 
emerging entrepreneurial opportunities. I have also discussed Shah Safari’s mentorship 
of the first generation garment-makers in Nepal, which again were largely Bahun- 
Chhetris. Owing largely to these two reasons, most of the mass manufacturers of the 
readymade garments are still the new entrepreneurs or Bahun-Chhetris.
A disproportionate number of readymade garment factories were owned by the Bahun- 
Chhetris, Marwaris and other Hindu castes. There were few Buddhists, Muslims, 
Christians or Janajatis operating garment factories. This had important implications for
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the way business partnerships worked in this industry. I looked at the castes and 
ethnicities of business ownership among 93 garment manufacturing firms, among which 
49 factories were business partnership firms. Sixteen of these had closed by March 
2004. Among the 33 that were still operating, the business partnership was almost 
always between the Bahun-Chhetris from India and Nepal. Only one of the 33 factories 
that I surveyed was a business partnership between a Newar Buddhist and a Hindu of 
Indian origin, while thirty were partnerships between the Hindus. Within this, fourteen 
of the business partnerships were between Nepali Hill Hindus; eleven were between 
Nepali Hindus of Indian origin; and five were between the Nepali Hill Hindus and 
Hindus o f Indian origin.24 The business registration records of GAN and my informal 
interviews with its key officials, as well as other specialists in the garment industry 
confirmed that hardly any non-Hindu Indian garment industrialists had moved to Nepal 
over the past three decades.
Within the bigger world of garment-making, I have discussed the motivations, 
conceptualisations and valuations of the niche producers stating a range of cases and 
examples. The bottom line is that all of the niche producers are old business elites and 
they all exploit their cultural capital in producing niche products. But, what we also need 
is the counterfactual, that is, do old business elites behave differently from their new 
business elite counterparts if they are operating in the same sub sector? As the figures 
above reaffirm, there are very few old indigenous business elites who operate as mass 
manufacturers. However, the rare cases that do exist show that old business elites act 
more or less the same as new business elites when they operate in mass manufacturing. 
For example, like their Bahun-Chhetri counterparts, two mass garment producers I knew 
from the Newar ethnicity relied on the Indian Tullu machines until the Japanese Juki 
machines came on board; they relied on the juwadi system until the industry was 
compelled to adapt to the chain system after global integration. There were, nonetheless, 
a few differences that I could note. First, the Newars appeared less comfortable in their 
dealings with buyers, especially if the buyers were Indian, which was almost always the 
case. To remedy this, both of the Newar factories eventually turned themselves into 
local subcontractors of a larger business house Cotton Comforts Pvt. Ltd.25 Second,
24 Since this was based on secondary data, religions are assigned as per surnames and with only 
cursory background checks with acquaintance. I could not ascertain religions o f  two o f  the factory 
owners.
25 Unlike other mass manufacturers who relied on opportunistic transactions with random global 
buyers and local subcontractors for a race to the bottom, Cotton Comforts maintained a steady 
business relationship not only with their sole buyer Gap Inc. but also with their local subcontractors.
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unlike several others who did not want to deviate from staple production, both the Newar 
factories undertook experiments to differentiate themselves from others. For example, 
one of the Newar manufacturers in question once set up a women-only factory plant 
following success stories from the Bangladeshi garment industry, though unfortunately it 
could not be sustained for too long because of the problem of high absenteeism. The 
other took the opportunity to do one order from a Japanese buyer for designing clothes 
out of Nepalese hand-woven cotton fabrics. Although the owner was enthusiastic about 
the prospects of this deal, he never received a repeat order.
There was a third (Hindu) Newar-owned garment industry, which had entered into 
garment manufacturing through a different path. He had been manufacturing jeans wear, 
t-shirts and other western clothes using imported textiles from East Asia which he would 
sell under fake Japanese and American brands in local Kathmandu retail stores. As the 
State allocated duty-related subsidies for the export sector and as the global garment 
buyers poured into Nepal in the 1980s, this Newar garment factory gradually migrated to 
mainstream mass manufacturing for exports, abandoning their local market clientele. 
Their products, markets and operations now differed little from the rest of the mass 
manufacturers who sold to American and European distributors.
5. A summary
In this section, I have offered a progress report on modernisation in Nepal, some thirty 
years on from Andres Hofer’s (1979) translation of Nepal’s muluki ain (penal code), 
against the strictly caste-based legal system that had dominated Nepal’s society and 
economy for the preceding five centuries. The second and third points of comparison are 
the two popular political uprisings, which, first confined the monarchy into a 
constitutional monarchy, and eventually, led all political forces in the country towards a 
dialogue on republicanism. While the multi-party parliamentarian system liberalised 
caste- and ethnicity-based organisations from political suppression, I argue that the 
Maoists finally brought back the ‘old’ baggage of caste and ethnicity to the forefront of 
modem State-building. I explore cultural and political embeddedness within a broader 
social organisation, which in turn, has deep implications for the dispositions of social 
groups within the country’s entrepreneurial order. It has to be said that determining what 
has changed and what is emerging in terms of the economic, cultural and political order 
at this time of historic transition in Nepal, is extremely complicated.
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The contrast between the political, cultural and economic systems Nepal embraced under 
the Panchayat regime and the multi-party democracy jointly provide a benchmark against 
which one can assess the brewing changes that lie in the emergence of a new Maoist 
order. Although the Maoists have declared that Nepal needs a ‘caste struggle’ in addition 
to a class struggle, they have also insisted that Nepal’s ‘culture’ can be a firm basis for 
economic and State restructuring. An ethnic pattern can already be identified within 
their urban organisations that deal both with the capitalists as well as the proletariat. 
These are expected to become increasingly formalised as the Maoists enter parliament 
and join the election for the constituent assembly that will officially spell out a new State 
order.
Embedded into the grand political, cultural and economic history is a series of micro 
developments occurring on the garment factory floors. This is the second theme running 
alongside the main one of politics and culture in this chapter. Unlike most of the 
conventional industries which would follow a natural pace of growth, the emergence of 
the ready-made garment industry in Nepal was rather abrupt and turbulent. I have shown 
that the formal economy of the factories was shaped not only from happenings within the 
national boundaries but those that originated thousands of miles away and were far 
beyond its control. American trade policies and the political economy surrounding them 
contributed to both origination and termination of the garment factories in Nepal. In fact, 
without the carefully engineered MFA quotas, Nepal had no comparative advantage in 
mass manufacturing readymade garments as was signified by the fact that there was no 
garment industry in Nepal prior to the MFA. The industry owed a lot not only to the 
governmental institutions, but also to grassroots-level institutions such as the GAN and 
the labour unions -  a discussion I will pursue in Chapter 9. Finally, the developments on 
the factory floors -  be it a rapid transformation from the juwadi system to a modem 
chain system, or the rapid migration from old to new machinery -  were not outcomes 
only of linear policy changes but were often driven by a complex mix of local and global 
politics with distinct winners and losers.
The unique effect of economic liberalisation, which is closely associated with the hard 
politics of multi-party democracy, however, cannot be dismissed in the readymade 
garment industry. In fact, most of the radical changes in factory turnover, production 
function and industrial organisation occurred as a direct result of added transparency in 
business registration procedures, embrace of market deregulation and removal of trade
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barriers. The early liberalisation widened the market and its scope which then led to cut 
throat competition that shrank profit margins and instigated a ruthless cycle of merger 
and acquisition. The material sophistication seen in terms of technology and 
organisational upgrade is an outcome of this process. The late liberalisation, which 
stands on the shoulders of early liberalisation, is marked by the dominance of niche 
producers over mass producers, which is a paradox but not counter logical.
I have highlighted the redistributive effects of the interweaving of economic, social and 
political processes that marked economic liberalisation and the subsequent growth of the 
garment industry. In fact, as the industry expanded and mechanised, the intersections of 
social and political effects emerged gradually. Especially among the niche producers, 
such effects were seen in the deeper intertwining of caste- ethnicity-derived cultural 
capital with the economic rationale on factory floors. The lucrative economic outcomes 
achieved by the niche producers had as much to do with capitalisation of their cultural 
knowledge and social networks, as with their overall managerial superiority.
The transformations in the modem garment industry as well as the consequential social 
changes among the new and old business entrepreneurs does not simply mean that local 
cultures are working for or against the garment economics. Nor does it mean that 
economic modernisation is working for or against the local cultures. In fact, one missing 
piece in the equation is the politics which formed the platform for both the rise of the 
garment industry and the demise that followed. The economics that evolved throughout 
reinforces the neoclassical ideas o f ‘scarcity and hence competition,’ but falsifies both 
neoclassical claims of instrumental rationality and orientalist claims of exclusive cultural 
supremacy. Beyond all these, what is far more important is the overall process of 
substantial institutional change that simultaneously connected economics with culture, 
culture with politics, and politics with economics; and in that process, altered the original 
institutional framework. Not only did the caste/ethnicity-based power constellation form 
the basis for medieval (explicitly) and modem (implicitly) State institutions and alter the 
institutional framework that formed the platform for modem economic development, but 
this conundrum eventually gave rise to a counter-order not only embodied in the grand 
politics of Maoist insurgency but also in the micro politics of factory floors. The 
economics has, time and again, coped with the given sets of institutions which are neither 
wholly optimal nor suboptimal, but a ‘mixed bag’ (North, 1990b: 9). In this process, the 
norms of economic rationality have also influenced the existing institutional frameworks
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of the time, only less deterministically than originally claimed by neoclassical 
economics.
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Chapter 3: A theoretical framework
Inspired by the Weberian thesis on the Protestant ethic (1958) and Parson’s notion of 
cultural configuration (1951), a considerable literature on the links between culture and 
economic function, both under the formalist and substantivist schools of thought has 
grown up. It has been well established that actors do not behave as lonely agents outside 
a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to ‘a script written for them by the 
particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy’ (Granovetter, 
1985: 487). They interpret the world through their ‘mental models’ -  or their 
accumulated knowledge, preferences and networks -  which are in part culturally derived 
and are partly acquired through the history of their experiences (North, 1990b: 18). For 
these reasons, contrary to the neoclassical assumptions, it is perfectly possible for 
individuals to have diverse views on ‘utility’ and ‘profits’. North (2005: 83) goes on to 
claim that what is seen as ‘utility’ or ‘profit’ is subject to the rational and non-rational 
constructs of economic ethnics, values, superstitions, and prejudices. His conclusion is 
that it is necessary to understand the history of a society before envisaging what types of 
economic actions might or might not take place there in future.
On what has been considered a middle ground between the ‘over-’ and ‘under­
socialised’26 schools of thought on the connection between societal and economic 
institutions. Granovetter (1985) argues persuasively that agents’ economic actions are 
embedded in concrete ongoing systems of social relations that are constructed and 
reconstructed during the flow of economic interactions. This view is reflected in the 
literature on institutions, including both the transactions-costs approach of Williamson 
(1981a) and the studies of industrial organisation such as those of Clegg and his 
colleagues (1990a). But questions remain on the significance of cultural factors in the 
economy. ‘Culture’ has long been a polysemic term in the social sciences. This chapter 
will attempt to problematise culture as a form of symbolic capital in a study of the 
interactions between economic and social institutions. The first section of this chapter 
will review literature under both new and old theories of institutions; Section 2 will place 
‘trust’ in the institutional discourse; Section 3 will extend the two preceding themes into 
discussion of variation in industrial organisation; and Sections 4 and 5 will propose that
26 Granovetter (1985) refers to Dennis Wrong (1961 ) ’s complaint about the ‘over-socialised’ concept 
that people are overwhelmingly sensitive to the systems o f social norms and values which is in 
contrast to the concept that actions and decisions are carried out in a narrow utilitarian pursuit o f self- 
interest which Granovetter describes as the ‘under-socialised’ view o f the person.
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Bourdieu’s theory on cultural capital could be a new dimension in the study of 
institutions within economic anthropology. This last statement is also the original 
contribution this thesis intends to make.
1. Is the ‘new’ institutional theory a premature departure from the ‘old’ 
institutional theory?
Largely rooted in the North American tradition associated with the work of Thorstein 
Veblen and John R. Commons amongst others, the study of institutions sought to 
analyse societal and organisational constraints on, or reactions to, economic changes and 
innovations. This literature has recently received a new infusion in what has come to be 
known as New Institutional Economics (NIE). The starting point of both old and new 
institutional theories is that the neoclassical assumptions o f‘full information among the 
economic entities in the market’ and of ‘zero transactions costs,’ which are said 
collectively to lead to a scenario of perfect competition and thus a Walrasian general 
equilibrium, are both nonexistent (Coase, 1937). By attempting to incorporate the 
concepts of public/rational choice to establish the reasons for the existence of hierarchies 
within markets, early institutionalists such as Coase thus solved some longstanding 
puzzles within the neoclassical theory.
One neoclassical puzzle was that of the existence of the firm. If the series of economic 
transactions inevitably leads to a ‘general equilibrium,’ why do the economic entities 
involved not function individually? What makes them choose to collectivise themselves 
under the administrative and financial structures of corporate firms? Coase (1937) 
brought in the notion of transactions costs to solve this. When there are zero transactions 
costs, the efficient competitive solution of neoclassical economics is obtained because 
the competitive market structure leads the parties to an equilibrium where aggregate 
income is at its maximum regardless of the initial institutional arrangements. Coase, 
however, put forward the proposition that transactions are not always costless in the real 
world. They are the economic equivalent o f‘friction’ in physical systems (Arrow, 1969: 
48 in Williamson, 1986:176). There are costs of using the price mechanism, which 
include the costs of obtaining transaction-relevant information, costs of negotiation and 
of concluding a separate contract, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing the contract 
ex post. When transactions costs rise, and possibilities of minimising them are absent, 
corporate institutions such as firms come into being.
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The idea of transactions costs has come to be problematised not only in economics and 
sociology but also in legal studies. Neoclassical law had envisaged arbitration (as 
opposed to litigation)’ as a key factor in explaining increasing contractual duration and 
complexities (Macneil in Williamson, 1986: 104). New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
linked this legal problematisation to the institutional discourse by assigning transactions 
costs to governance structures (which are the institutional frameworks within which the 
integrity of a contractual relation is decided). The framework of transactions costs, 
notably Williamson’s (1986: 104 and 177), showed the extent to which actors engage in 
to ‘relational contracting’ in their attempts to correct problems of bounded rationality 
(which precludes comprehensive planning), opportunism (which limits promise) and 
asset specificity (which limits the efficacy of competition).27
North (1990b) builds on the Coasean theorem on the institutional implications of 
transactions costs and extends it to challenge the second neoclassical assumption of 
‘instrumental rationality’. Contrary to the assumptions of rational-maximising self- 
seeking behaviour on which the neoclassical theory is grounded, North (1990b: 35) 
postulates that individuals possess mental models in which terms they interpret the world 
around them. Such mental frameworks that shape human interaction are culturally 
derived and are acquired through local experience and therefore vary widely across 
environments. North (1990b: Chapters 5,6 and 7) says that mental models are made up 
of formal rules (statute law and common law regulations), informal constraints 
(conventions, norms of behaviour and self-regulations), and the effectiveness of their 
enforcement. Collectively, these give rise to the rules of the game, or the subjective 
motivations and deciphering of surroundings, which North equates to institutions. 
‘Organisations’ are their complements, and include the players or groups of individuals 
bound by a common purpose to achieve objectives that are political, economic, social 
and educational in nature. Culturally derived mental models (or institutions) and the 
organisations derived from those, then, do not settle down to reach one general 
equilibrium as Walras had earlier claimed, but can aim for, give rise to and sustain, 
multiple equilibria.
27 Williamson’s criticism of the neoclassical economists (one he specifically mentions is Baumol’s 
1982 contestability theory) has been on the grounds that they undermined asset-specificity and 
assumed that hit-and-run entry can indefinitely prevail, hence precluding any form of long-term 
rationality. The NIE transactions costs economics, by contrast, gives higher priority to the condition 
o f asset-specificity suggesting that hit-and-run entry is often infeasible.
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NIE successfully refutes the neoclassical claims that there is universality about economic 
development, from which economies are incapable of deviating. The strength of the NIE 
school of thought lies in its analysis of the micro foundations of economies and the 
dynamics of institutions. Its weakness however lies in its lopsided emphasis on the 
present anatomy of institutions, often at the cost of their past.28 Further, an extension of 
the NIE studies actually goes on to introduce the ‘institution’ variable, not only 
qualitatively but also quantitatively, so as to permit mathematical analysis. This 
extension has been criticised as being too ‘static’ to be able to do justice to the intricate 
interdependencies among different institutions that it brings to the table (Stein, 1995).29 
To summarise, first, institutions are less instrumental than NIE scholars (especially its 
late-joining members) imagine in that informal institutions do not always leave a clear 
imprint on the formal institutions to be measured accurately. Second, adding 
‘institutions’ as a stand-alone, add-on parameter is trivial at best and misleading at worst. 
Third, institutional studies desperately call for longitudinal studies, and this is an aspect 
to which NIE has not been able to do justice. To say that we must bring history back into 
the explanation is but the first step. ‘History’ is just another portmanteau concept which 
has to be unpacked, to make clear whether one is appealing to pure contingency, class 
power, or culturally formed expectations (Toye, 1995: 66). ‘Empty’ as a grand theory of 
socio-economic development, as Toye puts it, NIE’s departure from the old theory of 
institutions is, then, a rather premature one.
Harriss (2002b) has made a case for a return from NIE to old institutional economics or 
OIE, on two important parameters of the historical specificity, of: (i) politics, and (ii) 
culture. On politics, as Mushtaq Khan (1995: 71) showed us, failures of both the 
structure and transformation of institutions are indeed specific to their political histories. 
Khan might have been overly cautious in stating that recognising political differences 
might actually require abandoning the NIE approach altogether, but NIE’s limitations do 
require, as Bates (1995) also said, analyses to be embedded within the study of politics. 
Two case studies on economic institutions -  a ‘grand’ socio-economic analysis of 
structural adjustment in Africa (Stein, 1995) and a ‘micro’ study of coffee trade in Brazil
28 Harriss (2002b: 12) notes that even for the analysis o f micro-foundation o f economics, the 
perspectives o f  NIE essentially complement insights derived from other approaches; they do not 
constitute a comprehensive, new framework.
29 The distinction between the NIE and OIE are, however, not determinate: In fact, some o f the 
institutionalists, including Douglass North amongst others, co-habit in both new and old institutional 
studies.
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(Greenhill, 1995) -  both signal the importance of in-depth historical analyses of the 
political context in understanding the institutions under examination. Detailed accounts 
of institutions given in both these case studies are comparable with Harriss’ conclusions 
from his comparative research on the political regimes of Indian states (2002b), which 
shows that both the rampant failures as well as the emerging islands of success in the 
Hindi heartland of North India can only be explained through an historical analysis of 
politics and society. There is a strong basis on which to argue that static understandings 
of institutional structures and undertakings are inadequate.
The NIE is further limited as it sets out to problematise that polysemic term -  ‘culture’. 
To borrow from Harriss (2002b: 8), culture is ‘the (historically specific) habits of thought 
and behaviour of a particular group of people,’ or ‘the ideas, values and symbols -  more 
generally, “meanings”-  in terms of which a particular group of people act’. NIE’s 
engagement with the problem of culture is no different from its engagement with the 
problem of politics, that it is exogenous to NIE: Culture is treated as ‘a residual in 
explanations for social change, or the lack of it, to account for what appears to be 
“irrational” (Harriss, 2002b: 9)’. In doing so, NIE misses out on the linkages of formal 
institutions such as legal rules and contracts with the informal institutions of motivations 
and deciphering of surroundings, which are necessarily embedded in deep, informal 
social strata.
At least on the two counts discussed above, the argument for return to the OIE approach 
in the analysis of economic change is well supported. The third count, only briefly to be 
mentioned here is that, contrary to the cautions expressed by North, later NIE studies are 
increasingly formalist and they have been excessively devoted to rational choice 
modelling. Even when the institutional accounts given in a number of NIE case studies 
actually show that institutions can be anything but economically efficient, the accounts of 
economic inefficiencies have gone under-reported in their conclusions (Clarence-Smith, 
1995,30 and Greenhill, 199531). Such an over-emphasis on rationality has also translated
30 For example, Clarence-Smith (1995: 171) concludes that the global demise o f  cocoa estates after 
1918 was a reminder that markets can effectively erode obstacles created by institutions and 
organisations. But this is not entirely substantiated, given the fact that the large-scale institutions were 
forced on to Asian and African colonies as ‘progress to benighted peoples’ even though there was 
plenty o f evidence that smallholders were as competitive on the costs o f labour, capital and quality (p. 
162).
31 Greenhill (1995: 197) quotes North in his conclusion that ‘institutions are set up to be efficient by 
reducing uncertainty in human exchange,’ but his account o f valorisation (1995: 194) highlights that 
the costs o f  valorisation were enormous, forcing the federal authorities to raise huge loans in New
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to an exaggerated focus on formal institutions, including those of property rights and 
legal measures, sometimes at the cost of the informal institutions that reflect what is 
‘local’ (Haber, 2000). In this intellectual path selection, the early proponents of 
institutional studies either retain only marginal ownership of the development of NIE, or 
disown it altogether. For example, Douglass North (1995) falls neatly into neither old 
nor new schools but dwells in a constant tension between NIE formalism and awareness 
of its limitations, to cope with which, he borrows heavily from the old economic 
historiography. His new volume (2005) is a clear departure from NIE where he argues 
that markets, economic systems and political systems are all human-devised creations 
whose functioning is neither fully automatic nor objectively rational. For North, 
economic changes are deeply underpinned by broader and more complex attitudinal 
changes, which are incremental, path-specific and bear the constraints of the historical 
past.
In truly emancipating the institutional theory from neoclassical boundaries which are 
either narrow or irrelevant for the study of institutions, the criticism of OIE as being ‘too 
descriptive’ (Toye, 1995: 66) actually becomes residual in the strength of the substances 
it engages with. This last point, that there is a strong case for re-approaching OIE in the 
face of NIE’s inadequacies, leads me to a discussion on various interlinkages between 
social configuration and economic exchanges. One important link between these two 
worlds is that of trust, which has been well explored by the scholars of various social 
science disciplines (Moore, 1997).
2. Trust
Is trust the missing factor that establishes the link between societies and economies, and 
does it explain why some societies progress more rapidly than others? Economic 
theorists acknowledge it as a transaction-cost-minimiser and a lubricant of economic 
activities (Arrow, 1974 in Bradach and Eccles, 1989: 282); institutionalists find in it a 
substantiation of the argument about the embeddedness of economic behaviour in social 
relations (Granovetter, 1985 and Platteau, 1994); and anthropologists invoke it to explain 
the role of culture in economic history (Hart, 1988; Parry et al, 1999). Francis 
Fukuyama’s (1995) recent volume, though not strictly academic, helps renew the 
emphasis on trust as the cultural characteristic explaining a nation’s well-being, as well
York and Europe, its effect on world coffee supplies were even worse, and that it did not solve the 
problem o f foreign participation in Brazil’s coffee trade.
54
as its ability to compete. Although much of the literature presents trust in terms of norms 
that are shared by all actors, what it describes has more to do with the overlaps in self- 
interest of the actors engaged, which in turn, are often characterised by inequalities of 
power (Sayer, 2001). The analysis of the bases and functions of trust is what I intend to 
focus on in the subsequent paragraphs where I discuss how the definition of trust has 
been significantly refined over the past two decades.
Gambetta (1993) and Zucker (1986) played key roles in defining the bases and functions 
of trust. There is a tendency to confuse trust with generic coping mechanisms that 
compensate for uncertainty and lack of information. Gambetta clarifies that trust is not 
about speculating how the market might or might not behave in future, but it is the act of 
believing that when offered the chance, a partner to a transaction is unlikely to behave in 
a way that is damaging to the other. This definition of trust has to do with risk 
negotiations (Hart, 1988) as well as incentives and reinforcing mechanisms (Moore, 
1999). Zucker (1986) conceptualises that trust can be based on, and thus finds its sources 
in: (i) processes -  ‘past or expected exchange such as in reputation or gift-exchange,’ (ii) 
characteristics -  ‘personality, family background or ethnicity,’ and (iii) institutions — 
‘formal societal or economic structures’. This concept benefits methodologically from 
two further distinctions added by Moore (1999). Trust could well be derived either from 
the specific (i.e. relying on a specific third-party experience of the other) or generic (i.e. 
reputational) ‘character assessment’ or from the ‘incentive assessment’ based on positive 
and negative incentives in the act of trusting. These incentives sometimes include formal 
institutionalised sanctions such as laws and regulations as well as informal sanctions 
such as private arbitration. They also include various forms of social mediation as well 
as the use of Mafia as mutually agreed enforcement agents. Other incentives include the 
interdependence of activities such that individual actors are dependent on each other for 
pursuit of a common self-interest. Yet other incentives might involve reputational 
jeopardy, direct retaliation or non-cooperation.
The ‘trust’ debate is not so much about its definition and origin as about its reproduction, 
and the frontiers here are fast-moving. There is no case for arguing that all character- 
and process-based trust are good for business, nor for inferring that they need to be 
dismantled for efficiency and development. The formalist proposition that economic 
systems are transformed through replacement of character-based trust by a ‘proliferation 
of formal production of (institutions-based or generalised) trust’ (Zucker, 1986: 100;
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Hirschman, 1982; Haddad, 2003) has been challenged mainly on three fronts. The 
institutionalists argue that character- and process-based trust could be as efficient 
lubricants of economic exchange as institution-based trust (Arrow, 1951). The trust 
theorists also emphasise that trust is not something that prevails uniformly across the 
whole society as formalists tended to believe, but that it is context-specific (Moore, 1999; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996).32 A wide range of ethnographic accounts as well as 
broader social science studies make the case for eclecticism in any analysis of the way 
trust affects capitalism. Moore goes on to emphasise that trust could either be character- 
specific or incentive-derived, depending on: (i) the relative strengths of formal and 
informal institutions in societies, and (ii) the economic opportunities and challenges that 
the societies are exposed to. The current debate is more on the difference between when 
character- and process-based trust lubricate economic exchanges and minimise 
transactions costs, and when do they become redundant or counterproductive so as to 
require State-interventions for formalisation of trust?
Successful Ghanaian businessmen were those who rid themselves of kin networks 
because losses through unpaid debts were frequent (Garlick, 1971). In contrast, Kenyan 
businessmen refrained from substituting family and social links with non-family links 
because of the lack of personalised trust outside families deemed necessary for business 
entrepreneurship (Marris and Somerset, 1971). The South Asian discourse on trust 
focuses on its relevance, or lack thereof, to the economic exchange in question. Timberg 
(1978)33 and Rudner (1989)34 propose that the trust inherent in the informal institutions 
of joint family and caste loyalties are the secrets of success in Indian entrepreneurship. 
One has to remember however that these stories are only partly about trust, at least from 
a strictly transactional point of view. Both cases are stories of deep embeddedness of 
motivations and deciphering of surrounding business relations: the way in which trust not 
only lubricates economic interactions but also facilitates deeper insights into the nature 
and structure of goods and services that these social groups offer. Both in Nepal and in 
India, a large number of Marwari businessmen have been textile traders for several 
generations, and their narrow radius of trust not only facilitates their textile transactions, 
but also deepens their knowledge of production and helps guard their business secrets.
32 For example, Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) deal mostly with trust in inter-firm relations, and in 
their view, trust within economic organisations and trust within other domains o f  social interaction 
should be treated as different issues.
33 Study o f Marwaris who are the leading caste entrepreneurs from North India.
34 Study o f Nattukottai Chettiars, who are one o f the leading castes o f financial service providers from 
South India.
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Zivetz (1992) rightly singles out the business case of the strong Marwari network when 
she calls for the replacement of the ethnic/familial compartmentalisation of business 
practices in Nepal with formal, institutionally-derived trust. Quigley (1985a) states that 
the narrow radius of kin and caste-based trust among the semi-urban Dhulikhel 
Shresthas, inhabitants of the suburbs of the Kathmandu Valley, restrains them from 
adapting to the emerging changes in the market so as to be able to engage in high-risk 
entrepreneurial activities.
The argument on trust as a lubricant is also true for the Chettiar financiers of South India 
(Rudner, 1989). They had earlier been misunderstood to be small-scale finance 
operators, when in fact they are producers of a sophisticated financial package, of which 
an individual Chettiar is only a tiny component. In this occupational collectivisation, 
their kin are actually the production components of the financial services that they offer 
to the market. In this sense, their trust networks add significant value to their business 
activities regardless of the circumference of the trust circle. Papanek’s (1972) call for 
modernisation of selected features of networking among the Memons of Pakistan; 
Harriss’ (2002b) argument about the State’s role in widening of the ‘radius of trust’ in 
India; and Zivetz (1992)’s case for deepening of trust among some ethnic groups in 
Nepal and widening of trust among others -  all support the case that trust needs to be 
studied with emphasis on the analysis of local contexts -  economic as much as social.
Since the role trust has come to play is a diversified one in various societies, there is a 
case for arguing that divergent trust patterns give rise to divergent economic 
characteristics, which in turn feed in to the social structures that had given rise to the 
divergent trust patterns in the first instance. Fukuyama is right when he argues that the 
nature of the traditional institutions, on which trust is based, has had a direct bearing on 
the architectures of exchange, production and market in Asia and in the United States. 
Fukuyama believes that America is capitalising on the strong institutions that endorse 
individual rights in the same way that it does on its physical capital through low savings 
rates. He draws on the metaphor of the emblemised eagles to denote among the 
Americans a unique combination of strong individualism with tendencies for a high 
degree of spontaneous sociability and willingness to remain under the umbrellas of large 
organisations. The result has been a society which puts strong emphasis on 
individualism but which is also capable of instigating a rise of large-scale producers, 
distributors and service-providers. In contrast, Asian societies have relied more on
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family values. Among various Asian societies, however, family values differ, and they 
have produced differing results over time.
In the case of China, the question as to why intermediate organisations do not feature as 
prominently in economy and society as they do in western societies, has to do with the 
great emphasis Chinese society puts on family organisation. Centuries of political 
instability resulted in the fact that family is the only reliable means of support. The 
principles of Confucianism encourage obedience to the father figure, faith in large 
families in which the inheritance is divided equally among the sons regardless of their 
merits and a general distrust for strangers. Consequently, a family-run business seldom 
grows or lasts beyond a single generation because of the inevitable feuding among the 
heirs and a reluctance to bring in outside professional managers.35 There are few 
Chinese brand names because small and transient firms are usually incapable of 
developing the necessary economies of scale and scope in marketing. In the case of 
Japan, Fukuyama attributes inter-firm alliances such as Keiretsu to hierarchical and 
paternalistic but merit-based family values. What is important to note is that the 
Japanese mukoyoshi system of child adoption allows industrialists to broaden their skill 
base as per their business needs, and thus maintain organisational cohesiveness as strong 
as that of a block of granite.
Inherent differences in traditional institutions related to trust largely explain the divergent 
economic characteristics of these societies. I draw three conclusions from this discussion 
on trust and from a broader discussion on institutions (see Sections 1 and 2). The 
institutional literature allows us to state, first, that institutions emerge when transactions 
costs are significant; and second, that the neoclassical assumption of instrumental 
rationality of institutions is replaced by an understanding that motives are society- 
specific and these pave the way for divergent economic goals and trajectories. Third, the 
premise of trust derives some substance from both these statements: it is one of the key 
societal constituents that contributes to reducing transactions costs (lubricating economic 
exchange); and it does not necessarily evolve in accordance according to the neoclassical 
rationality pattern. With these two statements in mind, I try to construct my third 
building block -  the divergence that exists in structuring of industrial organisation across
35 Fukuyama talks about a ‘Buddenbrooks’ phenomenon -  a term borrowed from Thomas Mann’s 
acclaimed novel about a German family -  to describe the gradual decline in entrepreneurial talent from 
the first generation to the third.
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societies. This explores a different aspect of the social embeddedness of economic 
action.
3. Industrial organisation within the study of institutions
If institutions are the underlying rules of the game in the economic order, organisations 
are the players or the agents of action. Organisational studies have borrowed from Coase 
and Williamson to show that industrial bureaucracies such as firms and corporations and 
social hierarchies such as class and caste are embedded within markets. The institutions 
affect economic engineering at two levels: (i) at a macro level -  in explaining the 
institutional underpinnings in the evolution of divergent capitalist systems across 
societies; and (ii) at a micro level -  in explaining the role of institutions in leadership, 
ethics and structures within and between firms.
Economic and business historians have identified broad changes in the forms of 
capitalism across societies since the industrial revolution. Drucker (1972) proposed 
‘Taylorism’ (or ‘scientific management’ as defined in Taylor, 1947) as a notable form of 
capitalism, where large managerial bureaucracies matched specialised machineries with 
semi-skilled workers to start large-scale production. Chandler (1977) proposed the 
American ‘competitive managerial capitalism’ (or Fordism as defined in Boyer et al, 
1997) as the rising universal trend, where multi-layered organisation of management 
units gave rise to large corporations where tasks were broken down to their simplest 
forms, improved upon and then replicated at a mass level. While there are no doubts 
about the early-twentieth-century victory of mass over craft production in the US, what 
remains unanswered is the question of why a similar trend has not developed in other 
countries. After cautiously disentangling the macro- and micro-level economic orders in 
the context of American economic crises, Piore and Sabel (1984) examine an alternative 
view as to whether or not the American adherence to mass production might have been 
more of a historical accident than a destiny worthy of being prescribed globally as the 
natural path to economic success. They conclude that Fordism or mass production is 
inadequate in explaining the rise of divergent capitalism across the globe. They suggest 
that ‘flexible specialisation,’ or a craft alternative to mass production involving a loose 
network of independent producers in place of large-scale producers, exists and accounts 
for inconsistencies in classical economic forecasts about mass manufacturing as the 
ultimate universal solution.
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Fordist and Taylorist claims about the supremacy of mass production have indeed been 
falsified by the rise of the various forms of capitalisms both across the Atlantic and the 
Pacific. Proprietary capitalism, which has stabilised in Europe and the UK since the 
nineteenth century, is structurally different from its American counterpart in that unlike 
the large mass-producing firms, European industry is organised around loose groups of 
vertically and horizontally specialised firms, which coordinate their inputs and outputs 
through largely short-term market contracting (Lazonick and West, 1998; Hollingsworth, 
1997; Sorge, 1991). Across the Pacific, in East Asian ‘collective capitalism’ firms 
collaborate on a long-term basis and thus loyalty and commitment dominate intra- and 
inter-firm coordination (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Orru et al 1989, 1991; Whitley, 
1992). Within Europe, Maurice (1979) has discussed the national variations found 
across sectorally and technologically comparable firms in Germany, France and Britain, 
which he attributes to locality-specific ‘societal effects’. Within East Asia, Tam (1990) 
has contrasted the Japanese ‘centripetal’ industrial configuration (where individuals and 
firms maintain long term loyalties towards the industrial clusters they are affiliated with) 
with the Chinese ‘centrifugal’ configuration (where individual and firm alliances are 
temporal and frequently shifting).36 In the end, some elements of American capitalism, 
such as the American direct selling organisations capitalising on the personal charisma of 
the seller, proved ineffective in Europe, while it resonated harmoniously in the Asian 
context of extended familism and social networks within a vigorous capitalism (Biggart, 
1990).
These rather diffuse contrasts and characterisations of the forms of capitalisms across 
societies necessitate more detailed and systematic studies of the processes by which 
particular industrial configurations evolve from and contribute to societal differences. 
Williamson’s (1986) ‘contractual’ approach, focusing on transactions costs economics to 
explain such differences in path-specificity, has long been considered inadequate, and 
various dimensions have been added to it, including one that focuses on networks (Ebers, 
1997; Orru, 1997) and the ground rules for acceptable practice (Herrigel, 1994). The 
organisational dimension that the current section of this chapter discusses is one of the 
most recent developments in this literature, which postulates the linkages between 
societal and industrial structures more substantially. In this thesis, I have specifically 
looked at two of the threads within this literature. The first thread examines how
36 It resonates with Fukuyama (1995)’s interpretation o f Japan as a ‘block of granite’ and China ‘a 
loose tray o f  sand’.
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synchronously or conflictually the major economic groupings within the society -  the 
public bureaucracy, management, labour and political parties -  draw on their broader 
national industrial culture (Wilks, 1990: 150). The second studies the extent to which 
liberal capitalism is allowed by the State to deepen, and the degree to which economic 
efficiency is compromised by the State in order to pursue goals that are strictly political 
or social (Clegg et al, 1990b: 71).
It is not only that the way industrial relations are embedded into social relations differs 
across societies; but the nature of the embeddedness also changes as societal and 
industrial institutions undergo readjustments over time. Marsh and Mannari (1990) have 
called this a temporal continuum, which forces industrial units to undergo internal 
modification in order to accommodate changes in technology, size and labour 
productivity as well as external adaptations to forces such as political and global 
industrial transformations. Others have looked more closely into the societal institutions 
which are also constantly contested and thus are continually changing under a path- 
dependent trajectory (Hollingsworth, 1997; Clegg et al, 1990a). The theory of path 
dependency overturns the idea of instrumentalism and highlights five key features in 
society-industry embeddedness: first, industrial coordination systems must adapt to 
exogenous market changes such as that of new competition which arises with changes in 
technology and in consumer tastes (Best, 1990); second, economic coordination 
mechanisms are guided by changes in politico-economic regulations and labour-market 
institutions; third, industrial organisations draw directly from the evolving informal 
societal institutions, for example, patrimonial authority, trust, the nature of the State elite 
and the inheritance system; fourth, emulation across societies is possible but has 
temporal and contextual constraints (Wilkinson and Oliver, 1990); and fifth, ongoing 
relational networks between large and small economic and social entities within a society 
are important in determining the overall industrial configuration in the long run 
(Marceau, 1990; Bourdieu, 1984).
Whitley’s conceptualisation of a ‘comparative-business-sy stems approach’ (1999) is the 
most comprehensive framework available in the literature for anatomising economic 
organisations and their interconnectedness with market economies and the political, 
labour and cultural systems. The core of the CBS approach is the comparison of 
business systems across societies on the four important fronts of: capital providers and 
users; consumers and suppliers; competitors and alliances; and employers and
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employees. Whitley then places business systems into the broader institutional 
structuring, which includes not only State economic policies and the political economy of 
labour unions but also the financial and educational frameworks within which the society 
functions, in order to examine the interdependences between them in the changing global 
context. His account of the capitalisms of Korea, Taiwan and Japan highlights to what 
extent the contemporary capitalisms in these countries, as distinct from each other as 
they may be, draw on similar social institutions of trust, loyalty and knowledge transfer 
as much as on their political histories of war and the bureaucratic arrangements for 
power sharing between the State and industrial groups.
To sum up, I have tried to focus the readers’ attention on issues surrounding conceptions 
of institutional variation related to the sphere of economic action and organisation. 
These concern differing relational networks, industrial frameworks and social and 
political platforms. Industrial evolution is path-specific but path-specificity need not 
make for inertia since evolution is an ongoing process that will involve adaptation not 
only to new market competition but also to changes in politics, labour and production 
economics, as well as gradual societal transformations. Whitley’s CBS approach gives 
us a comprehensive framework for anatomising this temporal continuum. In the 
following section, I will look at the society-specificity and path-dependency of industrial 
organisation from a prism of the embedding of economic action in culture.
4. Bourdieu and cultural capital
In the same way that organisational patterns, which are underpinned by motivations, 
deciphering of their surroundings on the part of individual actors, and the patterns of trust 
are specific to the histories of different societies, as shown in the earlier sections, so is 
the culture, embodying the habits of thoughts and practice of a particular people. Using 
Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital,’ this section will aim to define the culture- 
economy embeddedness as societies proceed towards economic modernisation.
Before engaging with the term ‘cultural capital,’ one has to acknowledge that the word 
culture itself is undoubtedly one of the most widely and diversely explored terms in the 
history of social sciences. As early as in 1871, Tyler defined ‘primitive culture’ to be 
‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as the member of society’ -  a definition 
that largely remains valid to date. In the context of social change, it has been agreed that
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culture is neither a mere add-on, nor an assumption in the utility function.37 Nor does 
culture denote an exotic parallel universe to the mainstream development discourse that 
needs to be conserved from degradation38, a set of immutable and essential national traits 
that can be invoked to explain economic retardation in some countries39 or a ‘best 
practice’ that is identified from one society to be replicated to another.40
Several suffixes have been added to the culture discourse throughout the last century, as 
evident in the proposition of the concept of culture-derived economic ethics (Weber, 
1958), cultural configuration (Parsons and Shils, 1951), cultural embeddedness 
(Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992), etc. On these scholarly shoulders stand many studies 
that are scattered across the disciplines of business studies, economics, sociology and 
anthropology.
‘Culture’ highlights the society-specificity of motivations and deciphering, and hence its 
path-dependence; and by adding the suffix ‘capital,’ Bourdieu brings the idea into an 
economic paradigm. Bourdieu’s definition of ‘cultural capital’ stands on twin pillars. 
The first pillar is his conceptualisation of the term itself, where he extends the logic of 
economic analysis to ostensibly non-economic forms of power and courses of action. 
For him, all forms of power -  be they material, cultural, social or symbolic -  are forms of 
capital which can be invested and also harvested at different times. Tracing the sources 
of cultural capital in a wide variety of institutions such as verbal and behavioural 
facilities, aesthetic preferences, education credentials, etc, Bourdieu distinguishes 
between three specific states that cultural capital may take. It might exist in an 
‘embodied’ state which requires pedagogical action, or the investment of time by parents, 
kin and the hired educational institutions for cultivated dispositions presupposing 
distance from economic necessity. Or, it might exist in the ‘objectified’ state such as in 
books, art objects and scientific instruments that require specialised cultural abilities for 
their use. Or, it might exist in an ‘institutionalised’ form attained and reproduced 
through the educational credential system. This is a short version of Bourdieu’s complex 
conceptualisation of cultural capital, which forms one of the twin pillars of his theory. 
Before we touch upon the second pillar, it is important to address one key criticism 
Bourdieu faces from contemporary sociologists.
37 Unlike the claim made by Becker and Murphy (2001)
38 Unlike the claim made by Scott (1998)
39 Unlike the argument theorised in Harrison and Huntington (2001) and narrated in Landes (1999)
40 Unlike the claim made by Inglehart (1990)
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Is Bourdieu an economic determinist in a neoclassical, or even a late new institutionalist 
fashion? Caille’s criticism of Bourdieu on this key question (1992 in Swartz, 1997: 68- 
69) is representative of many others, and is well grounded in that by extending the logic 
of economics to virtually all aspects of culture, Bourdieu makes little attempt to delineate 
what part of social actions can be explained by rational calculation and what part cannot. 
Caille notes that Bourdieu cannot be placed alongside most Althusserians because he 
disagrees that any ideology can assume relative autonomy from economy and politics. 
He, in turn, criticises Bourdieu for implicitly formulating an anthropology that posits a 
fundamental human propensity towards economic rationality. This is ironic in that 
Bourdieu himself has always been a sharp critic of economism, a point that becomes 
clearer as he takes a historical view of cultural capital. Bourdieu’s concept o f‘interest,’ 
which he uses to justify all human action sets him apart from the Althusserian Marxists 
who believe that some human motives are above rationality; and his interpretation of 
interests as dispositional as opposed to instrumental brings him conceptually closer to 
North -  a point I will pursue later in this chapter.
How cultural capital regenerates over time is a discussion that forms the second pillar of 
Bourdieu’s discourse. Tracing back the three states in which cultural capital exists, 
Bourdieu argues that it is the conversion of ‘embodied’ capital into ‘objectified’ and 
‘institutionalised’ forms of cultural capital which is essential for them to influence the 
play of interests -  interests that are not static but dispositional. He states that the process 
of conversion from symbolic to economic capital is not strictly utility-enhancing as 
transmission within the economic capital is, but requires a gratuitous expenditure of time, 
attention, care and concern, which makes the conversion possible only through a 
complex web of social obligations. For example, compared to the world of material 
objects, the world of art appears to be an island ostentatiously opposed to that of 
immediate economic calculations of losses and profits; and acquiring of artistic skills 
takes years of dedicated learning without immediate returns. Conversion of the symbolic 
capital of arts into economic capital ultimately does take place, but only through complex 
negotiations among the actors located at differing positions of the social structure, and at 
a pace different to exploitation of capitals that are already material. This is a key point 
Bourdieu makes. If we are to add to this the institutionalist assertion that social 
structures have their rigidities, which do change over time but only slowly and with 
resistance, then such a conversion process would be path-specific, at least in the short
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run. This is the gist of my discussion on why I argue cultural capital is important in a 
discussion of economic institutions. I will explain it further in the following paragraphs.
‘Habitus’41 is a key expression in Bordieu’s discourse on reproduction of cultural capital. 
Although expressed frequently in a linguistic analogy,42 it is a much broader concept, 
and includes a whole range of values, ethics and preferences beyond exploitable 
knowledge and skills from which economic returns might be derived. Habitus is not an 
innate capacity, it is a ‘structured structure’ that derives from the class-specific 
fundamental ‘dispositions’ that are internalised through early socialisation in family and 
peer groups.43 Since primary socialisation is more formative of internal dispositions than 
subsequent socialisation experiences, habitus is fairly resistant to change. There is an 
ongoing adaptation process that occurs as habitus encounters new situations, but this 
process tends to be a slow and largely unconscious one, which Bourdieu calls ‘defensive 
strategy’.
While habitus concerns individual agency, Bourdieu’s second key expression -  ‘field’ -  
defines the structure of the collective social setting in which habitus operates, thereby 
unifying the individual-society dualism. It is a spatial metaphor, which Bourdieu uses 
interchangeably with a neoclassical term ‘market’. However, contrary to the neoclassical 
use of the term, which is limited to exchange relations between commodity buyers and 
sellers, Bourdieu’s idea of ‘field’ includes hierarchies in addition to the exchange 
relations within this symbolic space. Also, contrary to the neoclassical claim of 
equilibrium which is an optimum state where struggles cease, the boundaries around and 
between fields are imprecise and constantly changing. Fields impose on actors-specific 
forms of struggle, which centre on various forms of capital, economic, cultural or 
symbolic. It is important to note that fields are ‘structured spaces’ where dominance or 
subordination stems not from innate characteristics but from unequal distributions of 
capital and is sustained through various struggles. Bourdieu specifically talks about three 
types of field struggles: conservation, succession and subversion. Those who hold
41 Before employing the term ‘habitus,’ Bourdieu used a series o f other terms to designate his key 
concept, including ‘structured praxis,’ ‘mental habit,’ and ‘generative principle o f regulated 
improvisations’ in his earlier work.
42 Bourdieu’s conceptualisation o f habitus drew largely from Saussure’s (1974) distinction between 
speech and language, and the theorising stemmed from his fieldwork on the educational attainment o f  
school children (Swartz, 1997).
43 Swartz (1997:104) has argued that habitus is similar to Weber’s concept o f ‘life chances,’ which are 
“objective structures internalised into corresponding dispositions leading group members to 
experience them as reasonable or unreasonable, likely or unlikely, natural or unthinkable for people o f  
their own kind.”
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dominant positions in a field employ conservation strategies; those who have less or no 
seniority may attempt to access dominant positions through succession strategies; and 
those who challenge the definitions of legitimacy established or enforced by the 
dominant group, engage in subversion. It is then important to note that there is a tacit 
agreement between the dominant and the dominated throughout the field struggle that the 
struggle is worth pursuing. Bourdieu calls this process ‘symbolic violence’ -  or a 
struggle between two parties about superiority of practice. It is symbolic because of the 
capacity of the process to ensure that the arbitrariness of the social order is ignored, or 
misrecognised as natural, by both sides engaged in the field struggle.
To sum up, habitus varies for individuals, and makes them more or less powerful in the 
field at a given time and context. In a spectrum ranging between the economic 
(subordinate) and cultural (superior), capitals at the disposal of individuals may lie 
towards one end or the other. Individual and group interactions for acquisition of any 
kind of capital are guided by the field strategies of conservation, succession or 
subversion. These struggles undergo renewal processes in the form of symbolic violence 
which embodies both tacit acceptance and contestation of the hierarchy and distinction 
between the parties involved. What this process eventually gives rise to is a 
reconsolidation of the social order, which is not a one-time incident but a continuous 
process of change. With it emerge renewed representations of cultures that have 
undergone a process o f ‘mimesis’, through which the dominated accept the dominant as a 
point of reference both for change and for continuity.
Ortner (1999) has used Bourdieu’s discourse to deliver a compelling historical 
ethnography of mountaineering in Nepal that documents and analyses the process of 
social reconfiguration of order between the Sherpas (the native mountain porters) and the 
Sahibs (the European mountaineers). The Sahibs think of the Sherpas as unspoiled, 
naive and loyal servants but they also know that the Sherpas carry, climb and manage 
their own organisation thriftily. The Sherpas think of the Sahibs as benevolent guardian 
figures but also quintessential dominators. Ortner shows how history in the high 
mountains is relational and representational, configured and periodised. The actors are 
animated by identities that evolve through deeper contradictions inherent in social and 
economic structures. She also shows how identities are determined and path-specific but 
at the same time practiced as sources of transforming agency. Ortner (1999: 58) calls 
this process ‘counterculture,’ where individuals subtly modify their norms, practices and
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values as they are alluded to by the dominant who remains the point of reference. In 
Ortner’s view, what we think of as the culture today has emerged through a process of 
both distortions and truths in which the dominated members of the society have sought to 
obtain personal, social and economic traits as per the desires of the more dominant 
members within their social ambit. Thanks to such hegemony, what has emerged among 
the societies today is a ‘virtual’ culture that is like the original culture they used to have 
before they came under exogenous and endogenous socio-economic changes, but which 
is now significantly improvised. The process of counterculture is not necessarily 
rationalisation of culture, but a process of mutually agreed improvisation called upon by 
the dominant and the dominated parties involved, or a mid point between ‘illusion’ and 
‘allusion’.
5. Can we compare Bourdieu with North?
Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital has some similarities with North’s theory of 
institutions, and in a number of ways, the former complements the latter. How economic 
actions are embedded in the norms and networks of the social order is an interesting topic 
with a commendable breadth of scope which indicates some opportunities for greater 
crossover between the boundaries of the two disciplines of economics and sociology.
To begin with, there is a resonance between Bourdieu’s and North’s criticisms of 
Althusserian Marxism. Bourdieu (1984: 467) rejects the Althusserian idea that 
ideological actions in societies can be compartmentalised and kept totally autonomous 
from economic actions. By declining the articulation of the Marxist base-structure 
dichotomy,44 Bourdieu extends his argument that the two realms of ideological and 
economic actions should not be separated in the first place. Instead, Bourdieu brings in 
the concept of cultural capital, which covers a much broader spectrum of cultural and 
economic capitals, and which constitutes complex conditions under which one form of 
capital is convertible to another. His notion of cultural capital directly combines the 
material and symbolic dimensions and thereby emphasises the fundamental unity of 
economic and social lives. North (2005: 83) also subscribes to such unification and 
rejects any differentiation between economic and social structures. The premise of his
44 Marx used this metaphor to explain the idea that the superstructure (or the non-material structures o f  
culture, religion and philosophy) arises on the surface o f the base (or the economic structure o f factor 
elements such as land, raw materials, capital and labour). Marx argued that the two must always be 
understood in relation to the other, and he treated the two as dichotomous and dialectically related but 
not the same.
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‘formal and informal institutions’45 are presented as the ‘scaffolds’ that human beings 
erect around them in order to facilitate deciphering of their environments and to reduce 
uncertainties around them. These scaffolds are an inextricable blend of rational (material 
artefacts and instruments) and non-rational beliefs (superstitions, religions, myths and 
prejudices), which collectively shape the choices that people make.
The criticism of the Althusserian compartmentalisation between what is purely economic 
and what is purely cultural leads both Bourdieu and North to make two propositions: 
first, that pursuit of interests universally underpins all human actions including what had 
earlier been segregated as the ‘superstructure’ or the symbolic, and second that 
configurations are continually contested and are changing. In the case of Bourdieu, it is 
the study of how, and under what conditions, individuals and groups employ strategies of 
economism in order to maintain or enhance their positions in the social order. Bourdieu 
explains that his use of the economic language of interest as a conceptual strategy is 
deliberately designed to correct for Marxist treatment of idealism as dialectically related 
but separate from materialism. Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence forms a basis 
for explaining both economic and social changes because it directs attention to structural 
forces through which individuals struggle to retain their personal status-quo but also 
adapt to the external forces for change. These forces consist of habitus, i.e., a culture- 
derived mental habit that structures individual perceptions and actions, and field, 
meaning a social order that is organised around specific combinations of various forms of 
capitals. For Bourdieu, economies and societies are constantly changing and each 
transition marks an increased reliance on the modification of the habitus and the field. 
Similar notions of change and pursuit of interests are central to North’s concept of 
institutions. He begins his 1990 book by stating that there is little reason to expect that 
economic changes are confined within the profit-seeking domain, but that they mark 
overall human evolution. He argues that institutions are the rules of the game which give 
rise to society-specific incentive structures. For North, institutions can be either formal 
which are relatively concrete, or informal which cover the broader arena of culture, 
history and politics. He claims that the two types of institutions are inextricably 
intertwined, and that together they form the enforcing mechanisms for any transaction. 
Individuals engage in transactions for pursuit of interests but are closely guided by their 
mental models which evolve through physical environment, the socio-cultural 
environment and their history of experiences.
45 See earlier section o f this chapter.
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Bourdieu and North are both centrally concerned with interests, but they both criticise 
the neoclassical theories for being static and for maintaining that the concept of 
rationality or interests are universal and objective. While neoclassical economists cast all 
interests in the same mould and follow the interest-consistency approach, both Bourdieu 
and North problematise interest as context- and actor-specific. Bourdieu uses the 
concept of interest not as a single and rigid phenomenon but as a disposition that 
motivates action towards consequences that matter to the actor. There can be as many 
interests as there are competing claims on the valued capital. While interests are to some 
extent based on human nature, they are only acknowledged and negotiated in the context 
of the social order. This notion is also central to the argument that North makes: he 
criticises the neoclassical notion of instrumental rationality in human action while 
accepting the neoclassical assumption that resources are scarce and hence that there will 
be struggles over them. North emphasises two additional dimensions to neoclassical 
economics: first, the problem humans face in interpreting the world with its multitude of 
facts; and second, the difficult conceptual problem of sorting the importance of different 
sets of facts and calculating an optimal position. North argues that the scaffolds formed 
by individuals to interpret the world around them are partly a result of their collective 
cultural history, partly of the everyday problems they confront and must solve, and partly 
of their past track record of problem-solving. Any action they take is typically 
incremental and path dependent. In this situation, perceived incentives obviously vary 
not only across societies but also within them. Within a given society, individuals from 
different backgrounds will interpret the same evidence differently, and in consequence, 
set different priorities based on the incentive structures they define for themselves. 
Bourdieu and North both contend that rationalities are not instrumental but subjective 
and culture-derived, and that multiple equilibria -  as opposed to the neoclassical concept 
of general equilibrium -  are possible and prevalent.
Beyond these conceptual commonalities, there are a number of intellectual problems one 
must acknowledge before bringing Bourdieu’s theory together with North’s. Some of the 
major obstacles holding back interdisciplinary work between Bourdieu and North are 
largely the presentational differences that dominate each discourse. North (1990b) 
approaches institutions from a perspective of transactions costs. He starts out by 
claiming that the institutional matrix moderates the degree of economism in exchanges 
where transactions costs are significant. However, his emphasis on transactions costs is 
substantially reduced as he proceeds to the main thrust of his arguments in 2005, which
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is that the interaction of beliefs, institutions and organisations makes path dependence a 
fundamental factor in the continuity of a society. But, path dependence is not a 
transactional inertia for him, rather it is only a constraint on the choices available to a 
society. His framework on institutional change acknowledges a degree of conflict 
inherent in societies, and at a different level from Bourdieu’s. His emphasis is on 
accretion of knowledge, which he says evolves from the interactions between genetic 
features, cultural heritage and experiences of individuals. His renewed emphasis on the 
role of knowledge and of path dependence in the process of economic change in his 2005 
volume is an important departure from his earlier focus on transactions costs economics, 
and brings him yet closer to Bourdieu’s world.
Another disciplinary obstacle between Bourdieu and North involves taxonomy. 
Bourdieu has especially cautioned that his image of ‘field,’ or ‘market’ which he 
sometimes uses interchangeably, is conceptually superior to the usage of these terms in 
neoclassical economics. Bourdieu uses the term field to represent the structure of some 
part of society where institutionalisation of practices is inevitably weak. For Bourdieu, 
each field is centred on a specific interest, which is constrained by vague and contested 
boundaries (e.g. field of art, an industry, a firm, and so on). He is cautious that any 
attempt to establish precise boundaries between fields, along the lines of organisational 
preferences (e.g., legal, economic, etc) are formalist and hinder a more compelling 
‘relational’ view of the social world. He clearly differentiates himself from the 
taxonomy that uses field as an organisational concept as in DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 
64). For similar fears of positivism, Bourdieu argues that the idea of field is superior to 
that of institution (1991:19 in Swartz, 1997:120). Having said that, Bourdieu’s cautions 
are not cast in stone, nor do they apply uniformly to all the diverse variants of the 
institutional theory. Bourdieu argues that field struggles require a tacit acceptance of the 
rules of the game in the same way that opposing players in a sports arena pursue the 
same rewards and follow the same rules while competing against each other.46 In this, 
Bourdieu’s field analysis actually calls attention to North’s discussion about the 
institutional aspects of individual and group action.
While Bourdieu’s is the most comprehensive theory on economic and social change after 
the Parsonian theory on cultural configurations, a number of new empirical studies have
46 Bourdieu uses the term ‘illuso’ to describe a belief or acceptance o f the worth o f the game o f the 
field which is shared among not only the key actors but also all others directly or indirectly involved in 
the field struggle.
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pointed out some inadequacies in his framework in addressing the complexities emerging 
throughout rapid globalisation. For example, Bourdieu writes that it is the emulation of 
elites by the petty bourgeoisie within a given society, which generates the renewed forces 
that maintain constant demand for symbolic goods, and which ensures the continued 
renewal of symbolic violence. Bourdieu does say that systemic changes to the societal 
habitus and fields can be brought about by exogenous changes such as mass migration or 
radical communicational integration, but he says so only in the context of educational 
changes and not in the context of economic and political changes. This theory of class 
emulation is less anticipatory of the wholesale transformations the world was to witness 
as a result of rapid global integration. With the rise of multinational capitalism, as seen 
in international franchising and distribution models, the relations of power in production 
become indirect. Increasingly, workers are subordinated to capitalists residing in distant 
cities who exert their influence through impersonal and often virtual exchanges of labour 
power for wages. Such systematic changes necessitate a revised model of field study 
which problematises the fact that social emulations are no longer needed for the demand 
for cultural capital to increase.
Gartman (1991 and 2002) argues that while Bourdieu’s theory remains valid for class 
culture, it has only little relevance for mass culture, which is no longer confined to the 
working class, at least in the industrialised countries. In mass culture, as he shows from 
his case study of the American automobile industry, there is a large overlap between the 
suppliers, producers and consumers of the cultural goods and those of the functional. 
The differentiation between the two is no longer about the admiration for ‘freedom’ or 
‘aesthetics,’ but is simply a demonstration effect and the functional comfort dependent 
on disposable income. The idea of a mass culture that obscures class differences is a 
powerful tool for understanding the role of culture in late capitalism, and may be 
conceptualised as a complement to Bourdieu’s conception of class symbolisation.
Earlier I contended that North’s theory on institutions has more conceptual similarities 
with Bourdieu’s sociological theory of action than with any other work from within his 
own genre of economics. North argues that the mental models of social actors are 
fundamentally important in understanding how they subjectively perceive a given 
environment. He acknowledges and reiterates that while the rationality assumption has 
served economists well for a range of analyses of human action amidst uncertainties, the 
instrumental perception of rationality has been a major stumbling block in the path of
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social science progress. He then makes the case for the role of implicit mental models 
that evolve through a combination of genetic predispositions and cultural imperatives in 
modelling ‘reality’ for deciphering the environment and determining course of action. In 
his discussion of the scaffolds as erected by social actors, North argues that perceptions 
are individual, and how they get translated into transforming the human environment are 
consequences of the institutional structure, which is a combination of formal rules, 
informal constraints and their enforcement characteristics.
The last two statements on mental models and institutional structures bring North very 
close to Bourdieu’s argument on cultural capital. Bourdieu’s cultural capital is a 
combination of economic and symbolic resources, a concept through which Bourdieu 
extends the notion of interests to ostensibly non-economic areas. His field analysis, 
which is about the sets of relations within societies including class structures, provides an 
attractive structural mapping of arenas of struggle. It offers an insightful way of charting 
cultural or symbolic resources that define and affect the rationality of social actions 
within social hierarchies. There is a great value in his proposition of a sociology of 
symbolic power that addresses the important topic of relations between culture and social 
structure and offers an interesting intellectual framework that connects human actions 
and practices to institutional hierarchies. A logical next step for North’s discourse on 
institutions, having problematised the role of mental models in economic path- 
specificity, is to look into the way mental models are situated within a given social order. 
Adding this key dimension to the well explored theory of institutions is what I perceive 
to be the original contribution of my thesis.
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Chapter 4: Arya-Nepal
My first case study, Arya-Nepal, was a Taylorist factory and a testimony to the MFA-led 
export development of homogenous readymade garments in Nepal. It grew rapidly in the 
1980s and 1990s but then collapsed abruptly at the turn of the millennium, owing to the 
inherent bottlenecks in the global supply chain used by Nepalese garment factories, the 
disruptive labour union politics as practised by the Maoists, and above all, the adverse 
global trade policy developments. This factory was representative of most of the garment 
factories in Nepal that mushroomed after the MFA came into being and then collapsed 
upon its expiration.
Arya-Nepal was initiated and managed by what many businessmen referred to as 
padhera janne byapari47 and not parera janne byapari.48 This was noted as the key 
difference between mass manufacturers like Arya-Nepal and specialised producers like 
Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli -  a theme I will pursue in the succeeding chapters. Such a 
distinction was often made not only in describing what types of garments they could or 
could not produce and what kinds of markets they could or could not penetrate, but also 
to indicate the level of sophistication commanded in the organisation of the factory shop 
floors, or the type of business alliances formed with their buyers and suppliers. More so 
than sectoral differences, it was such nuances of how businessmen perceived 
opportunities and threats, and how they translated these into practice concerning their 
industrial engineering which decided their long run trajectories. Differences of State and 
international policies did matter, but the way they actually materialised on the factory 
shop floors had much to do with the broader cultural and political context. Hence, how 
effectively a certain business enterprise could overcome the local and global crises is a 
question that must take into account both formal and informal policies and the 
institutions under which they prevail. In pursuing this central theme, I will reconstruct 
the history of the Arya-Nepal throughout the cycles of economic growth and collapse 
during the 1980s, 1990s and the early 2000s.
1. History of the factory
Ram Lamichhane, from a middle-class family within Kathmandu Valley, was among the 
few Bahuns who sought occupations outside the ambit of their ancestral priesthood as
47 businessmen who are products o f books
48 businessmen who learned through real life experiences
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early as the 1980s. The youngest of six sons from two co-wives in a large joint family, 
Ram thought it best to move to India to join the army after earning a graduate degree. 
Unfortunately, the pursuit of this mame-maarne pesha (profession of dying and killing) 
brought him into direct confrontation with his practising Bahun family such that he was 
forced to defect from the army after only a few years of service. Upon his return, the 
family gave him his ansha (share in the ancestral joint property) in an effort to reconcile 
their differences but also to dissociate themselves from the ritual sin he had committed 
by having joined the army. Undeterred, Ram used his ansha to establish a readymade 
garment factory, Arya-Nepall.
During the Panchayat era, Nepal pursued a protectionist economic regime whereby the 
State heavily monitored each and every economic activity. Although the State sought to 
encourage business entrepreneurship, its business regulations were so tight that the 
simple task of formally registering a business venture was a privilege available only to 
those who had ‘source-force’ (patrons, relatives and friends in key positions who could 
push through the process). Ram had none of the source-force. Hence Arya-Nepall 
operated as a ‘fabricator,’49 and had no claims on the export-related public incentives 
including the MFA quotas. Its primary function was to do jobwork for other factories in 
Kathmandu who had better source-force and hence were eligible for the lucrative MFA 
export quota. This was not the most lucrative of businesses, but the garment industry 
was a promising industry in the late 1980s, and with a great deal of hard work, Arya- 
Nepall went on to employ about twenty to thirty workers. Of Ram’s two teenage sons, 
the elder, Sameer Lamichhane, assisted him in managing production and merchandising. 
In 1992, Arya-Nepall merged with another factory housed in the adjacent building. 
Ram’s new business counterparts in this merger were Ajay Manandhar and Navin 
Sharma -  a Newar from Kathmandu and a hill Bahun brought up in Terai. Ajay and 
Navin had a long-standing friendship that went back to their college days and had been 
business partners for several years before the merger with Arya-Nepall. Ram 
Lamichhane, was much older than both of them and had known them only for few years. 
The new venture between Ram, Navin and Ajay inherited a large workforce from both of 
its predecessors. Although management structure in the new factory was informal, a 
general understanding among the three partners was that Ram would be in charge of 
production management; Ajay, accounts and book-keeping; and Navin dealing with 
buyers and negotiating transactions. The three business partners were declared equal in
49 A factory that operated on the ground but remained hidden from State records.
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both profit and loss although, interestingly enough, only two of the three partners, Ram 
and Ajay, invested money in the venture.
The business merger between Ram, Ajay and Navin had been driven by the fact that 
Nepal was slowly embracing economic liberalisation. As the State loosened its grip on 
regulating the economy, the business environment in the country became more relaxed 
and registering a factory was no longer a privilege available only to the elite. After the 
popular political movement overthrew the autocratic Panchayat regime in 1990 and 
embraced the multi-party democratic systems, the new government initiated wholesale 
deregulation of markets and industries in Nepal (see Section 3 in Chapter 2). Once the 
new national industrial policy was issued in 1992, the Ministries of Industries and 
Commerce encouraged the formation of business associations and delegated to them 
some of the regulatory tasks such as business verification and registration. This ended 
the political cronies’ privileged access to the process of factory registration. It was the 
potential of the improving business-enabling environment which had prompted Ram, 
Ajay and Navin to merge their individual factories and officially register the new 
venture, as Arya-Nepal2. The formal registration now gave them access to the much 
desired MFA quotas. However cumbersome the MFA quota acquisition process was at 
that time and however alien the complex network of global garment buyers, Arya-Nepal2 
now had a potential to reach its own international buyers one day.
Arya-Nepal2’s desire to attain the goal of reaching the global market had no shortage of 
stumbling blocks. Ram Lamichhane neither spoke English nor understood much of the 
international policy manoeuvres rapidly unfolding at that time. Navin Sharma and Ajay 
Manandhar however, both had recently acquired MBAs from renowned universities in 
the region and were more conversant with local and global policy developments. Navin 
Sharma was particularly seen to be a chalta-purja50 and it was said of him that he could 
easily cool down any fiery confrontation.51 More importantly, he had grown up in the 
Nepal-India border town of Nepalganj in Terai; had credentials from a reputed university 
in Punjab; and was married to a Punjabi woman and hence had access to some social 
networks in Punjab. Ram and Ajay looked up to him as someone highly capable of 
attracting prospective international buyers, in return for which they were prepared to
50 Meaning the machinery that runs. In other words, a good manager, doer and negotiator.
51 ‘ago banera gayo bhane pani banaidina sakne’ (he would turn the other into water even if  one 
confronts him as the fire).
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grant him equal shares in profit even though he had made no financial investment in the 
business.
Arya-Nepal2 manufactured cotton sweat-shirts and tops using both woven and knit 
fabrics. Initially it had only about forty or fifty kaligadhs (artisans) who operated under 
what was known as the juwadi system, whereby seven to fifteen workers formed loose 
circles, or khals, to divide jobs among themselves to sew readymade garments more 
efficiently. Each khal worked under a naike who not only took a managerial role but also 
that of a quasi-employer, having full authority over who to recruit and dismiss, and how 
much to pay each person for his or her contributions. Since the readymade garment 
industry was new to the Kathmandu Valley, a large number of workers in Arya-Nepal2 
(as in all other garment factories at that time) were from Terai, who had moved to 
Kathmandu only recently from places with a longer history of garment manufacturing, 
e.g., the neighbouring Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
As the garment industry deepened its roots in Kathmandu, more and more workers from 
within Kathmandu Valley and the nearby hills began to join the garment workforce. The 
industry particularly appealed to the so-called untouchable caste of Damais (tailor caste) 
from the hills. Arya-Nepal2 initially made remarkable profits: in 1994, it exported over 
four hundred thousand US dollars worth of readymade garments and employed over a 
hundred workers. The same year it replaced its old Indian machinery with slightly 
updated machines and switched its production system from a primitive juwadi system to 
a Taylorist chain system. In the chain system, the factory employed supervisors to 
develop a more scientific and systematic job division among the workers instead of 
subcontracting the khals to the freelance naikes. Once the ethnocentric cliques among 
the workers were dismantled through the use of the chain system, and the local workers 
had become more familiar with the skills and work ethics of the readymade garment 
industry, Arya-Nepal2 began slowly to attract local labour who went on to replace 
migrant Terai and Indian workers. Despite the seasonality of the production cycle that 
had made garment-making a less attractive job for the hill workers who generally 
preferred steady and ‘permanent’ employment, increasingly they began to feature as 
regular workers in Arya-Nepal2. Women, especially, who were not seen as the primary 
wage-eamers of the family and hence could afford to be unemployed for some months if 
needed were particularly attracted to this new industry. I have already mentioned how 
the hill Damais emerged rapidly as a dominant group in the garment shop floors where
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they not only outnumbered other hill castes but also outpaced them in climbing the career 
ladder such that it was increasingly common to see Damais supervising higher caste 
workers. Such a development was bound to have important implications for Arya- 
Nepal3 in the years to come.
By 1997, however, Arya-Nepal2 had developed worrying symptoms: there were frequent 
disputes among the business partners. Production was regularly disrupted because of 
interruptions from business partners and their family members; the trust in the 
accounting and book-keeping was fast eroding; and worse yet, some of the regular 
international buyers were beginning to take their business elsewhere. As a result of this, 
Ram expressed his wish to opt out of the partnership. A separation deal was reached 
where Ajay and Navin agreed with Ram that they would pay back his share of capital 
within a year. The spouses and sons of the three business partners were brought in as 
informal witnesses to this agreement. Nevertheless, as was customary among the smaller 
businessmen in Nepal at that time, no legal documents were signed and no third party 
was involved.
The unrecorded verbal agreement between the three business partners faced a major 
challenge within six months as the factory came to a standstill over a dispute with a 
major client. This could not have come at a worse time: Arya-Nepal2 had outstanding 
loans due not only to Ram, but also to the bank. Navin Sharma had only recently taken 
out a loan in order to revamp production and had put his house up as collateral. Despite 
their best efforts, the dispute could not be settled and the buyer cancelled his Letter of 
Credit on a major purchase order leaving Arya-Nepal2 insolvent. Navin and Ajay 
divided some of the fixed assets between themselves, while Ram kept to the earlier 
agreement that he had been ‘separated’ from the factory prior to its closure and so did not 
claim a share in the fixed assets.
Since Navin could no longer pay interest on the outstanding loans, Arya-Nepal2 filed for 
liquidation in 1999. The State-owned commercial bank, who had lent the original loan, 
not only seized the factory, but also declared all three business partners blacklisted. 
Linder the blacklisting law, none of the three would be allowed to register another 
business venture under their ownership until they paid back at least the accumulated 
interest on the factory loans. On top of everything else, their debt to Ram was still 
outstanding. Interestingly, the response of the two business partners to this crisis showed
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a stark contrast. Under major financial pressure, Ajay Manandhar denied his financial 
obligations to Ram, yet, although not visibly different in financial and social position, 
Navin Sharma honoured his.52 This earned him great respect among his professional and 
social circles, that ‘as a Bahun he would not let down another Bahun’. Ajay’s refusal to 
honour his obligations was less attributed to his individual dishonesty and more to his 
socio-religious standing; as Ram’s son Sameer put it: ‘Why would he pay us back when 
we did not have a single common kin ... and [more importantly] even [our] Gods [were] 
different.’
After a brief impasse between 1999 and 2000, during which period Navin had various 
jobs ranging from subcontracting for a Korean manufacturer to teaching at a local 
university, a new opportunity came his way. He signed a contract with Arya-India, 
Arya-Nepal2’s former fabric supplier, to work as CEO for their new plant being 
launched in Kathmandu. Arya-India was a private company owned by three brothers 
from a Punjabi Hindu family. They owned five factories, two of which manufactured 
cotton knit fabrics and the other three ready-made garments exclusively for the American 
market. Ownership and management of the factories was clearly divided among the 
three brothers. It was Arya-India-Fabrics, owned and managed by the youngest, Ramesh 
Jain, which invested fifty-one thousand US dollars to establish Arya-NepaB.
The senior management in Arya-NepaB comprised of a vice-president and three full­
time officers transferred from their headquarters in Ludhiana; as well as Navin, who soon 
brought in Sameer Lamichhane, Ram’s older son, as Production Manager. Ram himself 
had retired and now spent most of his time on pilgrimage and other spiritual activities. 
Arya-NepaB rented a house just outside the Balaju Industrial Zone, a government- 
facilitated industrial district in the northeast end of the Kathmandu Valley. This newly 
established government industrial zone attracted a large number of workers from all over 
the country. Whenever vacancies arose in Arya-NepaB that could not be filled from the 
pool of old workers and acquaintances from Arya-NepaB, they naturally recruited people 
from the local labour market at times competing favourably with the industrial zone. As 
far as machinery was concerned, it was not possible to reuse the old stock from Arya- 
NepaB -  not only had the old machines rusted and new ones unavailable locally, but in 
any case they were appropriate only for manufacturing woven garments. Arya-NepaB 
was to abandon woven clothes and specialise in cotton knitwear garments which needed
52 It took Navin almost five years to remobilise his business and reaccumulate enough money to be 
able to pay back his debts to Ram. He finally did it in October 2004.
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better technology. Hence, Arya-India transported new and better, but much more 
expensive, machines from Ludhiana; earlier machines had cost about three to four 
thousand Nepalese rupees, but the new Japanese and Taiwanese machines cost as much 
as twenty five to seventy five thousand rupees.
In November 2000, Arya-NepaB assigned Sameer to set up a new plant. The team 
rented a large complex of thirty-seven thousand square feet in the less built-up 
neighbourhood of Sitapaila on the north-western periphery of the Kathmandu Valley. 
Although the spacious new complex accommodated two full production chains, it lacked 
basic public infrastructure. The road to the factory flooded during the monsoon, the 
locality was a hang-out for criminals, gangsters and drug-dealers53 and the local farmers 
saw Arya-NepaB as an intrusion into their agrarian idylls. Arya-NepaB tried to address 
these issues in various ways: it built a small temple within the factory premises and 
recruited two priests to perform daily morning rituals, invested in road repair in the 
neighbourhood and offered handsome donations to the local ‘guthis’ (communal trusts). 
Dealing with the local crime, however, was a harder nut to crack. It initially recruited the 
services of a private security company only to learn one day that the main factory gate 
had been attacked in the presence of these security guards. Finally, Arya-NepaB sought 
help from local political leaders to deal with the local crime.
The elected Chairman of the Ward was a local leader of the Nepali Congress party who 
was also a black-belt in martial arts. The Chairman started his job by facilitating a wide 
range of philanthropic activities that would improve the company’s performance on 
corporate social responsibility. For example, a local sewerage system was developed and 
electricity distribution lines were extended to reach nearby villages. Subsequently, he 
recruited a number of his men into the Arya-NepaB workforce who acted as unofficial 
security guards to keep a close eye on the local gangsters. On several occasions, his men 
fought off the gangsters when they tried to disrupt factory operations. These measures 
were visibly effective; after three years of continued effort, the crime and work 
disruptions had significantly reduced and the factory was operating reasonably smoothly. 
Several of the local inhabitants, especially the women, had now joined the factory 
workforce and the neighbourhood had developed into a recognisable industrial cluster 
when eleven other factories had moved in. Encouraged by this, Arya-NepaB moved all
53 Not long before Arya-NepaB was established, there had been a fatal gang fight where one o f the 
workers I studied in my second case study, Rongoli, lost his brother. The murder had nothing to do 
with either Arya-NepaB or Rongoli, but the local farmers still somehow thought the ‘large factories’ 
to be the indirect culprits o f  the burgeoning crime in the neighbourhood.
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of its operations to this new location, leaving behind only a small cutting unit in its old 
building in Balaju. The Jain brothers acknowledged the hard work of Sameer and his 
team in making this work and he went on to exercise stronger command among the Arya- 
NepaB workers.
It served Sameer well that most of the workers in Arya-NepaB then were hill workers 
with whom he had a better rapport than his Indian colleagues. While the Indian 
managers remained tight-fisted about (Nepali) workers’ promotions and compensations, 
Sameer (with Navin’s blessings) was visibly more benevolent. This made him (and 
Navin) popular among the Nepali workers, and their decisions and commands were the 
ones that the workers heeded most. Such increased prominence of the Nepali managers 
would have long-lasting implications for the Indian-Nepali collaboration in Arya-NepaB.
It is important to describe a particular incident in order to explain why an essentially 
Indian factory would let Nepali managers exercise such authority over factory 
management. When the factory was established, two senior positions were created to 
strike a balance between Nepalis and Indians: Navin was initially expected to work 
closely with a Kathmandu-based Punjabi Vice-President. This arrangement worked well 
at the outset, but an implicit national-ethnic league soon emerged in the factory, which 
was exacerbated by a political incident in Kathmandu that gave air to general political 
hostility towards Indian ‘imperialistic tendencies’ at times. This one incident is 
exemplary of the complexity of Nepali-Indian relations. In January 2001, the opposition 
political parties in Nepal protested against the government’s suppression of a peaceful 
demonstration marching towards the Indian Embassy. The march was to protest against 
some controversial statements allegedly made by Hritik Roshan, a famous Bollywood 
film star, concerning Nepal. The police over-reacted and tried to quell the protest by 
firing in the air, and accidentally a bullet hit and killed a child. This fuelled the tension 
between Nepalis and Indians and some Indians were attacked during riots in the 
Kathmandu streets.54 Parliament stalled for several days over this among several other 
issues. This political crisis had acute implications for Arya-NepaB. Echoing the protests 
in the streets of Kathmandu, the workers at Arya-NepaB formed a Madheshi Daman 
Pratikar Samiti (Resistance Committee against Madheshi (i.e. Indian) Domination). 
Spontaneous riots engulfed the entire garment industry, fuelled by the fact that the Nepali 
hill workers had long felt threatened by the vast competition from the Indian and
54 Since the Nepali hill people could not easily tell Nepali Madheshis from Indians by their physical 
appearances, the Madheshis also were targeted at times.
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Madheshi workers. Like most other garment factories, the managers of Arya-NepaB 
quickly halted its operations for more than a week. The following week the Bollywood 
actor in question issued a press statement claiming not only had he never given the 
alleged interview nor made the alleged remarks on Nepal but he had recently got married 
and was away on honeymoon. With that, Kathmandu returned to normalcy. So did 
Arya-NepaB.55
Within weeks of Arya-NepaB resuming operations, a bizarrely analogous crisis disrupted 
the factory again: the Nepali factory workers started a petition to denounce anti-Nepal 
remarks allegedly made by the Indian Vice President of Arya-NepaB. After the petition 
had collected as many as four hundred signatures and the workers had refused to return 
to factory floors, Ramesh Jain, one of the partners flew in from Ludhiana to negotiate 
with the aggravated labour union. He then suspended the Indian Vice-President in an 
attempt to calm the workers, requiring him to return to Ludhiana where he submitted his 
resignation. The position was not refilled. After that, Navin and Sameer took full 
control of factory operations in their capacities as CEO and Production Manager.
2. Workers
Navin and Sameer’s factory politics worked further to solidify preferential treatment of 
the hill workers over Madheshi workers. Subsequently, the Nepali workers’ resistance to 
Indian leadership in Arya-NepaB manifested and intensified at the time of larger 
political conflicts between Nepalis and Indians on broader issues.
Within the complex ethno-political forces at play on the factory floors, the mechanics of 
labour recruitment was relatively simple and straightforward. The new generation of 
workers had found their way into the Arya-NepaB shop floors through multiple 
channels. Like other mass-manufacturing garment factories, Arya-NepaB maintained a 
notice board where labour requirements for the week were posted every Sunday. The 
factory compound and the two small tea shops across the road had a steady crowd of men 
and women loitering around, catching up on gossip, offering chakari to the floor 
supervisors and hoping to be recruited. It was up to the floor supervisors to decide how 
many production chains they needed and how many workers would be recruited. In 
principle, new workers had to have a Nepali citizenship certificate, pass an interview and
55 The alleged interview from the Bollywood actor was never substantiated. Instead, several o f  the 
local vernacular newspapers speculated that such an ethnic disruption was the making o f the Maoists 
who were at the time testing out preliminary strategies for an urban assault under their People’s War.
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demonstrate good tailoring skills. In practice, however, the floor supervisors already 
knew most of the workers queuing up outside the factory and formal interviews and tests 
were taken only rarely. Within this chaotic recruitment process, local acquaintances had 
preference over others, but equally, since the supervisors’ bonuses were based on 
collective productivity, people with better performance records were always chosen over 
others regardless of their origins and ethnicities.
Arya-Nepal3 by no means had the monopoly over the garment labour force. Workers 
were free to go to hundreds of other factories functioning in parallel and they did. 
Workers met each other in mosques, temples and teahouses, and they switched jobs for a 
raise as little as fifty rupees. While the Indian and Madheshi workers did this more 
easily -  thus earning them the name shukrabare (Fridayers),56 hill workers made some 
effort to stay in the factories where they knew the supervisors. Arya-NepaB was 
especially popular among the garment workers from the hills because it was dominated 
by Nepali workers and supervisors. Women particularly said that their families thought 
it was safer for them to work in Arya-Nepal3 than elsewhere where they were more 
likely to be asked to work side by side with Madheshis.
What eventually weakened the consolidation of Navin and Sameer’s influence among the 
Ary-Nepal-3 labour force was the Maoists’ labour unionism that overpowered the 
readymade garment industry in 2001. The second Maoist national conference in 
February 2001 adopted the Prachanda Path which broadened their focus and officially 
gave directions for expanding their base from the rural to the centre (Hutt, 2004). Along 
with other labour-intensive factories operating in Kathmandu at that time, Arya-NepaB 
became the forefront of Maoist unionism and the Maoists infiltrated the Arya-NepaB 
labour force in the autumn of 2001. The Nepali-Congress-led labour union in Arya- 
NepaB was seen less as a labour union and more as an ‘owners’ union’ working on the 
factory’s public relations in the neighbourhood and beyond. The Maoists entered Arya- 
NepaB often pretending to be unskilled or semi-skilled workers, and once in they easily 
displaced the Nepali-Congress-led labour union. Ironically, it was the old workers, who 
Navin and Sameer had inherited from Arya-Nepal2 who had succumbed to the Maoist 
proselytisation.57 As Navin and Sameer put it, these workers became, chhunai nasakine
56 It was often the case that the Indian and Madheshi workers (most o f whom were Muslims) would 
exchange information about wages and jobs when they met at Friday prayers and switch loyalties the 
day after.
57 Over time, the old workers had evolved into the de facto  mediators on discussions about labour 
benefits. Several new workers performed bhaitika (an annual ritual that sisters performed to pray for
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(uncontrollable) and they paralysed factory operations with their unrealistic demands. 
For example they wanted a fifty per cent rise in all wages and all of the several hundred 
temporary workers to be given permanent contracts with the factory. Navin and Sameer 
were dismayed that it was their own afno mcmchhe (loyals) whom they had patronised 
for years, who had finally let them down. The workers on the other hand did not 
reciprocate this notion of afno manchhe loyalty with the managers, ‘[the factory] never 
sufficiently appreciated our long years of service ... even after decades of our loyalty, we 
get fired like anybody else any day the factory finds cheaper workers elsewhere’.
As the worker-owner dispute escalated, Arya-NepaB suspended its operations for about 
a month. After the govemment-Maoist ceasefire collapsed in November 2001 and the 
government took a firmer position against the rebels,58 Navin and Sameer called the 
police in to the factory to have the labour leaders arrested. The real Maoists had already 
left the factory by then, and the police arrested their allies among the factory workers. 
This whole episode put Navin’s influence among the Nepali workers into jeopardy. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the workforce in Arya-NepaB remained hill migrants. As 
far as the labour leadership was concerned, the new cohort of hill workers quickly rose to 
fill the vacuum created by arrest of the old leaders. The local Nepali-Congress-led 
labour union remained loyal to Navin and Sameer throughout this crisis.
3. Production
Arya-NepaB manufactured exclusively for the American market. The global buyers for 
this market approached Arya-NepaB through their ‘buying houses,’ most of which were 
located either in Mumbai or in New Delhi and were manned by experts who ‘knew the 
pulses’ of South Asian garment manufacturers. Bigger brands often entered into formal 
and long-term agreements with producers and their contracts emphasised quality and 
labour standards as much as price and profit margins; smaller or no-name brands were 
more opportunistic and hopped in and out of countries looking for the cheapest deals 
prompting a ruthless race to the bottom. Arya NepaB was registered as an authorised 
producer with one of the bigger brands, Old Navy59 that purchased about sixty per cent 
of its annual production. The rest of it was absorbed either by smaller brands such as
prosperity and well-being o f brothers) to old workers during the festival o f  Tihar. Others brought 
koseli (gifts) when they visited their homes in the hills. These show the fostering o f relationship 
between the old and new workers as well as an informal hierarchy evolving among them over time.
58 For example, in November 1999, the government issued a ‘red comer notice’ to Interpol calling for 
extradition o f the key Maoist leaders from India and beyond.
59 Old Navy is a brand o f  clothing and chain of stores owned by Gap Inc.
83
Target, Li-Fung, Kohl’s, May Department Store and Wal-mart, or the no-name brands 
who worked on cheap anonymous or imitation garments.60
Both Arya-NepaB and Arya-India were confined to mass manufacturing of six garment 
items: polo shirts, t-shirts, turtlenecks, halters, tank-tops and jogging trousers. Their 
productions had inherent complementarities. For example, it cost 10 to 30 per cent of the 
selling price for Arya-India to buy India’s MFA quota for the American market while a 
lot of Nepal’s quota went unused every year.61 Arya-India manufactured its own fabrics 
while Arya-NepaB was a large consumer of this product. Logically, the Jain brothers 
arranged matters so that Arya-NepaB would manufacture selected garment items in 
Nepal and Arya-India would become the sole suppliers of all fabrics needed. This 
arrangement clearly favoured Arya-India for the reasons I discuss in the following 
paragraph. The fact that Arya-NepaB went along with it was an implicit 
acknowledgement of its status as a dependent subsidiary of Arya-India rather than an 
independent plant that took care of its own profits and losses.
Arya-India’s fabrics were not the cheapest Arya-NepaB could buy nor the best quality. 
Worse yet, Arya-India demanded payment in US dollars even though the Nepali currency 
was fully convertible to Indian. Arya-India insisted on a dollar-based transaction 
because of a controversial export incentive on offer from the Indian government for 
Indian foreign currency earners. India’s Duty Entitlement Passbook (DEPB) system 
granted foreign currency earners an export bonus equivalent to 9 per cent of the export 
invoice value. This bonus was receivable either in cash directly from the government, or 
could be sold to other Indian importers with a 5 per cent commission so the latter could 
use this as a bank guarantee for their own imports. Arya-NepaB however, had to 
undergo a myriad of bureaucratic procedures to get clearance for its dollar-based imports 
of fabrics when there were rupee-based options to be considered. In addition, with each 
devaluation of Nepali rupee vis-a-vis US dollars, Arya-NepaB incurred more and more 
losses in every fabric purchase from Arya-India.
Since the buying houses of most of the global buyers were based in India, Arya-India 
contacted and negotiated most deals with buyers. Once a deal was finalised and a Letter 
of Credit (L/C) issued, Arya-NepaB was brought on board to produce the merchandise.
60 For example, plain t-shirts supplied to organisations interested in selling promotional t-shirts with 
their logos and mottos.
61 See Section 2 o f Chapter 1 for details on how MFA quotas functioned and how they were bought 
and sold in global and local markets.
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An average purchase order in Arya-NepaB exceeded 50,000 pieces and took a lead time 
of thirty to sixty days to manufacture, mobilising five to eight hundred people. The 
purchase orders came with such detailed size and design specifications that there was 
little room or incentive to incorporate any originality. For example, a T-shirt with a retail 
price of USD 8.50 would have an L/C value of USD 3 per piece inclusive of raw 
materials, labour and overhead costs. The simplicity of the product and magnitude of 
volume then meant that the best avenue for revenue generation lay, not in designing and 
innovation, but in best utilisation of inputs and stringent cost-cutting in overheads.
Every production order began with fabrics acquisition. Fabrics were handled not in the 
new plant in Sitapaila, but the old plant in Balaju. Every roll was scanned for holes and 
defects both manually and using scanning machines and the approved fabrics then sent to 
the cutting masters in the same plant. There were only two cutting masters in Arya- 
NepaB, and they were among the best paid workers. The task of cutting pieces into the 
fabrics was relatively easy, but what made the cutting masters’ jobs demanding was their 
skill in utilising the last inch of fabric in order to cut wastage. Once this was done 
satisfactorily, cut patterns were bundled and despatched to the main plant in Sitapaila 
where the pieces would be made into garments.
Sameer, the production manager, led the team of floor supervisors and technicians who 
developed a detailed graphics plan of the production chain and physically set up chains, 
made sure that machines were in the right order, manned by the right man (or woman), 
and that each person had just enough space to do the job. Then he determined, in 
consultation with the floor supervisors and technicians, how much each worker in the 
chain should be paid. This depended on how long the job took, how skilled the workers 
had to be, and what types of machines were required. For example, stitching the neck 
into the main palla (body piece) was one of the most time-consuming and hence best 
paid jobs in the entire chain; operating hemming and overlock machines required 
experienced -  and hence expensive -  workers; whilst although it took much longer to cut 
out the hanging threads once the stitching was over, this was an unskilled task and earned 
only little money. Once the rates were agreed upon and approved by higher 
management, notices were put up on the factory board, and the worker hiring process 
would begin.
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Once the production process took off, speed and continuity of the rhythm were what 
determined Arya-NepaB’s profits. Arya-NepaB was one of the best in Nepal when it 
came to efficiency on the factory floor. This was necessary especially for a 
geographically challenged country like Nepal which is isolated from the global supply 
chain. Since there are bound to be disruptions in acquisition of inputs and transport of 
outputs, the factory floor operations had to be especially efficient. Following this, the 
garment factories in Nepal actually developed a relatively innovative business model of 
paying the workers not by number of hours he or she worked but by the number of pieces 
he or she produced each day. The piece was not the finished garment piece but those 
where each worker did one sub-task within a whole chain of production. The skilled 
workers in Arya-NepaB not only accepted contracts that were as short as a few weeks, 
but also gave up the stability of monthly or daily wages in order to earn piece-based rates 
because they were higher than regular wages. The unskilled workers who were stationed 
to work alongside the piece-rate workers, e.g., ‘thread-removers’ (who removed hanging 
threads after the stitching process was over) and ‘matchers’ (who neatly matched the 
right parts before the tailor ran them through the stitching machines), however, were paid 
less and their wages were counted on a monthly basis.
An example of the manufacturing chain for polo shirts 
Line supervisors: Newar1 and Chhetri*
W ork process Machine 
Type & 
no. of units
Persons working Time
taken
(seconds)
Wages
(NRs)
1. Shoulder joint O/L (1) Newar (Jhapa1* 21 0.40
2. Neck rib making - tanki S/N (1) Chhetri (Kathmandu) 14 0.25
3. Thread cutting - Chhetri (Kathmandu) 
Damai (Kathmandu)+
-
4. Neck rib attaching O/L (2) Bahun (Palpa) 
Chhetri (Baitadi)
34 0.70
5. Checking - Chhetri (Kathmandu)* 15
6. Neck tape making O/L - 0.10
7. Neck tape attach piping 
kachcha
S/N (1) Damai (Kathmandu)+ 56 0.70
8 . Front neck cover stitch F/L (1) Dalit (Janakpur) 19 0.45
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9. Back neck single needle 
kachcha
S/N (2)
Muslim (Mahottari )x 
Muslim (Mahottari)51 151
0.40
10. Back tape pakka  with 
label
0.90
11. Sorting Gurung (Ramechhap) -
12. Label making S/N (1) Tamang (Ramechhap) 0.20
13. Sleeve attaching O/L (1) Magar (Ramechhap) 58 0.80
14. Checking/sorting Rai (Ramechhap)
15. Armhole cover stitch F/L (1) Newar (Kathmandu)1 41 0.60
16. Side seam overlock O/L (1) Chhetri (Kathmandu)* 52 0.80
17. Sorting Chhetri (Kathmandu)*
18. Bottom hemming F/L (1) Chhetri (Kathmandu) 48 0.75
19. Sleeve hemming F/L (1) Chhetri (Kathmandu) 49 0.90
20. Patch label kachcha S/N 0.20
21. Patch label pakka S/N 0.30
9.3 minutes
Notes:
‘*’ and t+’ denote people belonging to one family.
x denotes people from one family working in partnership against the official set up.
1 migrated to Terai generations ago and did not speak Newar language
2 migrated to hills generations ago and did not speak Newar
S/N -  single needle sewing machine 
O/L -  overlock machine 
F/L -  flatlock machine
For Arya-NepaB, ‘quality’ meant accuracy of measurements and had nothing to do with 
authenticity of inputs, innovation of designs or creativity of process. Each purchase 
order came to Arya-NepaB with a sample piece and a detailed naap khata (measurement 
specification book) that described the required measurements in great detail. These were 
the benchmarks against which quality was measured. The task of quality control could 
also be seen as a punctuation in the otherwise uninterrupted flow of the production 
process. The quality checkers sat side by side with the tailors and checked measurements, 
first, when the two main body parts or pallas were stitched together, then when the
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sleeves and necks were added to the pallas and finally upon completion of the stitching 
process. Although each checker relied initially on a specification chart, or a simplified 
version of the naap khata which they kept prominently on their table, the rhythm of the 
process quickly enabled them to memorise the details such that they would soon discard 
the specification tables and measuring tapes to rely solely on their fingers and memories.
After stitching, the garments were passed on to the finishing department where they were 
washed to remove any stains and dust; machine-checked to see if any broken needles or 
other hazardous objects had got stuck in them; any hanging threads removed; ironed, 
packed and finally despatched to the factory storage. These tasks flowed spontaneously 
again only to be punctuated by three to six rounds of additional quality inspections. 
Occasionally, petrol and chemical sprays were applied to remove any stains present, 
otherwise, they were sent for a required ordinary laundering in the facility newly set up 
within the factory. When the laundry facility was inadequate or machines 
malfunctioned, which happened every now and then, this task was subcontracted to an 
external service provider.
Unlike the stitching operations where the factory had established an elaborate Taylorist 
production mechanism, the world of finishing was still caught between old and new. 
Apart from a few procedures, the task of finishing required the operation of heavy 
machinery such as the needle detectors, industrial washers and dryers, steamers and 
chemical sprayers, etc. Managers were unwilling to assign these responsibilities to 
people who might not make a long-term commitment to the factory, but had to recognise 
the fact that not many of the local Nepalis in the garment industry had yet acquired the 
skills necessary to operate these machines. Further, the finishing facility had been set up 
within the factory only recently, which meant Sameer and Navin could not inherit the 
afno manchhe from Arya-Nepall and Arya-Nepal2 as they had done for several other 
jobs. As a result, the finishing department was still under the control of migrant workers 
from northern India and the southern Terai. The supervisor of the finishing unit, a Bahun 
from Uttar Pradesh, received an attractive salary and benefits. Whereas the labour 
recruitment tasks in the stitching units had been highly anonymised, the finishing 
supervisor still retained a large amount of control over who he hired in his unit even to 
do less technology-intensive jobs such as steaming, ironing, folding and packing. Since 
the finishing workers saw their careers and remunerations more in the hands of their unit 
supervisor than higher management, they demonstrated greater loyalty to him as a person
than to Sameer, Navin or the Punjabi managers. For example, none of the finishing 
workers signed the petition against the Vice President when the rest of the workers were 
adamant that he should step down over an ethnic faux pas. Later on, after the Maoist 
proselytisers had left and the rest of the factory attempted to negotiate better working 
conditions, the finishing workers did not take part in any of it. It appeared that -  as was 
the case in the specialised factories that I will discuss in Chapters 5 and 6 -  the finishing 
unit still put ethnic and individualised loyalties above occupational, and ironically, it 
appeared that such introverted networks helped them keep their distance from the labour 
turbulences experienced elsewhere in the factory.
4. Transportation and Shipping
On average, it took about three weeks for a garment consignment to travel from Nepal to 
the United States via land and sea, at a cost of USD 900 for a standard twenty feet 
container. It was customary for the buyer to pay all the costs once the merchandise was 
loaded on the ship.62 However, the downside was that the L/Cs were time-bound and if 
the merchandise was not despatched from the port in time, the buyer had the right to 
cancel the L/C denying even the minimum payment of the entire order.63 This left Arya- 
NepaB and other mass manufacturers of the readymade garment teetering at the edge of 
a precipice. Whenever despatch to Kolkata was delayed, as would happen every now 
and then owing to political and supply chain uncertainties, Arya-NepaB had no option 
but to courier the merchandise to the next point of stop so that the shipment arrived on 
time at the final destination. The mass manufacturers occasionally sought help from 
GAN and the government in arbitration with buyers in disputes involving shipping 
issues. Their efforts were often in vain, but this was only to be expected given that the 
global readymade garment industry was a zero sum game, as the developing country 
suppliers all competed for the business of the few select buyers who controlled the global 
market.
62 A standard garment transaction involved a Letter of Credit (L/C) with the specification Tree On 
Board (FOB) Kolkata port, ’ where payment was generally triggered upon presentation o f a letter from 
the buyer confirming receipt o f the merchandise. The buyer had to bear all costs and risks o f loss o f or 
damage to the goods from the point that the merchandise was loaded on the designated ship in Kolkata 
port. FOB required the seller to clear the goods for export.
631 have described in detail in Section 3.1 o f this chapter how Arya-NepaB had closed down because 
the L/C for one o f  their major orders was cancelled. The cancellation in this case was because o f  
quality issues, but it still shows the power global garment buyers had over their producers from 
developing countries.
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I specifically looked at one purchase order Arya-NepaB worked on during my fieldwork 
in the factory. This was an order from the Old Navy brand of Gap Inc to produce USD
650.000 worth of polo shirts. If Arya-NepaB had produced this merchandise as per the 
original time table and despatched it in time, it would have earned a profit of USD
65.000 or 10 per cent of the order value. However, production was delayed due to 
frequent political strikes which not only disrupted the timely arrival of the imported 
fabrics but also shut down the factory floor for weeks at a time. As a result, the 
consignment was four weeks late leaving Kathmandu and had to be air-freighted all the 
way to the United States. This cost Arya-NepaB USD 156,000 or 24 per cent of the 
value of the merchandise leading to an overall loss of 14 per cent of the total value of the 
order. Admittedly it was rare that producers were forced to bear such heavy losses, 
although every mass manufacturer I spoke to had air-couriered their consignment at least 
part of the way at one time or another.
When production was not disrupted, Arya-NepaB shipped its garments to the American 
markets through the trans-Pacific route starting at the port of Kolkata. While the 
Kolkata-Los Angeles transhipment route was smooth and relatively predictable, the 
biggest ordeal for Arya-NepaB was to get the consignment to Kolkata safe and on time. 
Officially, there were 22 agreed transit and customs posts along the 1400 kilometre long 
border, but only 15 were designated points to Kolkata. Most exporters including Arya- 
NepaB preferred to use the Raxaul transit point in Birganj; if the roads were smooth, it 
took four to six days by bus to transport a consignment from Kathmandu to Kolkata and 
two days by rail. However, consignments were often delayed for weeks, not only during 
the monsoon when landslides routinely washed roads away but also during the political 
strikes called by the mainstream opposition parties as well as during the skirmishes 
between the Maoist rebels and the army which brought highway operations to a standstill 
for several weeks.
Beyond the obvious logistical bottlenecks, Nepal-India transportation also suffered from 
a series of political ones. Understanding these bottlenecks will entail some historical 
knowledge of the political problems Nepal and India have encountered throughout the 
diverse political trajectories they have undergone. There are no mountains, rivers or 
canyons that would have marked a natural border between Nepal and India along the 
Terai. The thick forests of Charkose Jhadi which were infested with malaria had 
historically acted as a natural border between Nepal and India, although local residents
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from both sides of the border were free to move around as they wished. After Nepal lost 
a war against the East India Company (EIC hereafter) in 1814, it signed a historic treaty 
in 1816,64 which facilitated the official border demarcation process between the two 
countries. Following this, Nepal and the EIC agreed on the major road junctions and 
places to levy customs duties. Nepal-EIC relations improved significantly after Jung 
Bahadur Rana came to power and demonstrated great loyalty to the British in quelling 
the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857.65 The British soon developed the open border with Nepal in 
order to gain easy access to Nepalese raw materials such as timber and forest produce, 
herbs and medicinal plants, hides and skins, etc. (Lall, 1999a). The border became more 
relaxed and de facto emerged as an ‘open border’ after the British signed a treaty with 
Nepal in 1923 recognising Nepal as a sovereign independent country and thus erasing 
from Nepali minds the fear of British invasion.
Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher initiated a series of development efforts to improve 
Nepal’s connectivity with India through railway projects that linked Amlekhganj with 
Raxaul, Janakpur with Jayanagar, etc. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Panchayat regime 
initiated internal and international immigration schemes for the hill tribes.66 Despite this, 
access to Nepal-India border crossings remained in the hands of Madheshi (largely 
Marwari) entrepreneurs. This might partly be attributed to the fact that the border 
continued to be a site of criminal activities and problems arising from the politics of 
Indo-Nepali relations. Even today, there is no denying the fact that the Nepal-India 
border continues to be a place where human trafficking and the smuggling of drugs, 
arms, archaeological artefacts, medicinal herbs and general commodities flourish.
Adding to the woes of the transport entrepreneurs trying to cross the Nepal-India borders, 
was the lack of clarity and system in the customs clearance process. This was document 
intensive -  around fifteen documents might be required for imports and eleven for 
exports. The tax procedure alone required three separate forms for business tax, income 
tax and VAT registration for import and export. There was neither a consensus nor any
64 The treaty o f Sugauli under which Nepal lost some o f  its territories to the British.
65 In recognition o f Rana loyalty to the British, the EIC signed a treaty with Nepal in 1860 where it 
restored the far western territory that had been ceded to India under the 1816 Treaty o f  Sugauli. This 
territory is also known as naya muluk or New Nepal.
66 For example, in 1964, when Burma enforced its new citizenship act, Nepalis who opted out o f  
Burmese citizenship were resettled in the central Terai (Kansakar: 1979,65). When there were ethnic 
riots in Northeast India, people o f  Nepali origin were allowed to resettle in eastern Terai. Some o f the 
Terai land were confiscated from the local Tharus and Madheshis to redistribute to the hill people as 
part of the first land reform programme initiated by the Panchayat regime in 1964. The resettlement 
programme for landless people (punarbas) in 1972 also saw more hill people move to Terai.
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transparency as to which documents were required for which types of merchandise 
because requirements changed at the whim of the customs officials in place which meant 
that the transporters had to maintain a close alliance with the customs officials and keep 
them happy at all costs.
This historical detour brings back the issue Arya-NepaB is currently faced with -  that its 
supply chain logistics was well beyond its control. Inasmuch as it would have liked to 
expedite and save costs on transportation, customs clearance and border crossing -  
especially to make up for the erratic factory operations in Kathmandu under 
unpredictable labour unionism -  it was dependent on its few afno manchhe connections 
for any queue-jumping that would marginally expedite its merchandise at the border. It 
is true that Arya-Nepal3 fared relatively better in handling the border bureaucracy 
compared to their non-Bahun-Chhetri counterparts. But it had no solution to the 
exorbitant transport costs every mass garment exporter had to live with. Owing to the 
bad infrastructure, lose border management and sporadic cases of criminality involved, 
there simply wasn’t a critical mass of transport operators through the border. As a result, 
transportation costs were very high until the merchandise got loaded on the ships in 
Kolkata port and joined the global transhipment. These were serious factors that 
hindered Arya-NepaB’s competitiveness in the global garment market.
5. Collapse of the factory
Owing to the hostile local political and international policy scenarios, Arya-NepaB 
closed its operations in March 2004. While labour productivity in Arya-NepaB was only 
slightly lower than that in Arya-India in Ludhiana, the overall cost of operations were 
substantially higher. For example, the inputs and accessories had to be transported from 
India and elsewhere to Kathmandu which took 4 to 6 days for physical transportation and 
6-10 days of exploration to find the right partners and finalise deals. In addition, as I 
have described earlier in Section 3, Arya-NepaB had no other choice but to use fabrics 
produced in Arya-India under the adverse terms of trade previously described. 
Managerial relations had soured since the Hritik Roshan scandal and labour organisation 
had deteriorated as the Maoists came out strongly with their anti-India agenda. The 
recurrent bandhs (strikes) called by the mainstream opposition parties had seriously 
fragmented its supply chain and the scheduled expiration of the MFA in December 2004 
was like a sword hanging over its head. The final straw was that Arya-NepaB was 
forced to air-courier three of its consignments consecutively within the short period of
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October 2003 to February 2004, bringing with it serious financial losses that called its 
business viability into question.
After the air-couriering of the first consignment in October 2003, Arya-NepaB floated a 
proposal to revamp its managerial organisation. Soon, a ‘new’ managerial structure was 
developed with the help of human resources experts from Ludhiana. The HR experts 
recommended hiring the services of a top-notch business consultancy to help develop a 
new business strategy. Fearful that such a team might advise against the tenure of the 
‘old’ managers, Navin recommended instead that they recruit a team of ‘young and 
capable’ people to join the factory as permanent career managers. A group of four young 
business graduates and two fashion designers from prestigious fashion designing schools 
in India and European countries were selected through a competitive process. This team 
was expected to work under Navin’s supervision but also in close liaison with the 
managers in Arya-India in Ludhiana to upgrade the organisational structure and 
operating systems of the factory. Major upgrades were made in the factory’s accounting 
system. They were paid approximately double Sameer’s salary and the company not only 
set up fancy offices for them but also arranged a whole set of perks such as company cars 
for their daily commute and membership in elite business clubs in Kathmandu.
The arrival of the new team sparked a great deal of interest in the factory. On the one 
hand, the factory workers saw these young people as potential saviours who might save 
them from the danger of redundancy hovering over their heads. The team was given a 
warm welcome, by not only Sameer and Navin but also the accountants, store-keepers, 
supervisors and merchandisers. On the other hand, the distinction of their attire and 
etiquette sparked curiosity among people. The security guards at the main gate would 
salute them not because they were functionally important but because they came to the 
office every morning in their modem ties and scarves, looking important; floor 
supervisors found it amusing that they were suddenly being addressed with the honorifics 
tapain and ji, as opposed to the familiar timi; Sameer was impressed that they spoke with 
the Indian managers not in Hindi but in English; Navin noted their habits of taking notes 
during discussions and their knowledge of the latest computer software used for 
accounting, merchandising and fashion-designing. Before long, the factory started 
entertaining a series of daily and weekly meetings in the meeting room as opposed to the 
previous practice of standing in a circle in the middle of the stitching floor to discuss
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anything ranging from machinery upgrading to factory downsizing, where everybody 
from CEO to floor supervisor felt free to walk in and offer their opinions.
However, frictions soon emerged between the old and the new managers: The Indian 
managers simply refused to speak English, and to the dislike of the new team whose 
Hindi was not fluent, meetings went back to being held in Hindi. On one occasion, a 
female merchandise expert of the new team was abruptly told by her Punjabi counterpart 
that she should tie back her hair at all times when she was in the factory, which sent 
shockwaves among the new team members. They were also not encouraged by the fact 
that the floor supervisors and production managers calculated time and costs of 
production spontaneously in their heads while they themselves preferred to enter data 
systematically into the computer to calculate their forecasts. On one occasion, one of the 
new merchandising experts forgot to place an order for the thread when placing an order 
for buttons. This was seen as a very basic mistake and became a classic joke among the 
factory workers. But what made the new team a laughing stock was their 
recommendation that the company invest in an expensive merchandise management 
software to prevent such problems in future. Within three months of joining, the new 
team had more or less failed to reinvigorate the factory or bring in any solutions to its 
long list of problems. One of the many rumours floating in the factory was about a 
conspiracy because the leader of the new team was supposedly somehow affiliated with 
the Maoist party. This probably had to do with a series of references he made to stories 
of the success of the Maoists at grassroots level which may have been said as an attempt 
to motivate the workers.
The new team did not really find their stint in the garment factory very rewarding either. 
They felt that garment-manufacturing was a lower class job and offered little career 
prospects. Two of them had left previous employment in travel agencies which were 
exclusively desk jobs and thus seen as intellectually more rewarding. One said she 
would ultimately like to find something in the international development industry. The 
other preferred to be in a fashion designing company where her skills would be more 
useful. They also favoured the idea of running their own business as opposed to being 
employed. It did not help that garment manufacturing was not a promising industry any 
more. Most of them frequently referred to older kin or friends with careers in more 
glamorous professions such as hotel management, public relations or the media as their 
role models. Their common assessment of a garment job was that it was more about
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charko bolnu (shouting) and chappal khiyaunu (rubbing shoes) than dimagko kam 
(intellectual work). Their families and friends were not particularly impressed by a 
career in the garment industry and although they were earning salaries that were 
competitive compared to other sectors, one of them said he did not tell his girlfriend that 
he worked in the garment industry. By March 2004, all six of them had quit.
In the meantime, at some considerable cost, Arya-NepaB employed a management 
consultancy team from Ludhiana to make some recommendations which Sameer and the 
floor supervisors openly argued was a repetition of what they were already doing. Whilst 
Navin made a few trips to Ludhiana to discuss the factory’s future, two more 
consignments had to be air couriered to Singapore because of production delays. The 
management consultancy firm advised Arya-NepaB to apply for government loan 
packages to try and counteract the recent losses incurred. This was not acceptable to 
Navin who argued in turn that Arya-NepaB’s profits and losses should be examined not 
in isolation but in conjunction with the accounts of the broader Arya-Group. He 
specifically pointed out the fact that Arya-NepaB had been sourcing all its fabrics from 
Arya-India in lucrative US dollar terms purely to help the latter qualify for the attractive 
fiscal incentives being dished out by the Indian government (see Section 3). Ironically, 
while the discussion on loan applications proceeded, Navin was finally able to pay off 
the last tranche of bank loans he had taken out half a decade earlier to rescue Arya- 
NepaB. He was not only finally taken off the government’s blacklist but was also able to 
pay back some of the money he owed to Sameer’s father from their business separation 
deal (see Section 1).
Parallel to this series of somewhat discouraging developments at the managerial level, 
Arya-NepaB underwent a series of other tragic incidents. In September 2003, an accident 
occurred in the washing unit seriously injuring five of the finishing workers. This caused 
the closure of the washing unit and the factory subcontracted the task to an outside 
service provider. In October 2003, a major bus accident killed five of the stitching 
workers and injured 26 others as they were being dropped off after work in a factory- 
operated bus. Despite the difficulties, the factory was seen to have paid generous 
compensation to the victims, although there were workers who thought the factory could 
have done more. In January 2004, Navin Sharma’s older brother, who had remained 
unmarried all his life in order to raise Navin after their parents passed away, had an 
untimely death and in February, Sameer lost his brother-in-law to a sudden and untimely
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heart attack. These incidents left Navin and Sameer jaded. A lively and ambitious 
business venture a year ago, Arya-NepaB was beginning to lose its fervour and around it, 
more and more garment factories closed down owing to deteriorating local political 
conditions. In a desperate attempt to cast away the dark clouds hovering overhead, Arya- 
NepaB commissioned a series of religious ceremonies in the factory while both Sameer 
and Navin remained occupied in the funeral rites of their family and kin.
In February 2004, the factory decided to downsize and let go of one of its two plants. 
There was open disagreement between the Jain brothers and Navin and Sameer as to 
which of the two buildings should be kept. Ramesh Jain, in particular, was in favour of 
keeping the smaller building but Navin and Sameer felt that the factory would not be able 
to operate unless the main building was retained. The main priest from Arya-India flew 
in to Nepal and advised that the main building was astrologically unsuitable for the 
owner. There were long debates between the Nepali and Indian managers not only about 
the business and ethical considerations of the proposed act but also the astrological. 
Against all odds, however, Arya-NepaB kept its main building in Sitapaila and gave up 
the smaller plant.
The fact that the Jain brothers forced Navin to give up one of the factory buildings was a 
strong signal to the workers that the problems in the factory were become 
insurmountable. It also appeared to them that, in the wake of two funerals in the family 
and two serious accidents in the factory, both Navin and Sameer had reached the end of 
their tethers. While the more seasoned of the factory workers went elsewhere to look for 
jobs, the younger and fierier workers decided that it was time to stand up for what they 
perceived was their rights and to take matters into their own hands. Four of the floor 
supervisors agreed that they should form a labour union in order to launch a more 
coordinated grievance schedule. Navin and Sameer’s advice to them was, first, that the 
raising of any new issues would not only alienate Ludhiana but hinder the Nepali 
management team itself in keeping the factory going; and second, that if the workers 
wanted the labour unions to get involved, they should coordinate better with the one that 
was already registered under Arya-NepaB. The floor supervisors were convinced that 
the current labour union, registered under the Nepal Trade Union Congress (NTUC) or 
the labour wing of the Nepali Congress, was not sufficiently responsive to labour needs. 
They wanted to register a new labour union under the pro-UML General Federation of 
the Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT). As they initiated a signature campaign with the
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aim of collecting the legally required quorum of 25 per cent of the total labour force, 
Navin and Sameer sank further into despair.
In the end, a new labour union was registered and the workers formally took to the floor 
against the potential factory closure. Such grievances, as Navin had warned the floor 
supervisors earlier, not only weakened his own case to Ramesh Jain for keeping the 
factory operating but also shook his confidence in himself as the leader of the Nepali 
workers he had hired. Amidst conflicting speculations, Navin cut a deal with Ramesh 
Jain that he would be appointed an Arya-India representative in the United States with 
visas and logistics arranged by the company, and at the first opportunity, he and his 
family resettled in California. Sameer remained in Nepal and joined a training course on 
fashion design. A large number of Arya-NepaB workers who had been paid lump sum 
severance packages by Navin and Sameer suddenly found themselves in a dilemma. On 
the one hand, after their employment ended, it was no longer possible for them to remain 
in Kathmandu; on the other hand they did not dare return to their war-torn villages with 
such large sums of cash in hand. Instead, a large number of the garment supervisors 
chose to seek new employment either in East Asian countries or in the Middle East, 
including hazardous destinations such as Iraq and Lebanon.
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Chapter 5: Rongoli
My second case study is Rongoli Pvt Ltd, a family-run factory exporting ethnic- 
contemporary garments to the high-end markets of the North American West Coast. 
Garment making was not a hereditary occupation of the factory owners who came from 
families o f cloth merchants from Uttar Pradesh in India. The influence of their family 
profession was reflected in Rongoli’s preference in garment designing: they focused 
more on use of fabrics and colour combinations than on cutting and fitting, as a 
conventional designing approach would entail. Except in one or two cases, all of 
Rongoli’s designs were women’s jackets, which followed standard measurements, apart 
from simple variations in length, sleeve or collar. The core of the designing in Rongoli 
was, as the owner put it, ‘fabric-play’. For them, the main fabric was a blank canvas on 
which they carried out the design to produce collages, in this case, using traditional 
techniques of patchwork, embroidery and beadwork. Although they used traditional 
colours and combinations, a series of bold improvisations were introduced from time to 
time which gave the products an avant-garde look. When Rongoli was founded in 1988 
it produced modestly priced quilted garments made of raw cotton aimed at the local 
tourist market, but it took a new direction after the Nepali government introduced its new 
industrial policy in 1992, which removed the import duty on export-contributing fabrics 
and paved the way for global integration. Instead of being confined to locally produced 
cotton, the new policy regime enabled Rongoli to import necessary fabrics in bulk from 
all over India, giving it the chance to take its creativity to new heights of industrial 
production.
1. The caste and family background of the owners
All of my local contacts who had heard of this particular caste group, referred to the 
owners of Rongoli as Marwaris. Except for the three designers, who were part of the 
inner circle of the Rauniyar family, all other workers in Rongoli thought their sahu 
(employer) to be a Marwari, and the various practices carried out in the factory on 
occasions to be Marwari ones. The Nepali census had also long categorised the 
businessmen from Utter Pradesh as Marwari caste. It was only when I got to know Gaj 
Raj Rauniyar, the proprietor of Rongoli, very well that I came to learn that the Rauniyars 
did not come from Marwar, a town in the north west of Rajasthan which is the origin of 
all Marwaris, but from the towns of Lucknow and Kanpur.
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The Rauniyars saw themselves as vaishyas (the merchant caste) under the Hindu Verna 
system. The richer of the Uttar Pradesh businessmen, along with their more authentic 
Marwari counterparts, came to Nepal during the Rana regime to serve the affluent Rana 
families in their initial business undertakings. A number of textile and sugar mills 
established in Terai towards the end of the Rana regime had UP managers and business 
partners. This opened a route for the lesser UP businessmen who lived in the bordering 
areas and were keen to tap into various business opportunities in Nepal. Since the UP 
and Marwari businessmen along with other Hindu business communities believed in 
charity, they patronised a number of basas and sattals (charity guest houses), both in 
Kathmandu and on the route to Kathmandu. Although these charity shelters were built 
primarily to cater to Hindu pilgrims travelling to Nepal to pay homage to Pashupatinath, 
they also lodged business travellers and business seekers. The basas were especially 
associated with caste patronage of affluent Marwaris to their fellow castemen (Zivetz, 
1992: 86).
Other Indian ethnicities had also been migrating to Nepal before or about the same time 
as the UP businessmen, in much larger numbers and greater capacities. In fact, the first 
Indian ethnic group to have come to Nepal were the original Marwaris. The first cohort 
of Marwaris had entered officially through the pragyapan patra (State letter of 
invitation) issued by the Rana rulers in 1929 to lead industrial projects in Nepal. Even 
before this, the first Rana Prime Minister, Jung Bahadur Rana, was said to have 
collaborated with a Marwari in the opium trade with China. The first modem industry in 
Nepal -  a jute mill -  was established in 1936 by Radha Kissen Chamaria, a Kolkata 
Marwari in joint partnership with Juddha Shamsher Rana (Gaige, 1975). The Marwaris 
did not enter as a unified ethnic group, but came to Nepal from all over North India and 
Burma. They did, however, share a number of common characteristics: they spoke the 
same language; were all merchants and all traced back their roots to Marwar, the north­
west province of Rajasthan. Although ostensibly divided into two faiths, Hinduism and 
Jainism, the two religions were closely intertwined among the Marwaris owing to, and 
resulting in, frequent inter-religion marriages over the generations. For these reasons, 
Marwaris had a unified and strong ethnic identity (Timberg, 1978:50). When they came 
to Nepal, this identity provided a kind of ethnic flagship into which other Indian business 
communities, including the UP businessmen, assimilated. Only about 200 families in 
number, UP businessmen in Nepal had the option of either marrying into the families of 
Marwaris already there or going to various Indian cities to look for suitable brides and
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grooms from their own ethnicity. Increasingly, people took the former option. In the 
genealogies I collected of ten UP businessmen in Nepal, more than half of them had at 
least one consanguine relative who was a Marwari.
Such a rapid ethnic assimilation of various Indian business communities with the 
Marwaris was a feature unique to Nepal that did not occur anywhere in India.67 This 
may be attributed to the minority status Indians had in Nepal where the large majority 
were nationally, linguistically and ethnically distinct from them. In this regard, 
assimilation was based on need rather than choice. Such a phenomenon is comparable to 
Chalmers’s discussion of how a strong Nepali identity emerged rapidly in various parts 
of West Bengal in the 1960s and 1970s among the various caste/ethnic groups who had 
migrated from Nepal. The vast majority of them, mostly Limbus, Gurungs, Magars, 
Newars, Tamangs and Kamis, swiftly switched from speaking their ethnic mother-tongue 
languages to speaking Nepali. Furthermore, a large number of Buddhist and Hindu 
Newars, who would previously have distinguished themselves from each other on the 
basis of their religion, went to the extent of abandoning their original surnames to adopt a 
generic surname o f‘Pradhan’ in Daijeeling, Kalimpong and elsewhere (Chalmers, 2003). 
An Indian equivalent of this Nepali phenomenon might be the rapid formation of the 
‘Marwari’ identity among the otherwise distinct Indian ethnic groups who had migrated 
to Nepal.
It is important to note, however, that these were a number of Indian migrant communities 
in Nepal who remained untouched by this stream of ethnic assimilation that made all 
Indians Marwaris even when they were not. For example, South Indians, who had come 
to Nepal first as missionaries and later as teachers and programmers in the computer 
software industry, kept their identity and social structure distinct from the Marwaris; as 
did the Kashmiris who had migrated to Nepal after the Sikh occupation of Kashmir in the 
nineteenth century and more recently after the Indian intervention in 1947. One would 
immediately recognise the Kashmiris as artisans rather than entrepreneurs although 
increasingly large number of Kashmiris are now running shops selling Kashmiri shawls 
and jackets to tourists in Kathmandu. Kashmiris certainly did not trust other Marwaris
67 Gellner and Quigley (1999) argued on the other hand that such melding o f different caste and ethnic 
groups was a phenomenon that had prevailed in the Kathmandu Valley since the time o f the Lichhavis 
in medieval times. They cite the case o f  the Rajopadhyaya and Kayastha Bahuns who had been 
brought to the Kathmandu Valley for their priestly knowledge and who later assimilated into the 
indigenous Newars o f Kathmandu Valley.
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and other Indians on matters of their financial or artisanal secrets. The same could be 
said about the South Indians — that they were primarily intellectuals and not 
entrepreneurs. A further reason why the South Indians did not assimilate with the North 
Indians in Nepal as elsewhere probably had to do with their language and religion.68 
This gives one reason to believe that in the same way as the Nepali diaspora in India 
unified itself on the basis of common origin and common language, it was the thread of 
common vocation and occupation, which wove the various Indian ethnic groups into a 
Marwari identity within Nepal. In this respect, the Marwari identity can be seen as 
comparable to a guild or an informal business association.
Currently, the status of the Marwaris, some of who are by now third or fourth generation 
migrants, is analogous to the Rajopadhyaya Bahun Newars (Toffin, 1999: 197). They 
have physical features distinct from the local Nepalis but most of them speak fluent 
Nepali.69 Yet they all have a distinct Marwari identity, no doubt strengthened by their 
common experience as immigrant entrepreneurs, of a certain degree of alienation and 
sometimes resentment from the local people -  a global experience for minority capitalists 
as shown by Bauer and Yamey (1957: 111). What it meant to be a Marwari in 
Kathmandu was, first, to have access to capital, whether large or small; to contain 
readiness for business opportunities, risks and calculations, and to have had exposure to 
Indian cultures beyond the experience of most indigenous Nepalis.
Gaj Raj and his wife Sabitri wore broader Marwari-Nepali identity like a second skin. 
As was pragmatic for other Marwaris in Nepal, Gaj Raj and his family did not talk much 
about their origins. Unlike most other Nepalis who nurtured nostalgic memories about 
their past, Gaj hardly ever initiated a discussion about where his ancestors came from. It 
was only upon inquiry that he revealed that they were originally from Uttar Pradesh but 
emphasised that they ‘had become’ (bhaisakyo) Nepali and that they had no more ties
68 While the North Indians spoke Hindi as a lingua franca and were largely Hindus, the South Indians 
either spoke Malayali or English and a majority o f them were Christians.
69 The Marwaris speak Nepali with a mild Indian accent depending on how long they have been in 
Nepal. Third or fourth generation migrants speak fluent Nepali while those who arrived more recently 
speak what is commonly called ‘Madheshi-Nepali’ (broken Nepali spoken with a strong Madheshi 
accent). Those who live in the inner part o f the city which have traditionally been the Newar 
strongholds often speak Newari in addition to Nepali. It was my general observation that men speak 
better Newari than women, which may be a reflection of their relative exposure to the surrounding 
culture and social groups.
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left with India.70 Gaj’s grandfather was a cloth merchant in a small village in Uttar 
Pradesh who had migrated to Birganj in the eastern Terai of Nepal during the Rana 
regime. Both his sons continued the family business in Birganj and other Terai towns, as 
did their sons. The youngest of the five sons in the third generation, Gaj was sent to 
Kathmandu Valley to pursue higher education. The only daughter of this family married 
a businessman in Kathmandu, and with this new personal connection Gaj had more 
reason to move to Kathmandu from Birganj. During his Intermediate and Bachelor level 
studies, at the commerce faculty of Tribhuvan University of Kathmandu, Gaj was already 
running a cloth shop in Makhan in Kathmandu Durbar Square which was and still is the 
hub of the local textile trade. He also pursued some hobbies that distinguished him from 
other Kathmanduites: for example, he was an amateur boxer, studied French and was an 
active member of the Rotary Club of Kathmandu. All these extra-curricular activities 
helped him build good networks among the elites and semi-elites in Kathmandu, and also 
gain experience in various business ventures. On a number of international trips he made 
as a Rotarian, he brought back with him auto-loom saris, ready-made garments and 
models’ posters from Bangkok and Hong Kong, to sell to Kathmanduites.
Gaj fell in love with Sabitri, the younger of the two daughters of his shop landlord. 
Sabitri’s family were from the same region of UP as Gaj. The two families had an 
agnatic relation separated by only four generations but their traditional norms required a 
separation of at least five generations for any conjugal ties to be socially acceptable. 
When Gaj and Sabitri decided to marry despite this they could not wed customarily but 
had to elope instead, returning to their community only after matters had settled down. 
Gaj lost his cloth shop as a result of the complications arising from his marriage to 
Sabitri.
2. Tracing the factory history
Soon after marrying Sabitri in 1978, Gaj borrowed six thousand rupees from his elder 
sister to start a ready-made garment shop in Makhan in Kathmandu Durbar Square. The 
shop employed one Damai (the so called untouchable tailor caste) tailor who sewed a 
series of quilted garments using plain cotton fabrics, as was popular among tourists 
visiting Kathmandu in those days. They often combined fabrics of four or five base 
colours, which were the products of simple colouring techniques developed indigenously
70 However, Gaj’s in-laws still had close marital relations in Lucknow and parts o f Uttar Pradesh 
although neither Gaj nor his in-laws particularly emphasised this during their conversations with local 
Nepalis.
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within Kathmandu, and sewn into easy to wear, free-size garments. What made the 
garments striking were the complicated quilted patterns used. It is in this respect that 
Gaj’s garments were cleverer than others, for example, some of his jackets folded neatly 
to make children’s bags. Such tricks made him popular not only among the tourists but 
increasingly also among expatriates living in Kathmandu. In the 1980s, with increasing 
developmental interest in Nepal, expatriates were fast emerging as a new elite group and 
networks developed with them through business or social activities helped Gaj and 
Sabitri get wider exposure to the clothing tastes of non-Nepalis.
Gaj recalled counting about fifteen shops in Kathmandu that sold similar garments at the 
time he started his shop. As the market for souvenir garments grew, people from 
different walks of life, including those who had originally sold handicrafts, joined the 
industry.71 The early starters had an advantage; when the latecomers were still catering 
exclusively to the local tourist market, some early starters had already started to export, 
initially to Japan and later to European countries. Gaj also started to supply a local agent 
exporting to Japan, Manandhar Exports Pvt Ltd, run by an important public figure who 
later rose to become the Nepali ambassador to several Scandinavian countries and whose 
son became the President of the Nepalese Chamber of Commerce. Through the network 
he developed while working for this firm, Gaj secured his first direct export order, to 
Japan, in 1980.
Gaj had to officially register his factory as Oriental Boutique in 1980 to qualify for the 
export order he had already received.72 The order was from a Kobe-based Japanese 
company called Amina Collection Pvt Ltd, was worth approximately fifteen thousand US 
dollars and involved the manufacture of what was called kozak monto, a traditional 
Japanese dress with long sleeves and hood, often in plain white, made out of locally- 
produced coarse cotton. Each piece earned Gaj USD 19.5, which was a handsome price 
by then current garment standards. The buyer was happy with his work and Gaj 
continued to receive regular orders. Although Gaj later also supplied garments for a third 
Japanese company based in Kanagawa Kamakura, only Amina Collection placed orders
71 Gaj and others recalled that, at the time he started his shop, there were many more handicraft shops 
in Kathmandu than garment shops.
72 One o f the reasons why many businessmen did not register their businesses had to do with the taxes 
as well as the long bureaucratic procedures attached to the task. Gaj also did not register his factory 
until he received export orders and paperwork became necessary. Although the workshop was in 
Tahachal in Kathmandu district, the official address given was that o f an area in Lalitpur because tax 
rates were higher for the Kathmandu district.
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directly with him and so he was most loyal to them.73 In the meantime, however, he also 
started selling wholesale to, and taking orders from, a number of American buyers, some 
of whom soon became regular customers.
Gaj found working for the Japanese very different from working for his American 
clients. He noted that Japanese clients not only gave very detailed instructions about 
colour, cut and measurements, but measured the finished garments to the last inch upon 
arrival. His market in Japan was exclusively comprised of Japanese ethnic clothes, an 
area he knew little about. He had made two business trips to Kobe and Yokohama, 
during which, with little knowledge of Japanese language and culture, he had found 
Japan rather impenetrable. Compared to this, his American buyers were experimental 
themselves and gave him more manoeuvring space in terms of design and manufacture. 
Hence, although the Americans were buying lower-priced items from him than the 
Japanese, he did more business with them. He said his principle at that time was that one 
must never say ‘no’ to customers. This was clearly a phase of expansion and growth for 
Gaj’s business.
In 1988, Gaj moved Oriental Boutique to a larger building. He also took this as an 
opportunity to reinitiate the necessary paperwork with the Department of Industries to 
register it as a new body, called Rongoli Pvt Ltd. The reason for this was that the 
business had grown enormously and because he had been too busy, he had not managed 
to do the milaune (adjustments) on his paperwork so as to clarify and pay off the tax due 
on Oriental Boutique. The new entity responded well to a number of important changes 
looming on the horizon that were about to set Gaj’s business on a new course. In the five 
recurrent discussions I had with Gaj and Sabitri (separately), both of them always 
mentioned the three trips to the United States that Gaj made between 1987 and 1992. 
The first was with one of his American buyers (and also a family friend) who had invited 
him to a trade fair in Los Angeles, the second an ordinary business trip and the third to 
explore the possibilities of migrating to the US as some Nepalis had started to do around 
that time. After a month-long stay in the US on this last trip, he finally decided not to 
migrate, believing that there were better opportunities for him to earn a sukhako jeewan 
(happier life) in Nepal. Upon his return, Gaj learned that the government had issued a 
new industrial policy, marking a radical shift from a protectionist to a free-market
73 Unlike business with Amina Collection which continued to date (though on a much reduced scale), 
Gaj’s work with the other distributor in Kanagawa Kamakura was ad hoc at best. His alliance with 
Manandhar Exports was short-lived.
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regime, which measures, among others, included the scrapping of import duty on textiles 
for exporting industries.74
This important policy change, for a cloth merchant like Gaj, was like the ‘opening of a 
new door’ in that he was no longer constrained to locally produced textiles, but could tap 
into the vast textile industry of India for his production. He did some cautious 
experiments in producing higher standard garments, and they paid him well. Deciding to 
expand his business in this line, he realised that he needed a stronger commitment from 
his buyers in order to succeed. He told me about his considerations and dilemmas at 
least three times, and I heard him talk about this with several others. The following are 
excerpts taken from all of his conversations. I have underlined the words said in English 
as they seemed to be more emphatic, especially in cases when the use of English words 
did not come across as habitual use.75
4 In Nepal, you know w ell,..., it is extremely difficult to do business. Not because this is a
poor country and we don’t have skills and goods to sell, but because the government does not 
give any facility, and nothing moves until you bribe ten people if  you want to bring anything 
(i.e. raw materials) from India. There is no way we can produce anything cheaper than
India.............. And another problem is, in this country, most people are the kind who would not
think what new work one could possibly do, what new designs one could possibly create, but 
they would steal anything and copy whoever is in the front. Herd mentality. The result is that 
buyers start to become choosy. If prices o f garments are increasing in other places, they are 
decreasing in Nepal because we compete among each other and in that chakkar’ (jumble), we 
go on buying each other out. That’s why, I thought, let’s do something new. Let’s start 
making garments o f our own creation, such that the buyer won’t look at the prices when 
buying them.’
‘ otherwise,..., what is Nepal? In the United States, whose markets we are so dependent
on, how many people there have ever heard o f Nepal? Given how many choices o f  garments 
they have that are coming to them from around the world, if  our goods are not unique, we will 
be lost in the crowd.’
74 In principle, export industries were exempt from import duty prior to the industrial policy in 1992. 
They had to pay 15-30 per cent duty upon imports with the understanding that the government would 
reimburse this within sixty days o f clearance o f the export shipment. In practice, the procedure took 
much longer than sixty days and included complicated paperwork which was not easy for a lay 
businessman without special connections to deal with.
75 There were some exceptions in his use o f English words, for example, some were that were used 
out o f habit or were used due to the perceived technicality o f the task.
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‘... what I thought was, . . one gets into the problem of cross-supply when one supplvfiesl to 
five buyers, that is, concentration on one’s work means ‘dhilasusti’ (delay and neglect) in 
others’ work. That is what kills quality. That is good for neither party. And another thing is,
..., it is very difficult to do business without trust and loyalty. ... This business goes through 
various inflows and outflows o f money. For example, one day I have lakhs16 o f rupees of bank 
balance and the next day it is nil. When I am buying fabrics, I am running an overdraft. It 
becomes difficult to do business without having a good understanding with customers at such 
times.’
‘.. .by loyalty. 1 don’t mean buyer’s khuita dhogne (putting one’s head on the buyer’s feet) as 
they do in other factories. What 1 mean by loyalty is, let it be so that the buyer and the producer 
have mutual loyalty for each other. That would happen when they are growing together... so 
they feel they need each other.’
[Gaj, Rongoli, in a series o f  conversations throughout my fieldwork]
In December 1992, Gaj made an important change in his business that would 
dramatically transform its course in the coming years: he dropped four of his regular 
customers in order to invest in building long-term bonds with only one. Gaj’s first and 
largest buyer was an American who traded not only garments but also South and East 
Asian antiques. Although Gaj was his sole garment supplier, his antique business was 
larger than his garment one. Gaj’s second buyer was a young carpenter from Seattle who 
was only just beginning to develop his business; he bought all of his garments from 
Rongoli and had no intention of diversifying. The third largest was an American- 
Chinese woman from Santa Barbara in California who bought not only from Gaj but 
several other countries and had many other businesses including real estate and a petrol 
pump chain. His fourth buyer was from Beverley Hills who was also buying woollen- 
wear from Guatemala and other Latin American countries in addition to garments from 
Nepal. The fifth was a company in California who ran a showroom and distributed 
garments and accessories from Nepal, India and countries in East Asia.
Of the five, Gaj said he had the strongest preference for his first buyer who had also 
become a close family friend by then. He was the one who had invited Gaj to a trade fair 
in Los Angeles in 1987, and Gaj had named his younger daughter after his daughter. 
However, the friend had recently been diagnosed with a tumour and had chosen to close 
down his garment business and focus only on antique dealing. This eliminated him from 
the list. From the four left, Gaj chose his second largest buyer, the young carpenter from
76 A hundred thousand rupees is regarded as a lakh.
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Seattle. Gaj thought that the buyer showed serious interest in doing business in Nepal, 
and that the buyer’s wife had a genuine interest in garment designing and marketing. 
Better still, they were fully dependent on Gaj as sole supplier of their business and given 
that both parties were at the initial stages of their careers Gaj thought they could grow 
together. This informal agreement lasted well in Rongoli and was continuously 
reinforced by the friendship between the two families.
One can draw a number of inferences from developments in Rongoli. First, that Gaj’s 
wider exposure to his customers’ worlds, and possibly his intergenerational roots in 
business operations, helped him make a more realistic assessment of his business 
strengths and weaknesses as well as market demands. Second, and more importantly, his 
assessment then led him to seek a higher degree of trust that would not only potentially 
give him access to larger finance, but also minimise the risk and vulnerability inherent in 
the business of garment-making. This form of trust shows the limitations of the 
traditional notions on trust. For example, the trust that Gaj sought was not with members 
of his agnatic, consanguine or spatial kin, but a pragmatic alliance with a total stranger to 
his land who spoke a different language and followed a different religion. This trust 
would not help Gaj seek remedial measures if his buyers were to renege on his 
commitments because they operated in totally different legal and institutional parameters, 
where one had little recourse to the other’s institutions. Neither would this trust translate 
into scope for reputational jeopardy since the two parties dwelt in different social worlds. 
What this trust did help create was some degree of inter-dependence in their business, 
functioning as a lubricant to facilitate deepening the thrust of their transactions.
Once this bond had been chosen and established, various investments were made, mostly 
on Gaj’s side as the one more dependent on this relationship, to nurture and transform it 
into something that might come to resemble the bonds of kinship. Both parties respected 
each other’s opinions of merchandise valuation and profit division so that there were 
hardly ever any disagreements over price or scheduling. Gaj not only built a permanent 
guest room in his residence for the buyer and his guests to stay during their trips to 
Kathmandu; he regularly entertained them and even arranged for his shopping, cultural 
tours, dinners and even for barbers to give him haircuts and massages at home.
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3. Rongoli garments
Rongoli is located in a four-storey residential building in one of the upmarket residential 
areas of Kathmandu. This was a spacious suburb when the factory was newly 
established in 1988. However, it became more and more crowded over time, and after 
the new commercial law of 1996 prohibited housing of large factories inside the Ring 
Road, only one or two factories remained in the area.
A year after the factory was established, the family took a dera (rental house) only a 
block away, which they later bought and extended into a handsome residence with 
garage, guard-house, a professionally landscaped garden with small pond, etc. In 
contrast, the factory, after sixteen years of gestation and growth, had not changed much. 
The roof top terrace had been covered up (using corrugated zinc plates) to make a new 
room for cutting fabrics, and the workers’ quarter had been expanded but that was all. 
The building maintenance seemed to be low although the rent had increased threefold to 
reach 65,000 Nepali rupees. As was common between several other landlords and 
tenants, there seemed to be frequent disputes between Gaj and his Newar landlord about 
the lack of building maintenance. The building became more and more congested each 
year as the number of workers increased and its textile stock grew enormously. Three of 
the rooms were then being used as fabric storage but fabrics seemed to be increasingly 
piling up, taking up more than half the space in the accounts section (coarse cotton, often 
white), designers’ room (more expensive fabrics -  silk, velvet, linen, polyester, rayon, 
chenille, etc.), in the corridors (old stocks of coloured cotton) and the owner’s office 
itself (brocade, leather and all other newly acquired fabrics). The factory once had a 
name-plate which distinguished the building from the residential buildings that had 
sprung up in the neighbourhood over time, but it was removed after labour-related 
problems. Now, the modesty of its appearance easily cloaked the richness of its inputs 
stored inside.
The stock of fabrics in Rongoli was by far the most impressive of all garment factories I 
have seen in Nepal. When I asked Gaj if the duty refund entitlement did not lapse when 
one kept such a backlog of (imported) fabrics,77 I was told that it was not a problem 
because he had afno manchhe (personal contacts) in the customs office. Only much later 
did I leam that since Rongoli garments were so different in design and inevitably
77 The government returns the duty paid on imported fabrics only i f  the finished materials are exported 
within 11 months. With such extensive stocks, it would have been impossible to use it all within that 
time.
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combined four or five different fabrics to produce one individual garment, the 
government GSM estimating department78 had allowed Rongoli to submit individual 
estimates of its fabric consumptions -  and, of course, over the years, Gaj had developed 
friendly terms with the officer(s) in charge. For example, although the standard GSM 
allowed for a lady’s jacket was 2.5 metres, Rongoli had a concession which allowed it to 
claim up to 6.5 metres of (multiple) fabrics. He said that ‘playing’ with the GSM was 
something that was nagari hundaina (unavoidable) in order to stay competitive in 
business.79
‘My business is all about playing with fabrics... Fabrics are my passion; our family lived 
with fabrics for generations, and I feel my world remains about fabrics. The moment I 
see a new fabric, I start playing with it in my mind.’ This was how Gaj described his 
business. More than the production steps, he emphasised ‘involvement from the 
beginning’ of all parties (himself, designers and buyer). He hardly ever said anything 
about the cutting and measurements of his garments, but talked endlessly about the 
choice and combination of fabrics, colour, embroidery and decorative work. There was 
only one mannequin in the entire factory which was used for modelling garments of all 
sizes, indicating that Rongoli was not very specific in its cuts and fittings. Gaj’s 
ancestral deity was Annapurna -  goddess of cotton and cloth. He always described his 
business as about kapada (cloth) and never about luga (clothes). When his conversation 
was interrupted, by phone or visitors, Gaj often came back to it with a reference to cloth 
and an abundant pile of cloth samples lay on his work table at all times. These minor 
observations indicate that his vision of the factory largely focused on cloth or kapada 
rather than clothes or luga.
Fabrics or kapada were defined by the number and make of tana (warp) and bana (weft). 
A standard fabric was referred to as 60x60, i.e. it had 60 yam units of warp per inch and 
30 yam units of weft per half inch. Warp was always measured in inches because this 
was manually set yam and thus prone to some variation, whereas weft was mechanically 
(if not automatically) woven and so was measured in half inches. Thickness-wise, yam 
came in three kinds: cambric (fine), sheeting (medium) and casement (thick). In each,
78 GSM - Garment Standard Measurement
79 In addition to this, the Shipping Manager described to me another method o f  fabric saving. 
Although the fabric made by large machines and formal mechanisms would have a standard 
measurement o f 374 metres in 1 thaan (bolt), smaller and more informal weavers going by the old 
systems would sometimes have 594 metres per thaan, and it was not very difficult to get the labels 
dropped through the angithiyas (traditional shipping agents) and Rongoli frequently did so.
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the yam thickness ranged from 0 to 20 where 0 was the finest. A standard yam was 
scaled at number 12. Rongoli worked on fabrics of all three kinds and twenty scales, and 
added to these the regional ethnic arts of beadwork, mirrorwork, cutwork and embroidery 
in order to create a fusion that would have an ‘ethnic-contemporary’ look. The fabrics 
most frequently used were plant and animal-based such as chenille (often in sheeting), 
cotton (in casement), rayon (in cambric), linen (in cambric), silk, wool, soft leather and 
man-made fabrics such as polyester, velvet, brocade, etc. A common feature on almost 
all fabrics chosen was that they were handloom woven apart from one or two such as 
polyester and velvet. While coarser fabrics were often used as the canvas, finer fabrics 
were pasted on top using different kinds of patchwork techniques originating in various 
regions of India.
There was no set order or timetable for production in Rongoli, nor were there clear 
distinctions between the roles of various individuals within the factory. The division 
between buyer and producer, owner and designer or between owner and wife were all 
very arbitrary and took on different dimensions at different times. The only set 
framework Rongoli had was the production schedule, based on the seasonality of the 
American fashion industry (see chart).
Production schedule in Rongoli
Months Tasks usually carried out
January
February
Designing for Fall. Production and shipping for Spring based on orders that had 
been secured last year.
March
April
Designing for ‘holiday & resort’ as well as late fall. Production and shipping for 
summer based on orders received the previous year. Fashion shows in the US for 
fall designs in March.
May
June
Some designing for resort and fashion shows for ‘holiday & resort’ and late fall. 
Production and shipping for fall.
July August Spring designing. Some early fashion shows. Production/shipping for fall.
September
October
Spring and summer designing and fashion shows.
November
December
Some designing for fall. Production and shipping for Resort.
Note: Spring and summer designing was the most work-intensive period in Rongoli. Often these 
designs resulted in orders for winter and fall colours in which case the colour combination would be 
changed to give them a new look.
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3a. Designing: ‘a musical concert9
The US spring and summer fashion shows were more elaborate than the winter and fall 
ones and most purchase orders came from the former. In order to exploit this, Rongoli 
developed light summer jackets, which also gave more scope for decorative handwork 
and flamboyant colour combinations. The buyer or his wife often travelled to Nepal in 
late August, just before the task of summer/spring designing started. This was the busiest 
time for Gaj, his designers and their helpers in the cutting, tailoring and decorating units. 
Once the samples were despatched, the factory closed down to celebrate the festival of 
Dashain and the workers were given their Dashain and Diwali bonus.80 The factory then 
remained relatively calm until it was time to design the fall/winter range where often 
colour variation techniques were used to revitalise the original spring/summer designs.
Gaj and his designers often talked about fashion designing as a ‘musical concert’ where 
everyone had to fulfil their own role as well as cooperating with others. All designing 
started with receipt of the ‘inputs’ from the buyer, which included a collection of fashion 
magazines from the leading designers and fashion events in the US and Europe, as well 
as a collection of (non-technical) sketches and designs that the buyer and his wife had 
recorded throughout the season. With these materials, the Rongoli designers turned to 
their choice of fabrics from storage. I was told that there were two ways of designing: 
‘sketch-to-textile’ or ‘sketch-from-textile’ the former being more conventional. 
However, since the core of Rongoli designing was the play on fabrics, and it had such a 
large stock of fabrics available to it, the latter suited them better.
Gaj often reminded his designers that a ‘true designer’ would act throughout his 
designing as if he had ‘ants in his pants’ -  clearly an American expression he had picked 
up. The factory would be mobilised thoroughly during the design season, with sketches 
changing hands (and minds) between Gaj and the designers innumerable times and the 
sample clothes going back and forth between the designers, decorative-workers and 
tailors. Every season approximately 30-40 sample pieces were shipped to Seattle. I was 
told that up until six or seven years ago, they produced only three or four designs which 
garnered enough repeat orders for a couple of years, but due to growing competition, 
currently they did not expect much repeat order business, and thus the number of designs 
per year seemed to be ever increasing.
80 Diwali was a more important festival for the Marwaris, however, as per local norms, workers were 
paid bonuses for Dashain and not Diwali. The bonus was equivalent to a month’s salary.
I l l
The main fabric that was chosen for designing would serve as a blank canvas on which 
the artwork was carried out. As a rule of thumb, any artwork was developed keeping in 
mind the nature of the canvas chosen. They were mainly of two kinds: if plain fabric 
was chosen, it would be decorated with ‘patchwork’ or ‘cutwork’ following either the 
watchikan technique of Kashmir or applique technique of Jaisalmer. Both of them 
involved patching a different piece of cloth onto the main platform to form large motifs, 
of Hindu (with distinct shapes of animals, birds, flowers and humans), Jain (even bigger 
motifs mostly of larger animals such as cattle), or Muslim (with abstract floral, plant 
shapes, almonds, fruits, etc.) art. Often, less expensive fabrics would be used as the 
canvas on which more expensive fabrics, e.g., Benarasi kinkhwab (rich and kingly 
brocades woven with heavy use of jaris -  gold and silver threads), amrus (brocade in 
pure silk), asavalli (with large motifs as in sari borders), soft velvet leather, etc., as the 
patches. An important feature in this technique was that the traditional art forms were 
largely improvised in their applications. For example, Kashmiri motifs were traditionally 
very intricate, colours delicate and the embroidery done with detailed stitches. This was 
not what Rongoli did. Almost always they worked with larger and coarser motifs, 
flamboyant colours and bigger stitches. Still a lot of the abstract motifs, e.g., of badam 
(almond), sarav (cypress), pamposh (lotus), sosan (iris), dachh (vine), yambarzal 
(narcissus) and dainposh (pomegranate), were largely derived from traditional Kashmiri 
motifs, and Kashmiri vocabulary would be used during production instead of using 
Nepali words for them. Rongoli would also use machine stitching, turning to handwork 
only when it was impossible to use the machines. In this way, even at the sampling 
stage, traditional crafts were adapted with a great deal of improvisation.
If the fabric already had motifs, then it would be decorated with beadwork, mirrorwork 
or stitchwork, using the motifs as the base. The most widely followed decoration 
technique was machine-embroidery. Gujarati jardoshi (using beads) would be applied 
by hand and if large empty spaces remained in the fabric, they would be filled with 
mirrorwork, now done using silicon plates instead of real glass, as was traditionally the 
practice in the art’s Gujarat homeland. The most suitable fabrics for these techniques 
were silk tanchoi,2,1 Bengoli baluchari of Benares with large diagonal motifs, and
81 This was designed initially for strict Muslim precepts which prohibited men from wearing silk. The 
tanchoi used silk warp but cotton weft and then added a layer o f cotton yam in between the warp and 
weft which fully separated the silk from the cotton, making it acceptable under the religious 
requirements - hence the name tanchoi (which touches the body)
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jacquard weaving.82 None of the Rongoli designs had patchwork on printed fabrics, and 
none of the patches were multicolour -  that was considered to raise the problem o f ‘idea 
conflict’. There was however one exception made where plain white cotton was tie-dyed 
using the leheria technique,83 and then decorated with patchworks of abstract and large 
floral motifs made with thin multi-colour polyester strips not wider than 0.2 inches. This 
was one of Rongoli’s earlier designs, and had brought them repeat orders over the years. 
However, they felt that the technique did not give much flexibility for creativity, so, 
while they continued to use these designs in other variations, they stopped combining 
leheria with the patchwork.
The designing seemed to undergo a number of phases. Even as a novice learner of their 
art, I could identify some designs which were different to others. In several such cases I 
was told that there were older designs being reproduced for repeat orders, including the 
one I described in the preceding paragraph. While most of these contained primarily 
Indian motifs of flowers, plants and animals, some of the new designs had started using 
symbols from beyond India, e.g., Mohala icons from Latin America, and ocean icons 
such as starfish, shells, palms etc from the beach resorts. The earlier designs were almost 
always based on bright, summer colours because earlier they designed only for the spring 
season. It was only in the past five years that they had started following the full US 
fashion season calendar and creating designs for the winter and summer in addition to the 
spring season. Also, it was only when they switched to the all-season market that they 
started following the colour and fashion forecasts from the Western designers more 
meticulously.
Rongoli had three designers: one had been there since the beginning of Rongoli, and had 
almost become a part of the owners’ family;84 the other two were much younger and had 
worked there for only about a year. It was natural that the former commanded higher 
respect from the fellow designers. Whilst on the surface they all worked in harmony, I 
noticed that Gaj would have relatively longer and detailed interactions with Seema
82 It was Joseph M. Jacquard who had invented the special loom which would add an extra weft 
automatically, thus making the weaving process more efficient. This was first exhibited in the Paris 
Exposition o f 1801. In 1909, however, the Indian Institute o f Handloom Enterprises (IIH) modified it 
to incorporate this automatic extra-wefting technique into the handlooms to avoid having to depend on 
a saathi (friend) who would put in the extra weft after each layer woven (Ranjan, 1992: 39)
83 It involved a colour combination of pre and post dye colours which would be developed by tying 
some knots on the cloth but leaving other parts o f cloth untied. The effect was that o f a wave-like 
pattern which is what the word lahar means.
84 She was regularly invited to family occasions, and some photographs of her hung in the house o f the 
owners alongside the family portraits.
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Shrestha, one of the two new designers, about some of her designs. I also noticed that 
her designs were slightly different from the Rongoli norm. Hers lent more to geometric 
patterns while the others mostly used curved lines. She used more leather to do her 
patchwork, others combined leather with fabrics. Her patches were smaller and more 
intricate, making them more difficult to replicate; the other designers paid much more 
attention to feasibility of production at a larger scale. This may be due to the difference 
in training they had received: Seema was trained at a prestigious fashion design institute 
in New Delhi and had had some work experience in a modem design company there; the 
two other designers were trained in ali kam (lesser) institutes and had had no experience 
before coming to Rongoli. Counter-intuitively, Seema’s longer training and experience 
seemed to work against her. The second junior designer, Namita Thapa, appeared to 
have internalised Rongoli designing better. Although her designs had only average sales 
and none were hits, they fitted in well with the Rongoli designing prototype.
The differences became clearer in the coming few months. Gaj once told me that Seema 
was often not quick enough to capture where buyer’s ‘eyes were going,’ and that her 
designs were ‘tense’. Gaj’s nuanced treatment of the three designers also showed where 
they stood in the hierarchy, for example, while Gaj’s car picked up and dropped the 
senior designer to and from work, the other two were only given a ride part of the way 
home, and when the senior designer did not come to work, there was no ride for 
anybody. Gaj and Sabitri had lunch with all three designers, but the two junior designers 
were rarely asked for their food preferences. Once Seema tried to go out to lunch but 
was told that she should just ask Gaj for whatever she needed and not go out herself. She 
never felt comfortable enough to mention her likes and dislikes to the Rauniyars, and 
preferred to ask me to bring certain pickles or desserts to accompany the meal. Over 
time, the task of designing became lengthier and lengthier for Seema, and to a certain 
extent, for Namita. Gaj once told Seema plainly not to leave for the day until she had 
finished the design she was working on -  a comment he and Sabitri would never had 
made to the senior designer. While originally Seema and Namita produced 8-10 designs 
each out of the 35-40 submitted to the buyer every season, in the second fall-sampling 
(October 2003), Seema produced only four designs and Namita seven. After a few 
months, Namita quit when she became pregnant. Seema was let go.
On reflection, Gaj said that it was not a good idea to hire young girls in a formal capacity 
as designers as it took a lot of patience and hard work to internalise the type of work
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Rongoli did and be sanchikai garna sakne (truly capable of the job) for the factory. He 
then hired another designer to replace Seema and Namita, but ‘just for the time being’. 
Nevertheless, he planned that the next batch of new employees would be hired as trainee 
designers who would be given a paid apprenticeship for the first two years, with longer 
employment prospects being offered only to the select few who showed the potential of 
bhijna sakne (soaking up) Rongoli designing culture.
3b. Production: a ‘wife’s department’
Gaj and Sabitri both worked long hours in the factory, to the extent that they ended up 
sending their younger daughter to a boarding school for several years. The job division 
between the two was never official, nevertheless, in my initial interviews I was told that 
Gaj was responsible for merchandising, design and transactions and Sabitri for 
supervision of daily production and quality assurance. For Sabitri to be able to do her 
work, Gaj had to ensure that there were orders on the books and that the right fabrics and 
accessories were available to work with. This symbolic dependence prevailed at various 
levels.
Production started with the cutting of the fabrics.85 Rongoli had two cutting masters who 
were referred to as masterjis (teachers, experts). One came from the eastern hills of 
Nepal and had trained in New Delhi, the other came from New Delhi and had worked 
there too. Fabric cutting was carried out using an electronic machine. Although the 
machine was capable of cutting in large volumes, its capacities were underutilised in 
Rongoli because they rarely made more than fifty or a hundred pieces of any one design. 
The challenge of cutting, however, lay in handling the patchwork and embroidery. If the 
garment used patchwork, the masterjis would also have to cut the various patches in 
addition to the mainpallas (body parts). Each individual garment took 6 to 20 patches of 
floral, plant and animal motifs. This involved delicate handling of fabrics and a great 
deal of patience in getting the curves right and finding the most cost-effective use of 
them. If the garment needed embroidery, then it would be cut into an individual base 
first without cutting the curves. They would then be sent to the artisans, often 
subcontracted, who would do the embroidery. Once the embroidered pieces came back, 
the curves and lines would be cut. This was clearly one of the most difficult tasks in the 
overall production. Not surprisingly, masterjis were the highest paid staff in the factory
8S Since Rongoli used paper patterns for samples, they reused the same patterns for fabric cutting 
which effectively skipped one step o f  production that would have been a crucial one for other 
factories.
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after the senior designer, as the financial risk involved in cutting made it important that it 
was strictly regulated.
It was mandatory that the cutting masters get an authorised signature on the fabric before 
they carried out any cutting. This sounded like a simple procedural step to me until I 
came across a specific incident. One day, Sabitri who was supposedly in charge of 
production, authorised one fabric cutting because it was only the bhitri (inside layer) of 
the jacket and she needed it urgently to keep the kaligadhs (artisans) busy. As soon as 
Gaj found out, he did not speak to his wife about this, at least not in the factory, but 
called the masterji right away and reprimanded him for more than an hour. The masterji 
was warned against another such ‘blunder’ and was firmly told that it was absolutely 
important that he (Gaj) signed every palla himself or else it would be him (the masterji) 
who would bear the consequences if anything went wrong. The reprimand then went on 
to emphasise the importance o f ‘loyalty,’ ‘risks of the act taken,’ ‘clear leadership,’ etc.
Once the pallas were cut, they would then go to the tailors who worked on the ground 
floor. Rongoli had 152 workers -  5 Newar tailors, 26 Damai caste tailors from the 
Nepali hills, 27 hereditary tailors from the Terai (mostly from Lahan), 28 Hindu and 
Muslim Indian tailors from the bordering areas (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) and 66 
un/semi-skilled workers and administrative staff.86 The Newar tailors were called 
sujikars, all of whom were Shakyas, Bajracharyas or high caste urban dwellers, and came 
from Lalitpur. They tailored only the sample pieces, worked in a room on the second 
floor, and were paid regular monthly salaries as opposed to piece-rate wages. The other 
three groups of tailors who worked on the ground floor were called kaligadhs (artisans). 
They worked in three different rooms assigned according to their ethnicity. The floor 
supervisor told me that they spoke different languages and listened to different radio 
programmes and songs, which was why they preferred to work in segregated rooms. 
This had some truth in it.
Loud music, often from commercial Bollywood movies of the 1980s and 1990s that 
would drown out the noise of the sewing machines was a compulsory feature in all the 
garment factories I visited. The Damai workers’ room in Rongoli was among the few 
where I heard Nepali folk songs being played instead of Hindi music. They also 
regularly listened to Nepali news. The Indians and the Lahan workers, referred to as
86 The numbers o f  Lahan and Indian workers varied from time to time.
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Madheshis by the hill tailors, listened to Hindi songs. The Lahan workers spoke Maithili 
among themselves and the Indians Bihari Hindi or other dialects. Although most Nepalis 
speak some Hindi and listen to Hindi music, the Nepali workers’ room rarely had Hindi 
songs playing. Nevertheless, music and language were not the only reasons why the 
Nepalis preferred to segregate themselves from the Madheshis. Their wives worked with 
them, and they did not like the idea that the joi nabhaikaharu (wifeless ones)87 would be 
anywhere near their women. Among the Nepali workers, often, men were said to do 
‘more difficult parts’ of tailoring while the wives ‘helped’ the husbands and took care of 
the children. The children returned to the factory from school and did their homework or 
played until it was late evening and their parents finished work and returned to their 
rented rooms in the nearby houses.
The various ethnic groups of kaligadhs also followed different working schedules. For 
example, the Indian Madheshis, most of them Muslims, took Fridays off whereas the 
Nepalis took Saturdays. Major religious festivals were at different times: Nepali Hill 
Hindus took days off for Chaite Dashain (April), Janai Purnima (August), Teej and 
Indrajatra (September); the Lahan Hindus Chhath (December) and Holi (February) and 
Muslims travelled home for Eid Al-Addha, Ramadan and Eid Al-Fittr. The factory 
remained closed for a few days at Dashain and Diwali -  national festivals in the country. 
This was distinctly different from most other factories where workers were expected to 
follow an official festival calendar issued by the government, except for the major 
Muslim occasions, when they were allowed to take days off. In Rongoli, where the 
workers were allowed to develop their individual working schedule based on their 
traditional calendars, it was more practical for the supervisors to assign separate rooms 
for each group. While most of the Nepalis had been in the factory regularly for several 
years, the Muslim workers often came for one or two seasons and went home for longer 
holidays and agricultural work, being replaced by others until they returned. This was 
one more reason why the Nepalis who had been in the factory regularly for more than ten 
years, preferred to stay in their own circle. Although the workers were ethnically 
divided, there was little resentment between the groups: Rongoli ran smoothly even 
during the anti-Indian riots of January 2001, which had forced several other factories to 
close down for several days (see Section 1 of Chapter 4). Not much changed on the 
Rongoli factory floors even at a time when the Maoist proselytisation of the garment
87 The Madheshi migrants left their women behind when they come to Kathmandu for temporary 
work.
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workers brought several mass manufacturing factories to a standstill (see Section 2 of 
Chapter 4).
When it came to wages, the level did not differ among the ethnic groups, but payment 
methods did. Each Madheshi worker would be given 50 rupees a day, but most Nepali 
workers would get 100 rupees because unlike the Madeshis, most of them had families. 
The rest of their earnings would be recorded in their khata hisab (accounts). The 
Madheshis went home at least once every couple of months and they left without definite 
prospects of returning. Hence, it was customary to ensure that they have their hisab 
chukta (accounts cleared) before they left. Since the Nepalis stayed for longer periods, 
their accounts ran for years. They did travel to their villages for Dashain, but they would 
receive apeshki (advance payment), as opposed to clearing their accounts. Gaj said he 
believed he was helping the workers to save by disciplining their consumption. The 
eldest of the hill workers admitted that he currently had ghaderi jodne paisa (money 
enough to buy a piece of land) held with Gaj but also aired complaints about difficulties 
he had had in the past in getting money out of the sahu’s (owner’s) hands.
Clearly, the ethnic division of workers and their payment systems served the interests of 
many who were more powerful: the owner who could tighten his grip on some of his 
workers’ wealth; the manager who could anticipate absenteeism more effectively and 
thus plan better; and the husbands who could continue the conventional paternalistic 
ways of collecting wages on behalf of their wives and allocating resources within the 
family. However, given that the factory building was originally a residential house with 
smaller rooms, some sort of physical division among the workers had to take place; and 
given that the workers in Rongoli worked more on their own rather than in large groups 
as was the case in most other factories, a division based on ethnicity appeared the most 
logical one.
All workers received a wage of between 75 to 200 rupees for each piece of garment they 
tailored, depending on the time, level of skill and effort required. Most of the garments 
being made while I was there were in the 120-150 rupee range, and the workers averaged 
two to three of the easier garments or one to two of the more demanding garments per 
day, working ten hours with short breaks. The tailored garments would then be sent for 
inspection, where they would be individually checked, not only for measurements, but 
more importantly the fineness of stitches. Sabitri herself did the final round of quality
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checking. Approximately a third of the output would be set aside for ‘alterations’ which 
was a very high rate for a garment factory. Sabitri would explain the defects personally 
to the kaligadhs before they were passed on to them for rework. These explanations 
would range from simple stitch faults to the re-stitching of the entire or major parts of the 
garment, and sometimes rejection of the piece altogether.88
Once the tailoring was approved, the garment was sent for ‘finishing,’ which would 
entail cutting and cleaning of thread, and any hand stitching and beadwork needed. This 
would also entail button attachment. In most garment factories, buttons would be 
attached by machines, but since Rongoli used bone and horn buttons which were 
manually made and thus irregular in size, these had to be done by hand. About 50-60 
workers, roughly a quarter of them women, worked in the finishing department on the 
third floor of the factory. The women worked until 5:30pm and men until 9pm. They 
earned a salary of between twenty two hundred (minimum) to five thousand rupees per 
month and the reason they said they were happy with the work was that the factory had a 
homely environment and they were never asked to stay ‘after dark’ as in other factories. 
On the one occasion in eighteen years, when they were asked to stay until 11pm, Sabitri 
sent messages (either by telephone or through a messenger) to the families of every 
worker and she herself stayed on the floor until everybody left. This was an incident 
both female and male workers liked to talk about whenever a discussion took place about 
working conditions. They also took pride in the fact that their work was not ‘any (old) 
garment making’ but one that required a great deal of skill and patience, such that if 
others were to join in, they would not stay for more than a week. After this, the pieces 
would be sent for stain removal if needed, which they did by spraying white petrol and 
other chemicals on them. They were then ready for final inspection (again by Sabitri, 
with one assistant), before being packed and despatched.
3c. Buying fabrics
Fabrics of different weaves, colours and motifs were the most important input for 
Rongoli, and the more choices they had, the better. As I discussed earlier, the owners of 
Rongoli saw their work to be ‘playing with fabrics’. Minimising work on all other
881 saw only one case o f  such rejection which was a garment stitched by a young kaligadh, who had 
just returned from vacation. Sabitri calmly explained the series o f faults it had, by the end o f which 
the kaligadh was so agonised that he just offered to pay for the piece. Sabitri did not cut his pay but 
ruled that from then on he should work very closely with his fellow kaligadh who had brought him 
there and get every palla  (cut) checked by him before going on to attach a new one.
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aspects of designs such as fitting and accessories, they chose to devote most of their 
energy to creating new designs using decorative arts.
The guidelines that Rongoli followed were those of the leading fashion forecasts from 
the US and Europe. The most frequently used materials in Rongoli were:
• Trend West (fashion magazine, USA)
• Textile View (fabrics and colours forecast magazine for three seasons, German)
• Trends Collezioni (fabrics, colours, prints and yams forecast magazine, Italian)
• Textile Report (forecast magazine on fabrics, prints and styling, French)
• View on Colour (inspirational magazine)
• Donna Collezioni (high fashion magazine, Italian)
• Vision and PratoExpo Fabrics Preview
In December 2003, a list of fourteen textiles was prepared from these forecasts, which 
included, among others, Printed Burnt Velvet, Gold Chenille, Optical, Pink Gold, 
Velvety Prints and Late Seventies’ Glamour. The reach of printed or written information 
ended here for Rongoli. All other tasks that followed drew entirely on their informal 
training, experience and networks. Neither the designers, nor Gaj himself, although all 
of them had received formal education and training, made any effort to draw information 
from the printed media, internet or even personal notes; most of their knowledge came 
from personal observation and interests and were communicated by word of mouth.
All of the fabrics listed in the forecasts were manufactured in Europe or the US, which 
were of course, beyond the reach of Rongoli. Gaj would then set out on a two week long 
trip to various cities in India, returning with samples of Indian textiles that were closest 
to the recommendations chosen from the Western catalogues and which cost him only a 
fraction of the European or American prices. Once orders for the new designs were 
received Gaj arranged for a larger quantity of the necessary fabrics to be shipped to 
Kathmandu. Almost 95 per cent of the fabrics for Rongoli came from India. Gaj had a 
love-hate relationship with India because most of his ideas, skills and inputs came from 
India, but then, so did his rivals.
When I asked Gaj his primary fear for the business, he said that it was the copying of his 
designs by others. He gave me examples, mentioning even a reputed brand such as
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Nordstrom whom he often supplied, had been known to accept a similar design from an 
Indian designer which Gaj thought was a case of unauthorised copying. He also noted 
that four or five Indian companies were already competing with Rongoli for its niche 
market, namely Allure, Nimon Market, Flashback, Anaj and Sandy Starkman. He felt 
the latter which had started on a much smaller scale about four or five years previously 
and grown into a factory bigger than Rongoli, posed a real threat. Under these 
circumstances, understandably, he was unwilling to trust anybody in India more than he 
had to.
Although Gaj was worried that Indian enterprises might in future erode his business 
niche, there was no way he could do without an Indian connection. It was the informal 
handloom weaving sector of India, which supplied the majority of the fabrics for 
Rongoli. This was a sector so dominated by kin and locality-based trust that Gaj could 
not manage the task of fabrics acquisition from somewhere as far away as Kathmandu 
and he had to have a reliable contact point in India. This was solved in a way that would 
have serious implications for his family. In 1993, an Indian woman from New Delhi 
came to work as a designer for Rongoli. Gaj thought Smita Chopda a good designer, but 
did not think she would cope with the Kathmandu lifestyle. He said that people from 
Delhi are used to ‘fast lifestyles’. After four or five months of working in Rongoli, Gaj 
sent Smita back to New Delhi to work as his Delhi-based merchandiser. Since then, she 
and her assistant Anuj have been carrying out the task of fabric acquisition. She 
facilitated all of Gaj’s trips to India and travelled with him all over the country. Gaj 
ranked her very highly in terms of her knowledge of and interest in fabrics and her 
enthusiastic learning attitude, and she was trusted with large sums of money and serious 
responsibilities; in 2003/04, Smita was Rongoli’s largest creditor. Since dealing with 
fabrics was always complicated, he spoke with her on the phone at least once a day.
This relationship with the merchandiser caused some tension in Gaj’s family. His wife 
and daughter thought that he was spending far too much time with her and giving her 
more attention than was necessary. If anyone made any comment about Smita during 
any conversation, this would be responded with a long and uneasy silence from Sabitri 
and others. Most of Gaj’s trips to India were viewed with suspicion; his wife never 
accompanied him in any of his trips to India during my fieldwork. Although the stated 
reason might have been that one person had to be in the factory to look after things while
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Gaj was away, the New Delhi merchandiser was a figure treated with resentment and 
suspicion.
Origin of Textiles from India: a summary
City Types of textiles manufactured
Ahmadabad Brocades: amrus (in pure silk), kimkhabs (means ‘little dreams; mixture 
o f cotton and silk), asavali (with richer and bigger patterns)
Amritsar/Ludhiana Woollen fabrics and tweed
Banglore Pure silk, dupian
Benaras Brocade: zari jamdani (weaved through play on weft; zari is metallic 
thread, gold or silver), cut-work jamdani, tanchoi', Getwa silk; jacquard 
silk, khewa
Bombay Leather, cotton
Chennai Leather
Delhi Wide variety o f textiles, the best ‘last resort’
Jaipur Leather. Tie-dye fabrics: bandhani (geometric), leheria (wave-like)
Karnataka Speciality cotton and silk mix, from small villages, e.g., ilkal fabric, 
narayanpeeth fabric, khana, etc.
Kutch Thread and materials for mirrorwork, zalakdozi embroidery (with a 
hook) and mochi artwork (using more distinct animal figures)
Lucknow Threads and accessories for chikenkeri embroidery
Others (Merath, Panipat, 
Pilkhuwa, Surat)
Various
Nepal Some types o f cotton, silk and linen
This table is derived from a summary of various informal discussions between Gaj and 
myself after his last return from his four trips to India (January, April, July 2003 and 
March 2004) during the course of my fieldwork. The list is not complete in any way, nor 
is it authentic even epistemologically. At various times, Gaj purchased what I thought to 
be the same textiles from different places. For example, he bought ‘no. 12 yam, mono­
colour, and casement tweed’ from Amritsar on his first trip, but on his second trip, he got 
the ‘same’ tweed from Delhi. When I asked him why he did not go back to his original 
supplier in Amritsar, he was astonished that after so many months of close observation, I 
was still not able to differentiate between what was, in fact, two completely different 
types of tweed. He explained that the new tweed was chasmebulbul or fo^-patterned,
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which pattern he said originated from the Indian miihai (sweet dish) called barfi which 
was crystalline in shape. The pattern would become apparent only after the fabric was 
washed and had slightly shrunk. This indeed was so.
I tried to compare my field notes with innumerable discussions I had with him and others 
in the factory about Indian fabrics, and was completely stumped. There was no 
straightforward formula as to what was best where. As often seems to be the case in the 
real world, one found what one was looking for, and what one looked for depended on 
who one was. What was quite distinct about the Indian textile market that Rongoli was 
drawing from, was that, as in all imperfect markets, there was no one official source of 
information. Although there were government units on textile promotion and 
information catering, I never saw Gaj or his designers consulting any books on textile 
acquisition. The use of formal information sources ceased as soon as the fashion 
magazines had been flipped through and a list of fashionable European and American 
textiles had been drawn up.
Rongoli’s world was one that had cloths and clothes everywhere. When one entered the 
factory building, even before reaching the main office, one encountered piles of fabrics 
the height of a man in the corridor. Gaj’s office would have piles of various fabrics all 
around the table, and smaller pieces lying on his working table. No lunch went by 
without having at least one discussion about Indian regional food, and linked to it, the 
regional textile and clothing.89 As I sat in his office endlessly during his working hours, 
I noticed that almost all the phone calls he received, and many of his conversations with 
his wife, were about either fabrics or embroideries. Buttons, threads and other household 
issues, were rarely discussed, nor was the machinery, which were the oldest and cheapest 
I saw in any of the garment factories. While all other factories, including the 
‘fabricators’ who were the lowest in the garment hierarchy had long switched to Japanese 
sewing machines, Rongoli was still working on manually-powered Indian machines that 
cost less than 10 per cent of the Japanese ones.
Everyone agreed that textile buying required the full-time attention of one person and 
without that it would be impossible to deal the jhyau (literally, ‘lousy’, but meaning
89 Normally, Gaj and Sabitri would have lunch with their designers while the regular staff were given 
lunch in their own offices. The workers either brought their own lunch or went out to nearby teashops.
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complicated) work, and that without personal follow up, the informal weaving sector of 
India just would not meet the demands of an international business like Rongoli where 
punctuality of delivery and quality of products and services were key to its success. 
When I asked if it would be better if Rongoli dealt more with the formal textile sector 
which was growing fast in India, I was told that this would be like afnai khuttama 
bancharo hannu (cutting your own feet with an axe) for a number of reasons described 
below.
In addition to the difference in work ethics between the informal and the formal sector, 
prices varied enormously too. For example, the ‘village-price’ of 60-inch width plain 
cotton in the village of Aravalli (in Udaipur) would be about 17 rupees (or 10.5 Indian 
rupees) per metre. The same cotton would cost a minimum of 27 rupees in the new 
markets of Udaipur and New Delhi. These were small differences in cost per metre, but 
would become much more significant when scaled up to accommodate the quantities of 
cloth the factory required. He gave me another example. In Benares, which 
accommodates a large brocade industry, one would have three choices: first and most 
expensive, one could buy from the grihasthis (who own or manage 50-100 looms) or 
kothidars (who owned more and also handled their own marketing). Second, approach a 
gaddi (established commission agent) in the local sutti (market), who would connect the 
buyer with the weaver for a small charge and one could buy the textile directly in a 
negotiated price. The drawback to this was that it was highly unlikely that individual 
weavers would have to supply sufficient supply of cloth in hand for the whole order. The 
third and most cost-effective way to acquire fabrics would be to place an order with the 
weaver through the gaddi. For this, one would supply the raw materials to the weaver 
and the balance owing would be paid on delivery. This would bring the prices down by 
about 40 per cent. Other states and cities had their own practices.
In Karnataka, for example, the weaving industry operated under a more horizontal 
economic system, again with three options. There were weavers or village-level co­
operatives of weavers who could afford their own raw materials and they were in a 
position to bargain strongly, and were called rokdas. The second system, satta, involved 
the buyer paying in advance for the raw materials and then waited for the finished 
product to be delivered. The final option was mungada whereby the sahu (buyer) 
provided the weaver with raw materials and paid him/her in kind, e.g., enough raw 
materials for one metre of fabric once the weaver had produced ten metres. A complete
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outsider would have no choice but to buy from the rokda system, whereas someone with 
local connections would be able to use options two and three which would make the 
cloth much cheaper.
4. Resilience beyond the MFA
Contrary to the general myth of the linearity of industrial development, where production 
was thought to gain efficiency with deployment of mechanisation and anonymisation of 
the process, Rongoli seemed to thrive on old business practices, e.g., caste-based 
compartmentalisation of workers, personalisaton of business alliances, etc. The global 
volatility generated by the MFA and the local crisis engendered by the Maoist labour 
unionism brought new challenges not only for Rongoli but all garment factories in Nepal. 
Notably these new developments did not weaken the business spirit in Rongoli, but if 
anything, were seized upon as opportunities for Rongoli to tap into new possibilities and 
to expand its reach.
As I have described earlier, Rongoli never had labour problems. Even when all other 
factories had closed down under the spell of the ethnicist Maoist labour unionism, 
Rongoli resumed its operations even if this required Gaj to padlock the main gate and use 
the back entrance to give the impression to outsiders that it was closed. So loyal were 
the workers to their owners in Rongoli that no one objected the secretive operations. 
However, this stopped eventually as the Maoist labour unionists sharpened their focus on 
the factory, but even then they could not infiltrate the Rongoli labour force as they did in 
most other factories. As a result, there were no demands for unreasonable wage increase. 
‘Donations’ were asked for and paid at times, but not as exorbitant as the mass 
manufacturers. In fact, when pressure was exerted on Rongoli to register a formal labour 
union, Gaj registered one with the more liberal NTUC, listing himself as the head of the 
labour union. For this, he needed to be endorsed by 25 per cent of his workers, which he 
easily got done. However bizarre was such a listing and however much the labour 
unionists tried to prevent it, it went ahead as Gaj had wanted. Over time, the local 
Maoist cadre acknowledged during his conversation with Gaj that Rongoli was a separate 
case altogether and that, although a Marwari, this particular family of Rauniyars were 
actually ‘Nepali’.
As far as the MFA-expiration was concerned, it was a reward in disguise for Rongoli 
because all the MFA did was that it moved the rival factories from its path leaving it
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larger shares of resources. Rongoli operated in a building that had been originally built 
for residential purposes and was located in a residential area. Not only was it under 
pressure from State officials and neighbours to move to a more appropriate area but it 
was in its own interests to gain more physical space. Although there was no immediate 
pressure from its buyers to upgrade its machinery, Rongoli was well aware that better 
machines would make the job easier for everybody involved. The expiration of the MFA 
offered Rongoli the opportunity to upgrade their machines at a very competitive price as 
the mass manufacturing factories which had closed down desperately tried to sell off 
their equipment to raise some cash. The Rauniyars individually received competing 
offers from their business acquaintances, including Arya-Nepal3, asking them to buy 
their machinery at a rock-bottom price.
Rongoli turned down all offers for the sale or lease of their factory buildings. The 
Rauniyars were of the opinion that the factory had to be within walking distance of home 
for the factory floors to operate smoothly. Accordingly, they bought a flat not very far 
from their current location -  just outside the ring road but still within walking distance 
from their residence. Finally, a factory-like open floor plan was designed and a building 
was constructed. The workers were still caste-segregated in this new building although 
now they only had a thin partition to separate the Nepalis from the Madheshis. As in the 
old factory, the owners still had their offices at the first floor main entrance, from where 
they could control the comings and goings of the artisans and store-keepers. The only 
difference was that Gaj and Sabitri now had separate offices as CEO and production 
manager, and the fashion designers worked in the room adjacent to Gaj and Sabitri 
instead of being one floor apart as was the case in the old factory. The store room was 
much bigger. The buyers -  who had by then divorced and worked as business partners-  
had their own offices to work from when they visited Kathmandu. Rongoli eventually 
cut a deal with one of the mass manufacturers to buy their new Japanese machines at a 
bargain price. Its production was obviously expanding and the market was flourishing 
despite the expiration of the MFA.
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Chapter 6: Swakan-Chhemu
My third case study is Swakan-Chhemu Pvt Ltd, a business collaboration of Buddhist 
Newars from the Kathmandu Valley with pro-Tibet entrepreneurs from the United 
Kingdom. This venture relives a long history of pseudo-kinship shared between Tibetans 
which is being reconstextualised to global integration as facilitated by technology on the 
one hand and demographic dispersion on the other. The two social groups involved in 
this business had mutually acculturated each other throughout the various phases of their 
longstanding exchange of commodities and philosophies. In fact, the Buddhist Newars’ 
cultural ascendancy over other caste and ethnic groups within Nepal drew largely on the 
reality and myths surrounding the medieval trade with Tibet that they had monopolised. 
Although the sealing of the Nepal-Tibet border in 1959 blurred the original sense of 
affinity that the Buddhist Newars from the Kathmandu Valley once shared with the 
Tibetans, they continued to benchmark their identities against the latter.
This chapter is an account of how the Buddhist Newars reconstituted themselves over the 
centuries, paradoxically, both as an economically thriving political minority within 
Nepal, as well as the bearers of a grand Buddhist cultural history outside Nepal. It 
explores the outcomes of the culture-economics interplay among the Buddhist Newars 
throughout the successive waves of economic and cultural globalisation that have lately 
engulfed them. Buffeted by a series of cultural and political dispositions, the Buddhist 
Newars did not accumulate a linear and mechanical expansion throughout the economic 
modernisation process, as a pure economic discourse would have speculated, but instead 
embraced a complex mix of identity, politics and economic pragmatism, which has 
helped them survive the fierce market competition of the twenty-first century.
1. Situating the Shakya family: Buddhist artisanship and tradesmanship
The Newars are an eclectic ethnic group who had posed a classificatory problem not only 
for the compilers of the caste-based muluki airt (penal code) in the nineteenth century,90 
but also for anthropologists studying them thereafter. Indigenously from the Kathmandu 
Valley, or ‘Nepal’ as it was then popularly referred to, the Newars took a phlegmatic 
approach to their defeat at the hands of the Parbatiya king Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1769.
90 The Newar society has traditionally organised itself under a full-fledged caste system as complex as 
the one described in muluki airt. Nevertheless, the muluki airt ignored the inherent diversity and 
hierarchy among the Newars (e.g., there are Hindu and Buddhist Newars, Newar priests and Newar 
untouchables) and designated them all as one homogenous ‘merchant’ or vaishya group.
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Essentially, all of the Newar State festivities, which once revolved around the felicitation 
of the Newar kings, conveniently accepted blessings from the Shah dynasty monarchs 
after their successful unification of the nation. For example, the living goddess Kumari, 
believed to be the protector deity of the Newar Malla dynasty, had no problem blessing 
the Shah kings who were the slayers of her original patrons. In fact, the worship of Indra 
(the King of Heavens) was the major ritual act Chhetri King Prithvi Narayan Shah 
famously performed on behalf of the defeated Newar King Jaya Prakash Malla on the 
very day he successfully invaded Kathmandu Valley in 1769. Thereafter, as the 
Parbatiya language and culture were increasingly being labeled as the de facto Nepali 
sajha sanskriti (language and culture) Newars lately came to pursue a bifurcated identity: 
whilst they distanced themselves linguistically and ethnically from the ruling ‘Nepali’ or 
Parbatiya ethnicity they also strove to make themselves part of an inclusive Janajati 
identity along with other non-ruling hill ethnicities who also felt disenfranchised by the 
ruling Parbatiyas (Gellner: 1992: 13-15).
Trade traditionally played a vital role in the Newar economy, because the Valley lay 
along an ancient trade route between India and Tibet, and more recently because 
Kathmandu, as the capital city and center of development aid, continued to spawn new 
markets for imported goods. Trade was primarily responsible for drawing Newars out of 
the Kathmandu Valley to establish settlements elsewhere (Gellner and Quigley, 1999: 
300). It also echoed the religious order of the Newar caste hierarchy which was said to be 
‘double-headed’ where Hindu (Brahmu -  Newar for Bahun) and Buddhist (Bajracharya) 
priests made competing claims for superiority within the Newar caste hierarchy. While 
Hindu Newars were generally perceived to be the subgroup that had adapted best to the 
Hindu ruling elite culture, Buddhist Newars have historically been closer to their Tibetan 
counterparts across the Himalayas where Buddhism held a strong influence. Given that 
it was the exchange of Buddhist philosophy that had initiated the mercantile Nepal-Tibet 
trade in the first place, the Tibet trade largely remained the prerogative not of all Newars 
but only Buddhist Newars. Rankin’s (2004: 90) research of Newar trading history 
pointed out that most of the Newar traders operating in Lhasa or Tibet until the Chinese 
takeover in 1950 were either Shakyas who were members of the lay Buddhist caste, or 
Urays who were the offspring of unions between Shakyas and Tibetans.91
91 Lewis (1999:48 m Gellner and Quigley, 1999) argues that the children of Shakyas and Vajracharyas 
with lower castes within the Kathmandu Valley or in other parts o f Nepal and India might also have 
been called Urays although these were not traders.
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In addition to the geographic advantage that the lowest two of the dozen passes into Tibet 
went via Kathmandu Valley, the legendary marriage of the Nepali princess Bhrikuti with 
the Tibetan emperor Srong Btsan Sgam Po in 633 had laid the initial foundations for 
political and economic ties between the two countries (Shakya, 1997: 39). Princess 
Bhrikuti was credited with introducing Buddhism to the previously animist Tibetans and 
constructing the first cohort of Buddhist architectural edifices in and around Lhasa. Such 
projects were accomplished with the help of the Buddhist Newar architects she had taken 
to Tibet as part of her royal entourage, who later facilitated the exchange of cultural 
capital between the two countries (Shakya, 1997: 77). Such cultural and economic 
exchanges were at times punctuated and other times expedited by frequent wars between 
the two countries until the 1650 treaty finally consolidated it in Nepal’s favour (see 
Section 1 of Chapter 2). In the following centuries, Nepali society and economy 
modernised, and the Shakyas pursued a wide range of professions within and outside 
their conventional ambits of Buddhism and trade. Nonetheless, they largely continued to 
pursue bifurcated occupational excellence, that effortlessly combined devotional 
artisanship with commercial trade (Gellner and Quigley, 1999:213). My third case study, 
Swakan-Chhemu, offers a good example of a modem enterprise that stems from the 
glory and decline of Buddhist Newar cultural history ffom medieval times.
As a factory that grew and sophisticated gradually against all odds, Swakan-Chhemu 
gives us an insight into what it meant to be a Newar entrepreneur. Heera Ratna Shakya, 
the head of the Buddhist Newar household that owned Swakan-Chhemu, started his 
career in the 1960s as a freelance translator who worked for Kathmandu-based foreign 
diplomatic missions. As Nepal opened up to the world in the 1970s, he gave up his 
translation career to start a curio shop in one of the four-star hotels in Kathmandu. By 
the time Nepal formulated its first comprehensive industrial policy and plan in 1981, 
Heera Ratna was already conversant with policy developments and their impacts on 
industries and firms, and he subsequently began to export curios to regular customers.
Commendably, Swakan-Chhemu’s active engagement with the State went well beyond 
an economist’s ahistorical emphasis on good outcomes being simply the result of a 
pursuit of cost economics and emphasis on procedural efficiencies. If anything, Swakan- 
Chhemu was conceived through the entrepreneur’s engagement with the State on matters 
that had less to do with economics and more with politics. In addition to being a 
successful entrepreneur, Heera Ratna had also developed personal and political ties with
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the Bahun-Chhetri elites ruling Nepal at that time: For example, he was among the few 
Newar activists who had fought for democracy in the popular movement that ousted the 
Rana regime. His role in maintaining security and public order during the transition that 
marked the handover of power from the Ranas to the alliance of Nepali Congress and 
King Tribhuvan was especially noted. He was instrumental in a successful launch of a 
local defense initiative called rakshya mandal (defence circle), which mobilised the 
locals at the grassroots level to maintain public security and order and kept disintegration 
at bay, allowing enough time for the new State order to gradually emerge. Such a socio­
political leadership strengthened his influence not only among the Newars of Lalitpur, 
but also among the ruling elites in broader Kathmandu. He subsequently was elected as 
head of the municipal council in the first local elections under the new democratic 
regime. Through his commitment to neo-political and social reforms, Heera Ratna 
gained access to the State bureaucracy which would later help him set up and expand his 
export business.
A second spate of events saw Heera Ratna’s success as, above all, a confirmation that 
cultural capital stood superior to strictly cost-based industrial thinking or narrow political 
maneuvering. Heera Ratna, like his compatriots of the same cohort, was deeply 
influenced by Gandhian philosophy. Following the popularity of the Swadeshi 
movement in India, Heera Ratna worked to establish a co-operative that mobilised the 
local women ffom Bhaktapur within the Kathmandu Valley into weaving cotton for 
consumption by the local population.92 Throughout his tenure in the municipal council, 
he was also instrumental in organising a series of art exhibitions within the country and 
abroad. He showcased the Buddhist Newar art of statuary and thangka-painting in 
diplomatic, cultural and commercial events in Asia, Europe and the United States. He 
was a founder member of the Handicraft Association of Nepal, which emerged later not 
only as an institutional curator of the Buddhist Newar culture that offered historical 
legitimacy for Nepal’s handicraft business, but also as a strong lobbying group that 
protected the interests of art and handicraft manufacturers nationwide.
By the time his public career ended in 1958, Heera Ratna had successfully consolidated 
his political, economic and cultural networks. Following the Chinese invasion of Tibet, 
as Kathmandu came to be seen among Westerners as the nearest possible station from 
where to keep a close eye on Tibet, Heera Ratna’s cultural circle quickly absorbed
92 Bhaktapur Hand-Weaving Co-operative.
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several Western scholars, diplomats and activists. Among them was Henerich Harrer, an 
Austrian mountaineer and celebrity author of the acclaimed travelogue ‘Seven Years in 
Tibet’ depicting his intimate relationship with the Dalai Lama as his Western mentor, 
who also used Kathmandu as his base as the Chinese strengthened their control over 
Tibet isolating it ffom the world. Harrer introduced Heera Ratna to a group of pro-Tibet 
European entrepreneurs interested in developing business in Nepal. Over time, Heera 
Ratna forged a formal agreement with one of the entrepreneurs, John Paso -  an English 
Jew Buddhist, and this eventually became the foundation of the modem and competitive 
business that Swakan-Chhemu became.
2. Property ownership in a joint family: the old, the young and the female
With a relatively large family, Heera Ratna was understandably a respected role model 
for his three sons and two daughters: he almost handheld his sons in choosing and 
establishing their business ventures throughout the 1970s. Tej, the eldest, set up a 
Tibetan carpet factory in partnership with an ethnic Tibetan, following an initiative led 
by the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) to develop an international market for 
branded Tibetan carpets. The Swiss government envisaged a Kathmandu-based Tibetan 
carpet weaving industry would offer employment opportunities to Tibetan refugees 
fleeing the Chinese persecution. Mani, Heera Ratna’s second son, set up a business 
venture to produce quilted garments. As the tourism sector developed in Nepal, it had 
come to offer a promising retail market as visiting tourists wanted to buy handmade 
garments to take home as souvenirs. Mani was four yours younger than Tej, and his 
project was substantially modest in both scale and content. The youngest, Rahul was still 
studying.
The Shakyas shared their ancestral house in a well-off Buddhist Newar locality until 
Heera Ratna died. All three sons and their wives and children, along with the two 
unmarried daughters, shared the family hearth and strongbox: his wife controlled and 
managed the hearth and kitchen storage while the keys to the strongbox lay in Heera 
Ratna’s wise hands. They relied on their personal bibek (wisdom) in deciding the course 
of action for the family. It was the mother who searched for brides for the sons; and the 
father who identified business opportunities and oversaw their first forays into business 
development. Once they were perceived to be able to stand on their own two feet, Heera 
Ratna spent the last few years of his life developing a mini estate where each of the sons 
could have their individual houses while sharing the compound and some of the common
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facilities with the rest of the extended family. He died in 1975. All of the family 
members I interviewed had fond memories of Heera Ratna as a remarkable man they 
were indebted to. Not only did the three brothers enthusiastically co-operate in 
commissioning and publishing Heera Ratna’s biography, but each kept and proudly 
displayed his personal memorabilia in their respective houses, the most prominent of 
them being a collection of some of the carpentry work Heera Ratna had undertaken while 
he was building his career as a local leader advocating swadeshi-ness (patriotism in 
consumption) and democracy. All of his offspring fondly recalled without hinting at the 
slightest sense of complaint that one of his granddaughters always got special treatment 
over others; nor did the sons have any squabbles over the inherent differences in 
monetary profits derived from Tej’s carpet-weaving and Mani’s garment-making. The 
patriarch was obviously very well respected and his decisions and personal discretions 
were accepted by all the younger members of the family without serious questioning.
The Shakyas of Swakan-Chhemu placed the family unit above individual likes and 
dislikes. The importance of daju-kija-mhyayamasta-bhinamasta (the relationship 
between brothers, sisters and their children) was continuously emphasised as the way to 
safeguarding dhuku-piku (the family strongbox and secrets). Tej’s carpet factory was 
initially a profitable business benefiting from the Swiss-led marketing campaign among 
its European elite clients. He and his Tibetan business partner employed over fifty 
workers and they were seen to be part of the new educated entrepreneurial elite who 
could not only set exemplary entrepreneurial benchmarks for society, but also had the 
potential to rise above individual entrepreneurial interests to advise governments 
internationally on industrial policymaking. In 1986, Tej received an offer from the 
World Bank to serve as Nepal’s trade specialist in its Washington DC office. Owing to 
the attractive financial prospects inherent in the offer, it was only sensible that he 
accepted it even though it meant handing over his business to his younger brother Mani. 
The formal business ownership registration, however, needed no amendment as it had 
been registered under their mother’s name in the first place. This was done purely to 
facilitate bureaucratic transactions rather than as a formal indication of property 
ownership. Rahul, the youngest of the Shakya brothers, followed Tej to train at the 
prestigious Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT) in New York. Although Mani had 
taken over the carpet business ffom Tej, he continued to nurture the small-scale garment 
business that he had started earlier. The carpet bust o f 1992 saw Nepal’s carpet exports 
plummet by over 36 per cent, owing to a loss of credibility regarding quality and the
132
genuineness of raw materials. Mani shut down the carpet factory and focused 
exclusively on his garment business, whose prospects appeared to have improved 
substantially with the sustained growth in tourism.
In the 1980s, Mani employed no more than five tailors and exclusively relied on locally 
made textiles and accessories for his production. Nepal was still under a protectionist 
trade regime, and there were stringent policies and procedures in place which 
discouraged imports, even if they contributed directly to the production of exportables. 
The political and economic changes of the early 1990s removed import barriers and 
prepared the economy for global integration. This had profound implications on the way 
Swakan-Chhemu did business. First, it was no longer confined to using local materials 
for its production; it could instead use imports such as organic and hemp fabrics which 
were more attractive to the tourists looking for souvenir garments. Second, it was no 
longer confined to its tourist clientele; with non-tariff barriers on exports93 significantly 
reduced, Swakan-Chhemu could compete directly in the international wholesale 
garments market.
Given the inherent uncertainty in the overall industrial climate that required frequent 
transitions from one business to another, families remained the key source of support for 
Swakan-Chhemu in terms of much needed skills and networks. More importantly, the 
essential family capital was kept undivided and fungible in case any need arose abruptly 
for unforeseen investments. There was a strong sense of family among the legal heirs of 
the family property which acted to keep the family unit financially intact and the family 
boundaries safely guarded. Tej, Mani and Rahul all acknowledged that they had resisted 
the temptation to individualise the family property by registering it under one or other of 
the female family members’ names rather than their own. Tej’s carpet factory, when it 
was running, was registered under their mother’s name while Mani’s garment factory 
was registered under one of the unmarried sisters. After the mother passed away and the 
sister given away in marriage, the property ownerships were transferred to the wives of 
two older brothers. Youngest brother Rahul was not married at that time, but even when 
he later was, none of the family members thought it a serious matter whether or not his 
wife had any property formally registered in her name. In any case, the two older 
women who did have property formally registered under their names did not exert any
93 Non-tariffbarriers usually include assignment o f fixed quotas, infrastructural bottlenecks as well as 
the red tape on licensing, customs clearance, standards certification, etc.
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control whatsoever over them, nor did they personally keep any of the official property 
documents outside the family strongbox. In fact, the wives would not even know how 
big was their business since they hardly ever came to the factory to see the operations. In 
contrast, there were very clear boundaries as to who qualified as part of the family and 
who did not. All three brothers were unanimous that when one of the sisters got married, 
all properties under her name must be immediately transferred back within the family. It 
was thought to be ‘dangerous’ to involve a brother-in-law in family matters because only 
the family shared the la, hi and ista (flesh, blood and business network) that formed the 
real boundary between thaha and kataha (one’s own and the others). The male in-laws 
who resided outside family territories and pursued their independent social and business 
trajectories could not be part of it.
In addition to financial capital, the social networks on which their business relied so 
heavily were also perceived to be of equal entitlement to all male members of the family 
above a certain age. I have already discussed Heera Ratna’s networking with Tibet 
advocates throughout and after his tenure at the municipal council. All three of his sons 
had been gradually introduced to this social circle as they came of age. Whereas 
daughters were carefully trained to concern themselves with activities directly tied to 
family needs, 94 the sons were encouraged to join Heera Ratna in interactions with 
foreign dignitaries, celebrities and scholars. As the Nepali economy entered 
liberalisation in the early 1990s, as I discussed earlier, Swakan-Chhemu actively 
revamped its business network structure. Although Mani was managing the day-to-day 
business in Swakan-Chhemu, it was Tej who brokered a deal for Swakan-Chhemu with 
one of their former clients of Buddhist Newar handicrafts. The significance of the deal 
lay in the details of the financial arrangements between the buyer and the producer: 
Swakan-Chhemu’s buyer, John Paso, agreed not only to finance Swakan-Chhemu in 
designing and manufacturing Tibetan-contemporary garments, but also to act as the sole 
promoter, buyer and distributor of Swakan-Chhemu garments among the pro-Tibet wing 
of the European Fair Trade market.
94 Women were not only excluded from networking outside the kin circle, despite legally owning the 
properties, they were not consulted on major or minor business matters. Unlike Sabitri in Rongoli 
who was an equal business partner and adviser to Gaj even before they formally registered the 
business, the wives o f Tej, Mani and Rahul hardly ever set foot in the factory. Their knowledge o f the 
business did not go beyond gossip and rumours they might have heard from their spouses.
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Entering into the new agreement with Swakan-Chhemu required a serious commitment 
and hence a structural change in the buyer’s business strategy. John Paso’s earlier 
business venture in Nepal had been that of curio dealership, which he had abandoned for 
a few years to pursue a more glamorous world of fashion designing in Bali. The time 
might have seemed appropriate for John to reengage in Nepal after earning credentials as 
a producer of fashionable garments. The result was the formation of a new business in 
Nepal in which John employed Tenzing, his (then) fiancee’s brother and a Tibetan 
refugee living in London. The timing could not have been more right for Swakan- 
Chhemu, as Rahul, the youngest of the Shakya brothers, had just returned ffom the 
Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT) in New York with his prestigious diploma.
3. Designing for Swakan-Chhemu: more than just garments
Drawing on the semiotics of the grand history of Nepal-Tibet trade led by the Buddhist 
Newars of Kathmandu Valley, Swakan-Chhemu’s ethno-contemporary garments were 
designed to access the vast global market that the modem Tibetan diaspora has been able 
to tap into. The financing, production and marketing process applied in Swakan-Chhemu 
were all direct outcomes of two paradoxical developments. At one level, the Tibetan 
diaspora made headway globally for their strong cultural capital associated with Tibet; 
and in this process of expansion did they come to rediscover the old cultural ties they 
once had with the Shakyas throughout the heydays of medieval Nepal-Tibet trade. 
Although Tibet trade was still an undeniable signpost to a Newar Buddhist identity, this 
trade route had been sealed off for several decades and the new generation of Buddhist 
Newars no longer felt the same original sense of affinity that their forefathers had with 
the Tibetans. In contrast, for more or less the same number of decades, the political 
upheavals in Tibet had come to contribute to its promotion in Western societies as a 
brand of pristine civilisation and spirituality. From a cultural economic perspective 
which stressed the process o f‘valorisation,’95 Swakan-Chhemu’s products were subject 
to re-evaluation in a discursive market wherein values of symbolic goods evolved. Such 
an evolution had several consequences, in general for the cultural standing of the ethnic 
and national groups involved, and in particular for the business alliances and 
methodologies that developed within Swakan-Chhemu. I will demonstrate in this section 
that the valorisation process gave rise to a number of creative avenues for product
95 Meaning the discursive process o f alteration in the value o f  cultural goods as per the attention paid 
to it (Klamer, 2004: 143).
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designing that led to business growth, and helped form unlikely alliances among the 
communities which were otherwise disconnectedly scattered all around the globe.
Swakan-Chhemu catered to the Fair Trade market, for which it had to use either certified 
hemp fabrics or certified hand-woven fabrics. In fact, graduating from the local tourist 
market in search of the global niche market largely required that Swakan-Chhemu 
minimise the use of locally-made hand-woven fabrics and maximise higher quality hemp 
fabrics. Though established as a realisation of Heera Ratna’s Gandhian vision of 
swadeshi-ness, Swakan-Chhemu did not hesitate in switching to use imported hemp 
fabrics. Equally, although developed to attract investors and consumers committed to 
promote Tibet’s cause, Swakan-Chhemu forged a partnership with a Shanghai-based 
Chinese firm in order to secure a regular supply of hemp fabrics. On these building 
blocks which were part coherent, part paradox, stood the symbolism that Swakan- 
Chhemu designed, produced and exported.
The fashion designer who designed all of Swakan-Chhemu’s garments was a young 
French woman who worked for John Paso, Swakan-Chhemu’s financier and buyer. 
Kelly would saturate herself with ideas by attending as many fashion shows as possible 
in the European fashion capital cities. This could take a week, or go on for months. This 
was all to make up her mind on a theme, which would mark all her designs for the 
season. Once she was ‘saturated,’ she would go on a shopping spree -  buying sample 
fabrics ffom the established brands of Diesel, Fanlarina, M60 and Bench Hooch to 
almost anybody in the Portobello and Camden Market street stalls in London. These 
were just for inspiration. When the inspiration was ‘ripe’, she and her associate would 
lock themselves in a room to sketch. The final outputs of all this activity were a few 
suitcases full of fabrics and folders full of sketches which they brought to Kathmandu 
with them. When they boarded their return plane from Kathmandu, their luggage would 
remain more or less the same because the original fabric samples had been transformed 
into key sample pieces. The full range of samples was then couriered afterwards.
It appeared that Kelly’s relationship with Kathmandu had little resemblance to that of 
other foreigners. She had outgrown Kathmandu’s novelty effect that kept tourists 
captivated in their first few weeks, and her existence in Kathmandu was inherently 
isolated from the buzzing crowd of developmentalists, anthropologists or hippies looking 
to find a long term niche. For Kelly, Kathmandu was a difficult muse, ‘frisky’ one day
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and ‘curmudgeonly’ the next. This was something that was also reflected in the way she 
connected and interacted with the owners and workers of Swakan-Chhemu. Contrary to 
general expectations for foreigners to be benevolent and guardian-like, though at the cost 
of being patronising Kelly was ekalkante (lonely), ghusghuse (quiet and introvert) but 
dhakwa-sikwa-mamha (demanding) figure for Puja, the designing assistant, Panday, the 
graphics designer and Rahul, the owner. Kelly made no attempts to socialise with her 
work colleagues apart from accepting occasional lunch invitations if they came from the 
owners and were scheduled for the working week. Instead, she would wander around the 
alleys and courtyards of inner Kathmandu and Boudha on her own looking for 
inspiration. One occasion when Kelly burst into tears about a minor error in embroidery 
confirmed Puja and Panday’s suspicion that Kelly was not like mepin bideshita (other 
foreigners) who were easy to get along with and made friends with everybody.
Yet, Kelly had to keep her artistic senses alive in order to continue to try to find ways of 
translating Kathmandu into something creative and interesting in her designs. Despite 
the logistical challenges, Kelly actually maintained that Kathmandu, with its complex 
melding of Hindu and Buddhist icons and eclectic mix of modem and ancient practices, 
was so inspirational that it remained a firm preference over moving their production to 
Dharmashala or elsewhere in India. She worked very closely with Rahul to add that final 
element of acculturation that gave her designs the edge. Although Rahul was hardly part 
of her hunt for inspiration as she wandered almost aimlessly around Kathmandu in search 
of the right image and icon, he almost always had the final say in deciding whether or not 
a certain Buddhist icon was appropriate for the style and colour of the design it was 
being added to. Kelly had more flexibility when the icons were not religious, and 
whenever a disagreement arose between them on the use of certain icons, Kelly often 
opted to use a non-religious icon. For Kelly, the harmony of fabrics, design and colour 
were as important a part of the design as the spiritual symbolism it conveyed; for Rahul, 
the final act of adding the symbols were as special as the mikha kankyagu (eye-opening) 
ritual of religious statue-making. The reality of contemporary fashion designing in 
Swakan-Chhemu, however, lay somewhere between the two worlds of spirituality and 
consumerism and its sustainability depended on extensive borrowing of ideas and 
practices from both worlds.
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4. Turning samples into production: a spatial expression of the order
The Newar communities have always exhibited a pronounced territorial introversion -  
settlements are protected from the dangerous surroundings by a ring of protector deities 
and icons (Gellner and Quigley, 1999: 300; Macdonald and Stahl, 1979: 115-118; 
Slusser 1982: 130-4; Shepard, 1985; and Gutschow et al, 1987: 134-8). Within the 
internal territories -  not only the communal spaces like bahas and bahis where Newars 
perform their ancestral, social and religious rituals but also in private spaces such as 
residential houses, Newars demonstrate an organisation of space that is a symbolic 
expression of household and social organisation. Newar city houses are traditionally 
three and half storeys high, each level being dedicated to distinct household and ritual 
chores thus echoing the symmetry of the rising order of assigned ritual purity. Access to 
the different storeys varies for different community members, depending on their ritual 
and pragmatic importance within the caste order; higher storeys are assigned as venues 
for more important household chores where only members of the higher castes are 
permitted entry (Gellner, 1992: 28; Parish, 1996: 73). I will demonstrate in this section 
that the cognition of spatial organisation not only facilitates household chores among 
Newars but also lends itself to commercial production processes, where employees and 
tasks are equated with the order of caste-based hierarchies and alliances that dominate 
Newar social organisation. The contests and compromises that modem manufacturing 
imposed on the owners and employees of Swakan-Chhemu set the stage for the caste’s 
transition from primordial to modem.
4a. The top floor: owners, their kin and the trusted
A Newar house is typically four-storeyed and half. The baigah (top half floor) and bhutu 
(third floor that is a full floor) traditionally has two uses: the first is the prayer room 
whereas the second is the hearth and dining area. Both these functions are secretive 
rituals among the Newars for which utmost privacy and segregation had to be maintained 
from the outside world. If  the house is very old, the upper part might also have 
extensions to the prayer room which have little light and air and are used as storage 
spaces. If the house is new, the dark storage space may have been turned into an open 
terrace or the kasi. The chwata (second floor) is where women and children spend most 
of their days doing family chores and is used for larger kin rituals marking major 
festivals as well as birth and death rituals. The matan (first floor) is used for formal 
meetings with business acquaintances. All of these floors are open only to the family, kin 
or caste members of equal or higher status. The lower-caste invitees to social rituals,
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e.g., barbers and farmers who assist in the preparation of the rituals, have food brought 
down to the lower floors. If the house is located in the main street, the chheli (ground 
floor) is either run as a family-operated shop or rented out for such. If  the house is 
located in the galli (inner alleys) and chuka (courtyards), the ground floor is often dark 
and inadequately ventilated, and will only have a lavatory and storage room. If the house 
belongs to artisans, the ground floor will be better maintained for use as a jyasa 
(workshop).
Although Swakan-Chhemu was much larger than residential buildings and although it 
was three-storeyed and half as opposed to four and half, there were several aspects of the 
traditional Newar spatial organisation which could be seen to have influenced the way 
the workspace was lay out in Swakan-Chhemu. For example, the second floor (or the 
full floor that is on the top) was where most of the important decisions were made and 
tasks undertaken. One had to take off one’s shoes to enter the main complex of this floor 
which housed all of the important offices: Mani’s office where key decisions were made 
on logistics; Rahul’s which tackled production management and fashion design; a large 
and spacious sampling room that Kelly and John jointly used during their stays in 
Kathmandu; design extension accommodating Puja and Panday and finally, the 
accounting offices. There was an ‘outer’ extension on this floor that could be accessed 
by walking through an outside balcony that did not require entering the main floor, and 
hence did not require taking off shoes. This housed a large and barren room for the 
‘finishing’ department that resembled the chwata of conventional Newar residential 
homes. The task of finishing included time-consuming and feminine tasks such as 
cutting off loose threads, measurement and quality checks, steaming and ironing, etc. All 
of the workers in this unit were Newar and Parbatiya women from within or around the 
Kathmandu Valley. Since it was perceived to be socially inappropriate that Nepali 
women work alongside the loud and rough Madheshi migrant workers, Swakan-Chhemu 
decided to house the finishing department next to where the owners worked even though 
this broke the assembly line. A Newar man ffom the untouchable caste whose family 
had served the Swakan-Chhemu owners for several generations was head of this unit.
This floor summed up most of the activities that conventionally went on in the bhutu, 
chwata and matan of traditional Newar residential homes -  the family activities of 
cooking and feeding, women’s chores of knitting and cleaning and men’s business 
meetings and leisure activities. Although all located on the same floor, there was a clear
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ritual separation between the owners’ business space where the Shakya kin occupying 
various important jobs like managing, designing, accounting and financial monitoring sat 
(or the traditional equivalent of the matan) and the workers’ casual space where the 
women of lower castes sat down to carry out the finishing tasks. One required taking off 
one’s shoes while the other did not, and people hardly crossed each other’s thresholds 
unless it was strictly necessary.
There was one exception however when it came to the use of the half floor nestled on top 
of the owners’ floor. This part historically had little light and ventilation, and had acted 
as the traditional storage space as well as a secretive prayer room as per the conventional 
Newar spatial order. Only recently it had been agreed between the owners and buyers of 
Swakan-Chhemu that there was a need for an in-house embroidery and screen-printing 
facility to expedite the designing and sampling processes. It was then arranged that their 
regular embroidery subcontractor -  a young Muslim man (see Section 2b of Chapter 8 
for details) -  should house two of his kaligadhs (artisans) in the Swakan-Chhemu 
complex. Where to place them was not very straightforward both ffom a business 
organisation as well as a ritualistic perspective. Both the artisans deployed to Swakan- 
Chhemu were Muslim migrants from the Terai and were as loud and ‘women-less’ as the 
stereotype suggested. Although there was a small room vacant within the main sampling 
area, it was unacceptable for not only Puja and Panday but also Rahul and Mani that 
these ‘outsiders’ work on the top floor. Since embroidery is a much cherished skill and 
also a tightly guarded business secret, it was also inadvisable to place them below the top 
floor. The only option left, then, was to develop the upper part of the mezzanine top 
floor as the embroidery and screen-printing room. The sub-floor got the necessary 
renovation to transform into a workshop; nevertheless, the Shakyas ensured not only that 
no provisions were made for additional light or air, but that the worst of the furniture was 
used in order to clearly differentiate it from the owners’ space.
As in conventional Newar homes, it was clear that the upper floors of Swakan-Chhemu 
allowed only the ‘insiders’ to enter these territories. Who was perceived to be insiders or 
outsiders was less obvious and this varied among the various cliques within and between 
the floors. The lunch hour, which ranged ffom thirty minutes for most workers to a 
whole hour for some privileged staff, was the only regular time off they got through the 
working day. The owners and employers developed their own social and networking 
codes about lunch arrangements. The women in the finishing room brought their own
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lunches and rarely left their room, even during the lunch hour. Their supervisor went to 
a nearby tea-shop along with the supervisors from other units downstairs, most of whom 
were also Newars from comparable castes. The Muslim artisans in the embroidery unit 
went to the same tea-shop but with other Muslim workers from the production unit. 
They performed their daily prayers together in the designated space. Puja and Panday, 
along with other Newar staff ffom the accounting, cutting and record-keeping units went 
together to another local tea-shop. Mani and Rahul either went home for lunch or 
skipped it. However, when either Kelly or John was in Kathmandu, Rahul’s family sent 
lunch for everybody in the design room. Puja would join John and Kelly for this, but not 
Panday the Newar Hindu Brahum even though they shared an office. Neither Mani 
joined these lunches nor any other staff from the accounting units. Instead, when the 
auditors were on duty, Mani’s family sent lunches for everybody in the accounting room. 
Rahul and the designing team did not join his unit. Such informal practices show this 
important floor to be functioning as a virtual space with a hierarchical order embedded 
into it: Rahul, the buyers and the designers lay at the very core of it, surrounded by Mani 
and his accounting team, while the lower caste ‘finishing’ women and their supervisor 
were firmly kept at the periphery. More valuable outsiders -  the embroidery team -  was 
somehow guarded safely for the sake of their business secrecy but still treated as 
outsiders. We can see that the arrangements that Swakan-Chhemu workers made for 
their daily lunches not only reiterated this sense of caste- and ethnicity-based 
camaraderie and hierarchy among the workers, it also leads us to a discussion about the 
job division between the owners themselves.
Mani laid the foundation for Swakan-Chhemu and also built its initial administrative 
structure whereas Rahul added to it a new dimension of creativity and fashion design. 
Their current job division reflected this. Mani studied business administration in 
Massourie in India and his world was that of the global and local supply chain which was 
punctuated by State bureaucratic measures that control, among other things, import of 
inputs and interactions with local suppliers, filing of taxes, transportation of finished 
product and financial negotiations. He was the sole contact point for the regular fabric 
suppliers in Shanghai where his son later interned upon his MBA graduation from 
London. The rest of his interactions took place in the narrow circle of government 
bureaucrats and clearing agencies. Resigned to the inherent delays, inconsistencies and 
corruption in these areas, Swakan-Chhemu went on to subcontract most of these tasks to 
a handling agency under Mani’s close supervision (see Section 3a of Chapter 8). Not
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only as the finance manager of the firm but also as the older brother, Mani ensured 
accounts were kept current and that half of the factory net earnings were transferred to 
Rahul at the end of every fiscal year.
Rahul joined Swakan-Chhemu after he graduated in fashion design, and his area of 
responsibility was that of design, sampling and production of garments. Given that he 
had lived for a number of years in New York to earn his degree and hence had more 
exposure to the Western world, Rahul was also expected to handle most of the social and 
production-related interactions with the buyers and designers. He worked closely not 
only with Kelly, John and Puja in the designing room, but also the cutting master whose 
knowledge of fabrics had come to gain his respect over time. As time passed, Rahul was 
increasingly responsible for the smooth functioning of the bulk of the international 
production management including the cutting, stitching and finishing units.
4b. The first floor: the world of fabrics
The main wing on the first floor was the fabric cutting room that accommodated about 
twenty skilled workers. Swakan-Chhemu initially had three separate cutting units: the 
largest one for woven fabrics, was headed by Kaji, a Buddhist Newar; the second for knit 
fabrics, was headed by Rana, a Hindu Chhetri from Uttaranchal in the North Indian 
Himalayas; and the third and smallest was for leather fabrics, headed by Mohan Nepali 
from the Hindu untouchable caste. Kaji was the only one who had been with the factory 
ffom its very beginning, and naturally he was the most trusted of the three. Rana and 
Mohan were brought in purely for some experimentation on fabric diversification and 
their contracts were very clearly defined with no room for discretion or subjective 
interpretation. Such an organisational structure worked for some time, but proved 
inadequate when a serious accident took place on the factory floor.
Kaji was a skilled artisan in his forties who had been a professional tailor all his life and 
had worked for the Shakyas for years. When Mani decided to start his original garment 
business, Kaji agreed to work in the factory right away. As Swakan-Chhemu gradually 
expanded and upgraded to manufacture exportable garments in larger quantities, Kaji 
trained himself, bit by bit to use the larger fabric cutting equipment. By the early 1990s, 
he was proficient in operating electric fabric cutters that would cut a pile of several 
hundred sheets at a go. Unfortunately, one day, Kaji cut his arm while operating the 
machine. He was hospitalised locally but did not recover fully enough to resume his job.
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Kaji had no sons, only a teenage daughter who was disabled and mute and he also 
supported an unmarried sister in her thirties. Under the circumstances, the Shakyas gave 
him early retirement and recruited his daughter and sister even though they lacked any of 
the industrial cutting skills. The vacancy for his position sparked a bitter rivalry between 
Mohan and Rana as to who might be chosen as the chief cutting master of the factory.
Mohan and Rana had both joined Swakan-Chhemu as independent franchisers, with little 
room in their contracts for discretion or trust-building. Later on, especially as they got to 
know the factory better and as the market potential for their products became more 
pronounced, they both became interested in stronger business relationships with Swakan- 
Chhemu. At the time of Kaji’s accident, Rana’s knitwear products were much more 
popular in the market than Mohan’s leather products. In fact, Mohan’s leather unit had 
been downsized to manufacture only accessories occasionally used for their woven and 
knitwear products. However, when it came to the social order, the fact that Rana was a 
devout Hindu, spoke only Hindi or Nepali (and the Kangra hill dialect that was similar to 
Nepali), and that his business and social network was concentrated on North Indians, 
made him not only less trusted, but rather suspicious a figure. Counter-intuitively, the 
Shakyas trusted and liked Mohan better despite his having brought little business to 
them. ‘Mohan is as cheated by the bramhus (a Newar colloquial term for Bahuns) as we 
ourselves are,’ Mani said with more or less the same conviction as he had said, ‘we’d 
rather do no business with the marshyas (a Newar colloquial term for Indians).
Mani and Rahul had several factual and mythical reasons as to why it did not make sense 
for Buddhist Newar entrepreneurs to form alliances, however strictly business they might 
be, with Hindus, Bahuns and Indians. I was told how the Nepali government had long 
favoured Indian entrepreneurs over the indigenous Newars and how, for decade after 
decade, the Nepali Bahun bureaucrats had hindered (saha maya) the progress of Newars. 
They reminded me, as if to prove their allegations with hard data, that when the Rana 
Prime Minister Juddha Shamsher Rana had had to decide whether to rely on indigenous 
Newar businessmen or to import businessmen from India for the first-tier 
industrialisation process, the ghushyaha (corrupt) bureaucrats around him had persuaded 
him to issue a pragyapan patra (State letter of invitation) to the East India Company to 
send thirty Marwari businessmen to Nepal.
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As Kaji took early retirement and it became clear that Rana’s knitwear unit was there to 
stay and Mohan’s leather unit to go, interactions between Rana and Mohan became ever 
more complicated. Rana thought Mohan misrepresented facts about him to the Shakyas 
while Mohan said Rana was ‘a rotten marshy a’ (Madheshi) and was stealing money ffom 
the factory. After several bitter arguments, Rana left Swakan-Chhemu two years before I 
started my fieldwork. I actually met and got to know him well in another of my case 
study factories, Arya-NepaB, where he had moved to. He was still bitter about his 
forced departure ffom Swakan-Chhemu, although in retrospect, he had come to see that 
there was more to it than Mohan opposing his every action and misrepresenting facts to 
the factory owners. ‘Newars have properties all over Kathmandu. They do not work 
hard, nor can they cope with others who work harder than themselves. OK, Mohan 
wanted to brainwash Mani and Rahul so he could get a job. But they were no kids. If 
they could not see through such simple things, what else could one expect of such 
employers?’
Whatever the matter was, Rana was let go and Mohan was let stay. When I was doing 
my fieldwork, the extent of Mohan’s influence in the factory operations could be seen 
from the fact that he had recently recruited two of his brothers-in-law to carry out the key 
tasks of fabric storage and accessories acquisition. Rahul respected Mohan’s talents not 
only in fabric cutting, but also in sampling and the overall production process. In the 
strictly kin- and spatially-introvert world of Swakan-Chhemu, this was indeed a 
significant achievement. The way Mohan’s stature grew in Swakan-Chhemu over the 
past decade is a testimony to the reality that vocations are no longer confined within the 
narrow caste order, and that the Newars must and do continually shape and further the 
conditions that make the production process more efficient.
Little else happened on the first floor other than fabric cutting. The large room was 
clearly divided into areas for woven and knit fabrics. Each section had a large table 
where fabric would be stretched out and layered; paper-cuttings placed on top to mark 
out the patterns; and finally cut. Kaji’s daughter and sister both worked harmoniously 
under Mohan’s supervision but they did not have any more responsibilities than several 
others working on the floor. Although Kaji’s sister would refuse to follow orders at 
times if she thought Mohan was not treating her with due respect, there were no visible 
tensions on this floor, nor any indication that she might take over Mohan’s leadership in 
the near future. Other workers were a mix of the Hindu Damais (tailors’ caste) and
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Sarkis (leather workers’ caste), relatively lower caste Newars and occasionally one or 
two higher Buddhist Newar caste people. A smaller extension to the main room on the 
first floor was used as the fabric storage room. One of Mohan’s two recently recruited 
brothers-in-law was slowly taking over the job from a low caste Newar woman who was 
preparing for maternity leave.
4c. The ground floor: the labour
Although Swakan-Chhemu was a modem building and relatively light and spacious, the 
construction and lay out of the ground floor echoed the traditional Newar chheli which 
were generally part storage and part jyasa (workshop) but clearly not a living space. 
Two extensions had been added in the case of Swakan-Chhemu, the first to 
accommodate a knitting unit and the second a hall that offered cooking, eating and 
sleeping facilities for the workers.
As in several garment factories in Kathmandu, the majority of the Swakan-Chhemu 
tailors were Madheshis and male. Unlike the extreme anonymity encountered by 
garment workers in mass manufacturing factories, the Swakan-Chhemu tailors showed a 
strong sense of community brought about through working regularly in the same factory 
for several years. The naikes (juwadi leaders who also were often also the village heads 
in these cases) in Swakan-Chhemu, a Madheshi from Lahan in the central Terai, had 
been regularly supplying workers from a cluster of villages in their vicinity for few 
decades. Swakan-Chhemu would charter a bus to these villages, and the village heads 
would literally summon artisans to get on the bus for a season-long trip to Kathmandu. 
Their counterpart in Swakan-Chhemu would arrange for board and lodging for them on 
the factory premises. At the end of the season, the contractor was also responsible for 
transporting them back to their villages on factory-chartered buses. They were fully 
responsible for the workers’ loyalty and skill; in turn, they received the bulk payment 
upon completion of the order which they would then distribute among the workers. 
Workers did not defect from them because they paid more than the going rate and they in 
turn remained loyal to Swakan-Chhemu because other factories in Kathmandu no longer 
used the naikes nor the juwadi system.96
96 After the garment mass-manufacturers switched from the primitive juwadi system to the Taylorist 
chain system in the 1990s, they skipped the middlemen and directly hired and fired workers in their 
hundreds.
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Swakan-Chhemu was a rare, if  not the only, factory where the juwadi system still 
prevailed. The garment workers were kin among themselves. They formed a khal 
(gambling circle) of up to fifteen juwadis (gamblers) under one naike (team-leader and 
middleman), who worked jointly to produce stacks of garments. The juwadi system 
functioned under an apparent hierarchy where the naikes not only decided who stayed 
and who went from his khal, but also who did what and how much they would earn. 
Although the nature of job division rarely deviated ffom the standard norms, each naike 
announced rates for each part of the job to each juwadi depending on the overall rate 
secured from the employers. To this were added complicated calculations if daily 
commodity prices rose in the market or if they had to work through important social 
occasions. Outside nominal compensations, the juwadis also expected the naike to take 
care of any household emergencies that occurred back home while they were in 
Kathmandu. This included major and minor favours of advance payment directly to their 
families, mediation in local disputes, etc. With so many layers of obligations 
intertwined, the juwadis would stay together only if they shared ties that stretched 
beyond the factory workfloors. All the juwadis that I met in Swakan-Chhemu belonged 
to the same or neighbouring villages and had one or more affine or consanguine 
relations. There were two or three Nepalis among the Swakan-Chhemu tailors who were 
not Madheshis and had no relationship with the juwadis and they worked independently. 
In general, unless they had a serious fall out with the naikes or floor supervisors in 
Swakan-Chhemu, both juwadi and independent workers did not move elsewhere because 
of the higher wages paid. In turn, Swakan-Chhemu demanded ffom their naikes and 
juwadis better precision of tasks and longer term loyalty to the factory.
Naikes often brought adolescent apprentices from among their kin whom they called 
bakaras (goats). In return for on-the-job training, the bakaras usually lent a hand not 
only in tailoring but also in cooking and cleaning. When they graduated from the 
assisting chores which would have been carried out by women in traditional workshops, 
they joined the khal as bona fide juwadis and gave continuity to the rhythm of juwa. The 
fact that the bakaras took on the traditionally female chores in the factory reconfirmed 
my earlier statement that the Madheshis never brought their women with them, neither 
for companionship nor for assistance at work. This then earned them the reputation of 
being ‘dangerous’ and untrustworthy with women workers in the factory. I have already 
discussed how Swakan-Chhemu distanced the task of finishing of garments from the 
tailoring process. Although these two were probably the most closely related production
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steps, it was not deemed right to station the hill women who did finishing work, side by 
side with the Madheshi tailors.
All of the garment workers in Swakan-Chhemu were Muslims. Their board and lodging 
followed Muslim norms, and arrangements were made for them to undertake their daily 
prayers in an adjacent open field. Although the workers from the ground floor socialised 
easily with the Muslim artisans ffom the embroidery unit who worked on the top floor, as 
seen ffom the joint daily prayers and lunches, no workers ffom the ground floor ever 
ventured up to the higher ones. The only people who went upstairs from the ground to 
second floor were the main naikes. One time when they were denied what they thought 
was a legitimate wage raise, they took four or five of their juwadis to have a broader 
discussion with Rahul the owner. Although there was no direct confrontation, the very 
act of ‘climbing the stairs to the top floor’ sent such shockwaves around the factory that 
they hastily resolved the matter within an hour and ‘the climb’ was never repeated. 
However, the workers continued to reconstruct the incident each time embellishing it 
further.
5. Resilience beyond the MFA
I have already discussed how, unlike several other garment factories operating in 
Kathmandu at that time, Swakan-Chhemu remained unaffected by the breakdowns of the 
supply chain that occurred from time to time. In Swakan-Chhemu, the workers were 
organised on the basis of caste and locality and were remunerated well in the form of 
wages better than offered elsewhere. Thanks to this, they remained less affected by the 
Maoist proselytisation. Since the sourcing of fabrics, accessories and embroidery 
services were adequately hedged through personalised trust rather than business 
opportunism, the problems of supply chain ffagmentation were easily overcome. Above 
all, it served Swakan-Chhemu well that their buyers were internationally competitive 
entrepreneurs who personally admired the cultural history of their producers. Further, 
the consumers of their goods were those who were willing to pay a premium for the 
symbolism of the local culture in addition to the value of the input materials. For 
Swakan-Chhemu, their niche in the global market was not subject to momentary policy 
changes such as the MFA and it continued its production cycles with full normalcy after 
the MFA expired in December 2004. If anything, its owners got more local prominence 
as several mass manufacturers left the field. For example, the older Shakya brother was 
nominated to the implementation committee when GAN set out to advise the government
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on the simplification of paperwork required for declaring the rules of origin for export 
subsidies. This was a gesture of recognition of Swakan-Chhemu’s business success. At 
the factory level, however, there was no visible change in the way Swakan-Chhemu 
produced its goods, or the way it formed its business alliances among the series of actors 
within and outside the factory floors, or more importantly, the way it behaved in the 
market and the way the market treated Swakan-Chhemu. The MFA expiration came and 
went without changing the way Swakan-Chhemu had always operated.
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Chapter 7: Cultural capital
In the preceding three chapters, I have shown how the producers of specialised garments 
survived the demise of the Nepalese homogenised garment industry through their dense 
cultural knowledge and skills. Unlike the economic policy scholars’ picture of ‘failed 
garment states’ as being fragmented in their outreach to the market owing to problems of 
labour, input and entrepreneurial skills (World Bank, 2002), I have shown how the 
owners of Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu successfully overcame the industrial crisis 
thanks to their rich and dense web o f knowledge, networks and skills derived through 
kinship and ethnicity-based relationships. The current chapter continues the discussion 
and highlights the continual blurring of boundaries between what is purely cultural and 
purely capital -  a dynamic taking place on the readymade garment shop-floors in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. IT discusses how the emergence of cultural 
capital in the context of global market integration has re-invigorated the ancient 
productive strategies of the textile traders (Marwaris) and culture traders (Newars) 
described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and asserts that the ‘new’, post-Taylorist economy 
intrinsically relies on pre-industrial sources of knowledge, networks and skills.
I examine the relevance of Bourdieu’s discourse on the restructuring of the social classes 
for the widening and modernising ‘field’ of specialised garment manufacturing in Nepal. 
In his ethnography of the Nattukottai Chettiars, a prominent merchant caste from Tamil 
Nadu, Rudner (1994) examined the role of culture and social capital in the success of this 
efficient caste-based banking system. Drawing on the arguments emerging from 
Rudner’s seminal work, my analysis revolves around the following questions: what is the 
relationship between formal and informal economic processes and how do they transform 
throughout economic development? What happens to the transactional knowledge, 
structure and rules that prevailed in the conventional economy once it expands beyond its 
original boundaries to embrace new opportunities or threats? How does the 
transformation of transactional knowledge and its distribution affect the existing social 
structure and power balance between various communities within an economy?
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1. Cultural capital in manufacturing specialised garments
The structuralist discourse led by Radcliffe-Brown and Durkheim engaged with the logic 
of economic analysis for ostensibly non-economic forms of power and social courses of 
action. Weber, Parsons and Malinowski substantiated further to argue that culture 
evolves in society-specific economic contexts which make some cultural practices 
economically flawed and hence unsustainable in the long run while other cultural 
practices are economically productive and hence institutionalised in the long run. My 
research shows how the culture-derived knowledge which contributes to the garment 
industry has emerged through a series of filters in which the producers of specialised 
garments -  in large part because of their pragmatism concerning the way the global 
garment industry is constructed -  have sought to be the kinds of industrialists and to have 
the kind of cultural capital that global consumers want. Following the Weberian and 
Parsonian tradition, I show that transactions economics underpin the reconstruction of 
culture-derived knowledge, which may give rise to what Ortner (1999: 58) called 
‘virtual’ culture that would enable the agents to compete and survive in the world of 
global capitalist markets (see Chapter 3). My counter-argument, however, is that the 
‘virtual’ culture is not independent of the ‘original’ culture in that how far the agents can 
stretch themselves towards economically pragmatic knowledge, skills and practices, 
depends largely on the position they start from, and the characteristics of that starting 
position. To address this multi-faceted issue, this chapter discusses the ethnographies of 
the readymade garment factories in Nepal (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) in the context of 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of cultural capital.
Bourdieu explained variation in culture and life-style by class position, yet he defined 
class in part by the distribution of cultural capital or aestheticism. His core argument is 
that aestheticism-derived class takes shape after the two parties involved have voluntarily 
legitimised it, and that any venture -  be it economic, cultural or social -  develops from 
the structure established through legitimisation of knowledge. This conception of 
cultural importance identifies principal sources of power as possession of different forms 
of capital (e.g., economic, social, cultural and symbolic) through one’s habitus. Habitus 
is neither objective nor innate but a ‘structured structure’ that derives from the class- 
specific fundamental dispositions that are internalised through early socialisation in 
family and peer groups. The mark of subjectivism extends to an ongoing process of 
adaptation that occurs as habitus encounters new situations, but this process tends to be 
slow and largely unconscious. Any social interaction that is underpinned by ownership
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or lack of cultural capital is then marked by what Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic violence’ 
where the two parties maintain a tacit acceptance of the importance of elite knowledge or 
culture -  or ‘distinction. ’ He recognises that the dominant class is divided between those 
who possess only economic capital, the lesser fraction of the economic bourgeoisie, and 
those who also possess cultural capital, the greater fraction of the cultural bourgeoisie. 
Bourdieu’s postulation is that most economic conflict in modem societies is not 
interclass rivalry between the working class and the bourgeoisie but an intra-class rivalry 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ aesthetics, which is a continuous process following the 
incremental widening of the field.
I will differentiate between the deepening of cultural capital in the readymade garment 
industry in Nepal during its initial stage when it functioned within the ambit of local 
society, and its widening as the industry broadened its field to encompass an 
international clientele. In both the stages, the interlinkages between economic and 
cultural capitals are pervasive and the worlds of formal and informal institutions 
persistently overlapping. Such interlinkages have given rise to the use of cultural 
platforms for developing in-depth understanding as well as the actual substance and 
process of the material production. I will discuss two accounts offered to explain this 
phenomenon. First, Rudner’s work (1994) may be described as offering a ‘highly 
socialised’ account. He shows that the functioning of the South Indian caste group of the 
Nakarattars is organised around banking and territorial dominance and that the 
relationship between mercantile trustworthiness and economic power is reciprocal and 
functional. Among the Nakarattar elites, worship and commerce, purity and mercantile 
trust, and temples and politics function side by side. Rudner observes that although the 
history of Nakarattar caste institutions has been marked by a series of disjunctures, there 
is an underlying continuity that underpins the modernisation of commerce, suggesting an 
integration of the economic and cultural domains of social action.
The ‘highly economistic’ accounts, on the other hand, have highlighted the importance of 
formal institutions as the basis of new knowledge within the industrial and macro- 
economic systems. Some examples include cost-benefit analyses of State incentives to 
encourage research and development, the establishment of training and vocational 
institutes, public-private partnerships to trigger innovation and protect its benefits 
through copyrights systems, etc. While policy and programme incentives may provide a 
formal framework for knowledge generation and transfer, informal institutions such as
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familial and locality-based chains of knowledge transfer as well as caste and ethnic 
identities appear decisive in whether and how formal policy measures translate into 
actual business practices.
Economic sociologists emphasise that economic actions affecting formal institutions -  
including those concerning generation of knowledge and skills -  are embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of informal institutions (Grano vetter, 1985). Rational choice 
theorists argue that the set of resources that inhere in family relations and community 
social organisations are useful for cognitive or social development, which in turn has 
long-term economic implications (Coleman, 1984). Further, culture theorists argue that 
it is not enough to establish the existence of industrial knowledge and networks within 
culture, but it is equally important to examine how the cultural and ideological content of 
the former alters the configuration of the latter, since the two are inextricably intertwined 
(Bourdieu, 1993).
As a result of global factors and the cultural image of the country, the market indicates 
that Nepal has a comparative advantage in specialised garment products rather than 
scale-based homogenous products. Yet, it was only a select few industrialists -  all from 
the old elite caste and ethnicities -  who could afford to develop their businesses to 
capture this niche market. I have already shown in previous chapters that owners of 
specialised factories chose to produce materials which they already had acquired 
knowledge of through family legacies. Even when the market was promising, 
industrialists did not venture lightly into developing unknown products which demanded 
knowledge and skills which were not part of their hereditary family professions. In this, 
we see that the industrialists interpret the world of business opportunities and constraints 
through their mental models -  or accumulated knowledge, preferences and networks -  
which are partly culturally derived and partly acquired through their experiences in 
business organisation. For these reasons, contrary to neoclassical assumptions, it was 
perfectly possible for multiple cultural groups within an economy to aim for, arrive at 
and sustain multiple equilibria of product demand and supply.
The Rauniyars, who are traditional cloth merchants, specialise in garment products which 
derive their special features from a sophisticated blending of manually woven fabrics. 
Although their designs could well benefit from an expansion of clothing styles, the 
Rongoli designers did not enter the unknown territory of fashion designing. Instead
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Rongoli’s production solely entailed ladies’ jackets of the same size and fit, which were 
differentiated only by their use of fabrics, colours and embroideries. Swakan-Chhemu 
produced a wide range of men’s and women’s boutique clothing, but the core theme 
which gave them a common brand was the stylised Tibetan Buddhist iconography and 
the signature semiotics derived from it. This was the core they capitalised on, in order to 
capture their niche markets.
Another application of cultural capital in the readymade garment industry in Nepal 
entails the use of cultural institutions to facilitate contractual relations among the agents 
involved in production and distribution. Zucker (1986) and Moore (1999) use the notion 
of ‘character-’ and ‘process-based’ trust to conceptualise business networks and 
institutions that serve as a business infrastructure for the generation and sustenance of 
cultural assets capitalised in the industrial set up. Business structures and networks -  or 
social capital as Putnam (2000) calls it -  can be either based in the informal institutions 
of caste, ethnicity and kinship, or they can foster the cultural patterns of kinship through 
their rational relational obligations and interdependence. What is crucial for the 
sustainability of social capital is the added value it brings to the economic exchange.
An important element that is often missing in the discourse on social capital, especially 
in the version that Putnam led, is the acknowledgement that the role of social capital is 
uniquely contextual. For example, the business structure and the nature of networking 
were strikingly different between the two successful producers of specialised garments. 
Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli both identified a common ground for business interests 
and then developed surrogate kinships with their buyers. The founders of Swakan- 
Chhemu used their cultural identities as Buddhist artists as the basis for being identified, 
rather passively, by their connoisseur o f Buddhist art and philosophy buyers. Rongoli 
recognised its vulnerability to exogenous market crises and actively identified and 
approached a buyer who would be materially dependent on Rongoli to supply all his 
needs. Such relational dependency is not to be found in Arya-Nepal3, in which the 
owners formed business partnerships with industrialists of the same religion and 
attempted to legitimise these partnerships through religious rituals and events. While 
such an allegiance was convenient, it was not sustainable, as seen by the dismantling of 
this business partnership upon the change of the WTO policy in 2004 (see Chapter 4). 
This leads us to observe that trust and cultural capital are characterised by the specificity 
of the added value that they bring to the economic exchange in question. In other words,
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the ‘cultural’ relevance of Swakan-Chhemu buyers was economically sustainable while 
that of Arya-Nepal3’s was not; and such subtleties are bound to steer the economic 
trajectories that the Buddhist Newar and Hindu Bahun-Chhetri societies in Nepal pursue 
in the long run.
While the role of cultural capital in the industrialists’ relationship with their buyers is to 
identify interests in common knowledge, its relationship with their employees is about 
regeneration of that knowledge which adds value to their businesses. Rongoli invoked 
cultural ideals amongst its workers to foster trust within its business organisation. For 
example, it preferred to employ entire families -  as opposed to individual workers -  so as 
to carve out a role for the factory owners as the interlocutors within family units and it 
nurtured the traditional stereotypes of caste, gender and age -  be it disaggregating 
workers of different caste and ethnicity into different wage and work clusters, 
discouraging mandatory overtime schedules for women, or maintaining the codes of age 
hierarchies in day-to-day interaction among the workers. These were useful ‘lubricators’ 
of business organisation, which proved to be successful strategies in reducing wage costs 
and labour turnover in the time of normalcy and keeping labour resistance at bay in the 
time of crises. In contrast, Swakan-Chhemu chose to engage with the naik.es and pay 
higher wages to workers at the bottom of the hierarchy in order to maintain labour 
loyalties and trust and reduce labour turnover, which was important for maintaining 
knowledge of production processes and product quality. Swakan-Chhemu recruited only 
its kin for indispensable positions. In contrast, the only labour management tool 
available to Arya-Nepal was, ironically, that of labour unionism (see Section 1 of 
Chapter 4) because the culture and wage-based labour organisation sought greater job 
security for workers than could be offered by the owners in the volatile world of mass 
production. At times, these proved inadequate to cope with the looming crises, as in case 
of the Hritik Roshan scandal and the Maoist labour union crisis (see Chapter 4).
This brief discussion points to important challenges to cultural capital in the context of 
its strictly economic value. Although Nepal has opened up to the international market 
for mass-produced garments, its core comparative advantage lies in specialised, ethno- 
contemporary garments for which it is essential that the producers derive their business 
knowledge and organisational systems from familial, ethnic and cultural legacies. In the 
variety of daily struggles occurring in this rapidly transforming industry, economic 
production and organisation draw on an extensive, yet deep-rooted cultural capacity to
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utilise and transform knowledge and organisational practices, particularly against the 
looming challenges o f scale-based global competition.
2. The context of cultural capital
One of the most visible expressions of overlap between cultural and economic capital is 
the contemporary dominance of ethno-contemporary garment production over 
homogenised production in that the niche producers have survived the crises of the 
ending of the MFA and domestic political instabilities while the mass producers have 
not. The case of cultural capital makes cultural identities transformable into capital, 
which can be invested and harvested in capitalist ventures. The ‘distinction of taste’ that 
the cultural agents embody constitutes an important cognitive dimension as they set out 
to develop their business strategies in the world of contemporary capitalism. Set against a 
State that neither proactively dismantles nor formally acknowledges caste and ethnicity 
as a unit of classification among the Nepali people; and given the lack of any formal 
institution that works to transfer knowledge and skills across cultural groups (in this case, 
castes and ethnicities), communities pursue their cultural rituals and business activities 
almost in isolation from each other. But the ultimate global market that each of the 
cultural groups is now pursuing is increasingly a unified one. The newly emerging 
markets for culture-based production, however, spread beyond the narrow borders not 
only between cultural groups but also between nations and continents. In a rapidly 
globalising world, appreciation for cultural products from within and beyond a society is 
spreading as rapidly as consumerism itself. What this implies for the producers of such 
cultural products is that they are no longer dependent on local patrons for consumption of 
their produce, but rather can widen their horizons so as to reach potential consumers 
from different realms who would have been outside their habitus in the pre-globalised 
world. It also implies that they can no longer operate only within a tightly knit circle of 
friends and family, nor can they remain untouched by the vices and virtues of capitalism. 
In what follows, I will point to only a few of these cultural markets.
2a. Indra Chok
In this subsection, I describe the social and economic interactions taking place at Indra 
Chok, the heart of cloth trading in Kathmandu, which is inhabited largely by immigrants 
from North India, and where Sabitri and Gaj Rauniyar of Rongoli met, married, lived and 
worked, until they moved to their new business venture (Rongoli) and home in newer 
part of Kathmandu. Indra Chok consists of roughly a quarter square kilometre with a
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thick web of narrow alleys, and it was here that Gaj and Sabitri met all five of their key 
buyers who were instrumental in their decision to move away from Indra Chok to invest 
in their new venture, Rongoli. It was here where over four generations of Sabitri’s family 
lived and worked and here where Gaj moved to from the small Nepal-India border town 
of Birganj as an adolescent to live with his sister and her in-laws.
Indra Chok is not only a market for women’s traditional clothing and matching 
accessories but a women’s cultural centre, of sorts, where women shop and socialise, 
especially to design their wardrobes for festivals and rituals. A substantial shopping trip 
to Indra Chok is a must for every would-be bride in Kathmandu, and her friends and 
relatives. Almost all the merchandise in every shop in Indra Chok comes from nooks 
and crannies of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Only very limited embroidery and 
finishing work is done locally, and then by immigrants from India. Almost all of their 
merchandise is handmade and/or are the products of cottage and small industries. In this, 
the Indra Chok economy in Nepal and its direct counterparts in various parts of India all 
lie at the periphery of the formal economy. They are traded through informal channels, 
often avoiding taxes and duties, yet they serve a clientele who are the elites of the formal 
economy.
At Indra Chok, the shopkeepers and suppliers not only exchange goods and jobs but also 
build economic and social alliances, which are essential if one is to penetrate the vast 
informal economy of weaving, embroidery and clothing manufacture from all over India, 
Bangladesh and some parts of Pakistan. Business networks are not constrained within a 
certain community -  the Indra Chok businessmen must develop multiple trustworthy 
supply chains from different parts of these countries if they are to survive the cut-throat 
competition. An understanding of the business network is especially important because 
all production orders and financial transactions are conducted verbally and over a long 
time span, legitimised by sketchy paper receipts which, at most, serve more as memory- 
joggers than for any legal purpose. Shopkeepers develop their expertise from early 
childhood, through apprenticeships with parents or kin. Knowledge of product quality is 
especially important because, on the one hand, the supply chain consists of a vast 
diversity of products and production spaces with no codified standardisation to 
distinguish original from fake, and on the other hand, the clientele largely consists of 
upper and middle-class urbanite housewives of Kathmandu who are deeply familiar with 
the Indra Chok market and able to bargain hard for the best quality and value for money.
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2b. Boudha
The north-eastern end of the Kathmandu valley is a bustling market of Tibetan Buddhist 
statues, thangkas, antiques, music CDs, Tibetan carpets and other artefacts. While the 
general artefacts, antiques, thangka and carpet businesses are distributed between 
Buddhist Newars and Tibetan Nepalis, statuary is still largely dominated by Buddhist 
Newars. Although different in substance, the statuary trade in Boudha has certain 
similarities with the cloth-trade of Indra Chok: First, it requires an in-depth
understanding of the aesthetics of statuary art which can only be developed by being part 
of the tightly-knit social circle of the statue-makers; and second, since the chosen 
families of Newar Buddhists have a monopoly on statue production, the radius of trust 
that is so vital for this business is so uniquely narrow that there is hardly a business case 
for a transition from character to process-based trust, as the economic discourse on this 
would seem to suggest (Zucker, 1986). This might come as a disappointment for 
theorists who predict a conveniently linear departure from manual precision to 
mechanisation of the production process and from informality to formalisation of 
producers’ networking.
The Buddhist statuary market of Boudha is less a market of pragmatic economic 
entrepreneurship where producers hold supremacy through the mechanics of their 
products; but more a world of aesthetics where they derive their distinction through their 
centuries-long caste dispositions. The fact that Buddhist Newars are perceived to be the 
only genuine producers of Buddhist statues is founded on centuries of Nepali history 
which saw them as the primary keepers of Buddhist philosophy in Nepal as well as 
conduits of Buddhism to the far-flung comers of the Himalayas, including Tibet. The 
history of the medieval Nepal-Tibet trade suggests that acculturation and counter­
acculturation between the two societies was achieved through an exchange of 
commodities and philosophies of distinction (Slusser, 1982:130-4; Rankin, 2004). Such 
culture-based history has been contained in modem statuary production and exchange, of 
which Boudha is a vibrant example. A typical statue shop in Boudha, as elsewhere in 
Kathmandu Valley, is owned by an art entrepreneur, who displays products made by kin 
and local friends. It is important to note that a professional artist would produce statues 
of only a few selected deities -  the deities to whom the families have demonstrated their 
loyalties across generations. Occasionally, it does happen that statues are copied and 
‘sinfully’ reproduced by novice artists. There is no formal mechanism to establish
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copyright of designs. An ad hoc solution that the entrepreneurs practise is that they hide 
the best of their statues to show only to khas (real) customers.
Unlike the Indra Chok market where most, if not all, merchandise is imported from 
various parts of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, almost all inputs for the statue market 
are indigenous. The brass or copper might be brought from India, but they are then 
heated and melted into moulds manually designed by the artists using locally available 
inputs such as wax and clay. The artists finish their statues using home-made chisels and 
hammers. The art is hardly codified; parents pass on skills to their children. As families 
undergo modem pressures, only one or two children are available to give continuity to 
the ancestral profession, while the rest follow more mainstream vocations that require 
training that takes less time and less serious dedication. Some families do take 
apprentices from outside but this requires the two families involved to remain the best of 
friends through several years of knowledge transfer. Almost no apprentice is taken from 
outside the circle of kin. It then becomes clear that while the Indra Chok market depends 
upon widening of social capital, the Boudha market requires its deepening.
3. Widening of the field
One of the most visible changes that both Indra Chok and Boudha have undergone in the 
past few decades is their integration with actors and principles external to Nepal. In this 
section, I will discuss how formal macroeconomic policies have influenced this 
transition. Following the 1951 movement (which ousted the isolationist Rana regime) 
and the 1961 royal takeover (which instigated a formal industrial policy framework 
internally and a process of global integration externally), Nepal opened up to the first 
surge of tourism in the early 1970s.97 International development aid agencies followed 
in the early 1980s, which ushered in a new elite class of expatriates (Heaton-Shrestha, 
2004). The business instincts of the traditional bazaars’ more ambitious men made them 
quick to realise that the tourists and expatriates had stronger purchasing power and 
higher social status than their regular local clients. This new clientele could not only 
enhance the prestige they had in their businesses, but also initiate knowledge transfer and 
exposure to a bigger market yet outside Nepal’s borders. A significant number of former 
cloth-sellers and statue-makers quickly stepped in to fill this vacuum of ethno- 
contemporary souvenir clothing.
97 Although Nepal is now better known for backpackers’ mountain trekking, the initial flocks o f  
tourists were admirers o f Nepal’s architecture and social culture who spent most o f their time within 
the Kathmandu valley and kept themselves busy with walking tours and shopping.
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Before this exposure to tourists and expatriates, the tastes of the local clothing clientele 
for traditional cloth-sellers had been dictated purely by the social and cultural norms of 
exchange where profits were expected to be minimal, designs conventional and the idea 
of quality equated with durability. In contrast, the new clientele brought in ideas that 
would radically increase profit, as well as the view that daring creativity and innovation 
in design could be regarded as more important than product durability. These new 
opportunities thus liberated business hopes, which had previously been constrained by 
the structure of market and the rules of exchange between buyers and sellers.
This is not to suggest that every businessman would now compete for the expatriate and 
tourist market and abandon their old clientele. First of all, partly due to linguistic 
barriers, and partly to the suspicion and hesitation most businessmen showed regarding 
the perceived sustainability of the new norms, the less daring of them showed little 
interest in connecting with the new clientele. Second, exchange with new clientele 
necessitated a certain degree of embodied cultural capital, to be expressed in such things 
as verbal facility, general cultural awareness and aesthetic preferences. Those who were 
inferior linguistically or aesthetically did not qualify for the new market, and hence 
remained in the old.
In the years that immediately followed the tourism and ‘development’ boom, the new 
clientele was obtained by establishing social links with expatriates living in Kathmandu 
or through travel agents who could use their social capital to connect sellers with 
incoming tourists. Select entrepreneurs from Indra Chok, Boudha and other traditional 
markets, who were not only best placed to forge such links but also had accumulated a 
wealth of knowledge through their long-term affiliations with the old markets, succeeded 
in establishing a strong foothold in the upper echelons of the new market. A visible 
result was that particular comers in both Indra Chok and Boudha transformed into 
clusters of foreigner-oriented workshops producing innovative souvenir garments using 
locally manufactured inputs. It was common that one faction of a joint family -  often the 
youngest son who could afford to take higher risks because his older brothers had already 
secured the joint family assets -  would start such new ventures. Both the Rauniyars of 
Rongoli and the Shakyas of Swakan-Chhemu are good examples of this. By the early 
1980s, there were at least fifteen similar factories which produced specialised garments 
for a not so large new local market comprising visiting tourists and resident expatriates.
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They each had a small workshop employing five to ten workers and a retail shop on the 
periphery of the cultural markets such as Indra Chok, Boudha, Thamel, Patan, etc.
The second wave of change in the new cultural market came in the form of globalisation. 
After the second renewal of the MFA in 1982, Shah Safari established a purchasing 
house in Kathmandu and introduced subcontracting of mass garment manufacturing 
among over fifteen factories in Kathmandu. Subsequently, the 1992 industrial policy 
removed both tariff and non-tariff barriers to the export of finished products and import 
of raw materials required for production of exportables. The government subsequently 
introduced a series of policy incentives to encourage garment production and export from 
Nepal (see Section 3 in Chapter 2). What this meant for the small-scale producers of 
specialised garments was that they either chose to mass manufacture homogenised 
garments for Shah Safari and join the mainstream market, or they upgraded the quality 
and scale of their specialised production and tried to reach far-away niche markets 
beyond the local retail business with tourists and expatriates.
Both the Indra Chok and Boudha economies, situated in close proximity to tourist 
attractions, underwent a radical transformation during this phase which can be seen in the 
spatial transformation of the industry: The foreigner-oriented workshops which had been 
situated at the periphery of the cultural markets moved to the periphery of town which 
could better accommodate the needs of manufacturing on a larger scale. Interactions 
between producers and their clients were formalised and facilitated by means of 
communication. The self-contained structure of Indra Chok and Boudha entrepreneurs 
was no longer valid once the economy opened up to foreigners. It was imperative that 
the entrepreneurs now carve out new cultural roles vis-a-vis their new clientele in the 
broadened structure of economic positions, and that their products respond to the new 
and global tastes without fully losing their cultural imprints.
4. Reconsolidating social classes within a widened field
I have already described the process of reconstruction of the specialised garment industry 
as producers embraced waves of global integration both geographically and culturally. 
The current cultural construction of the specialised garment industry has emerged 
through a process of reconstruction and adjustment, in which the manufacturers -  in 
large part, but not entirely because of, their dependence on income from garment-making 
and exporting -  have sought to be the kinds of people and to have the kind of culture that
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global consumers have wanted. Ortner (1999: 58) has discussed the reconstruction of 
Sherpa identity and emergence of a ‘virtual’ Sherpa culture, owing to their dependence 
on the vocations of mountaineering and tourism. One could argue that a similar feature 
is true in the case of garment-makers who have developed a ‘virtual’ culture 
entrepreneurship.
Originally, the international niche market valued the supply from the Nepali garment- 
makers for their capture of South Asian cultural capital. Some of the successful garment- 
makers offered unique textile combinations while others offered a fusion of ancient 
South Asian semiotics with modem fashion clothing. Some of the buyers of the 
Nepalese garments noted that they bought from Nepal because that gave them access to 
rich Indian textiles without having to expose themselves to the Indian ‘harshness and 
chaos’. Another buyer commented, during my interviews with them while in Nepal and 
later in London, on a certain identity-based cultural capital of selected garment-makers; 
that their chosen producers were ‘the descendents of ancient Lhasa traders’ which is 
enough attraction among the pro-Tibet clientele that we wish to target, followed by 
generic observations that Nepalis were ‘honest and easy to deal with’.98
The notion that Nepali garment-makers were honest, easy-going and the bearers of 
ancient culture took various forms. Sometimes, it entered into a near exploitative 
discourse that viewed their trustworthiness as easy to manipulate. Mostly, however, 
there was a straightforward appreciation of people who could keep positive attitudes 
under quite adverse business conditions. For example, after a lengthy and resource­
consuming round of inspection of samples of clothes, it might happen -  owing to 
changes in fashion tastes in the Western markets -  that the entire range had to be 
dismissed and a second round of sampling started. Although pure business ethics would 
require the buyers to bear at least part of the costs arising from such last minute changes, 
most of the specialised garment-makers in Nepal felt compelled to bear most of it 
themselves.
These acts of compromise and the somewhat laid-back nature of the Nepali garment- 
makers in turn shaded into acts of outright service for the buyers. Garment-makers 
housed and fed their buyers in their homes; built extensions to their houses to provide
98 Based on interviews with John Paso and his associates who were the sole buyers and distributors o f  
Swakan-Chhemu.
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guest rooms for them during their stays in Kathmandu and even went to the extent of 
hanging their photographs on their walls along with those of family. The buyers took it 
that such loyalty and the service orientation of the Nepali garment-makers were the 
results of the ways in which business was conducted. Contrary, such a pure business 
outlook might have been shared by some garment-makers but not all, not even a 
majority. In fact, they related to a strongly established non-business notion, which ran 
through many aspects of their culture — of waiting upon, appeasing and seeking favour, 
or chakari (Bista, 1992). The buyers, on the other hand, were hardly aware of this aspect 
of their relationship. On their part, there was a tendency to view their relationship with 
their suppliers through the lenses of pure capitalism or business pragmatism, whereby the 
buyers justifiably refused to reciprocate the hospitality. For example, Gaj confessed that 
his buyer, who was among his closest ‘friends’, did not offer him cooked meals when he 
was visiting in Seattle. Despite minor disappointments such as these that occurred from 
time to time, the buyer-supplier relationship, from the suppliers’ perspective was one that 
was embedded in either profoundly kin-like assumptions or subservient enforcement of 
the hierarchical order.
An important feature of chakari or the hierarchy enforcement is that the person who 
receives chakari is more powerful than the one who offers it. However, this is a 
reciprocal notion, and the receiver’s power must be augmented through the returning of 
favours to the chakari wal (giver of chakari), mostly in kind, although at the whim of the 
patron. This, then, was the spirit in which the Nepali garment-makers served their 
buyers, which was often misunderstood by the latter, for whom manufacturing was a 
purely pragmatic business world where the role of culture in knowledge generation was 
not always extended to business or the social organisation that came with it. The Nepali 
garment-makers were occasionally disappointed by the non-reciprocation of the benefits 
of chakari from their buyers and they did air their disappointments, but only in the 
absence of the buyers. However, they acknowledged that they were ‘learning a lot about 
the garment market abroad by working with the buyers’, which for them might be the in- 
kind reciprocation they expected in return for their chakari.
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The European and American buyers of the Nepalese garments often cited generosity, 
trustworthiness and loyalty as striking features of Nepali producers." However, price 
squabbling, cheating and ripping off are equally real in producers’ transactions with their 
compatriot clients. Both Indra Chok and Boudha markets are full of stories of poor 
quality products, overcharging, and unkept promises. However, it is important to note 
that the selfishness and lack of trust one sees in the Indra Chok and Boudha markets are 
related to the structures of social hierarchy in Nepali society. The nature of relationships 
between those who monopolise knowledge and those who consume the products of such 
knowledge is not an equal one. In essence, the relationship between an artist and an art 
consumer in a purely Nepali context is far from being a strictly capitalist buyer-seller 
notion where the former reserves all rights of selection and decision. A traditional 
business transaction would ensure that the seller would enjoy some discretion on quality 
and price of product, especially in the aesthetics market where choices are restricted. 
Incidences of large business deceit are disapproved of as fundamentally selfish and 
unforgivable, whereas small incidences are viewed as unfortunate but understandable. 
When the sums involved are large, Nepalis regard such flaws as upsetting, and the 
reaction when the deceit is disclosed is a pragmatic, ‘we will no longer deal with him in 
future’. When the sums involved are minor, these are brushed aside.
Any change that emerged over time in the hierarchy between producer and buyer is also 
knowledge-centric. Inasmuch as the producers were seen as having the monopoly over 
the cultural capital essential for specialised garment-making for the local clientele, it was 
also understood that they would have the upper hand in the transaction. The buyer-seller 
relationship was essentially a non-hierarchical one. These dynamics changed when the 
garment-makers switched to a new field, e.g., production for international markets 
through collaboration with foreign buyers: The garment-makers no longer had the 
monopoly over the knowledge essential for production, which then translated into a shift 
in their relative status within the structured spaces. Their subordination stemmed not 
from innate characteristics but from unequal distributions of cultural capital in the new 
field they have entered. It was only after a tacit mutual acceptance that the field of 
struggle was worth pursuing, that buyers and producers entered into a complex series of 
negotiations that determined a new order of material and cultural positioning. 
Throughout such interactions, the parties involved remained relatively autonomous but
99 1 conducted recurrent interviews with over twenty European and American buyers o f Nepalese 
exportables during my fieldwork in Kathmandu. Upon conclusion o f my fieldwork, I was able to 
follow up with some o f them in London.
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interconnected with the external factors. To sum up, the Nepali garment-makers 
continually shaped and furthered the conditions that made the work rewarding -  deeper 
knowledge of the larger and more superior market they now penetrate -  and that 
contributed to their own continuing empowerment.
5. Conclusion
Although Bourdieu was more concerned about the dominated classes and their social 
miseries caused by the new neoliberal structures of power, his insights about the 
struggles between the intellectual and economic factions of the dominant class offer a 
theory of class symbolisation which validly describes a nature and process of late 
capitalist culture.
My ethnography of three garment factories owned by members of the dominant cultural 
bourgeoisie shows how the structure of economic positions is translated into and 
recognised as cultural symbols, life-styles and identities inherent in individuals, which 
later are churned into commercially capitalisable assets. In the process of natural 
upbringing, people from different cultural clusters are subjected to a different set of 
material conditions of existence. Since the combinations of cultural and material 
conditions profoundly influence how people perceive and process new opportunities and 
challenges, people’s reactions to a given social and economic scenario are necessarily 
characteristically different.
Bourdieu’s view of field and its acculturation leaves aside the question of cultural 
changes. Gartman (1991) has further explored the ‘dialectical’ conception of culture as 
human praxis which may transform, as well as reproduce, the class structure. He does 
not differentiate between structural changes brought about by historical class struggles 
that are internal to the society and those caused by inter-societal conflicts. My work 
focuses on the latter. In this chapter, I have shown the dynamic interconnections in the 
specialised garment manufacturing industry between the institutions of class and culture, 
fostered by new capitalism that emerged from widening across national borders. At one 
level, such a widening entails deeper interdependence between culture-intensive and 
capital-intensive processes of production and exchange, at another, it requires class and 
cultural restructuring among the agents involved. Unlike the exclusively caste-based 
economic production highlighted by Rudner in reference to the Nattukottai Chettiars (or 
Nakarattars) from Tamil Nadu, where an insulated caste group acted as a complete
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economic system not only in their home region but also in far-flung comers of South and 
Southeast Asia, the Nepalese readymade garment industry fostered overlapping and 
cross-fertilisation between caste/ethnicity-based entrepreneurial circles and those outside 
the caste or national units.
My brief examination of the exploitation of cultural capital within a mass manufacturing 
industry reveals that it gave rise to a new social order within the existing one. The 
emerging global garment market is a new economic opportunity open to all; however, 
owing to different cultural and material dispositions, various cultural groups approached 
the new opportunity differently. The old elite entrepreneurial groups (both the State- 
protected Marwaris and State-neglected Newars) came under great pressure from a 
restless new elite class (i.e., the Bahun-Chhetri entrepreneurs who came to enjoy power 
after the State restructuring of 1951) to modernise the emerging industry and deliver a 
rising standard of production. Finding little useful support from a weak and backward 
State bureaucracy, the old elites allied with international capitalists like John Paso in 
Swakan-Chhemu and David Willberg in Rongoli. In this new alliance, the Shakyas and 
the Rauniyars held positions structurally different from those in their old alliances that 
functioned strictly within the closed society. Seeking to carve out for themselves similar 
roles to those they would have in their kin-based vocational pursuits, the owners of 
Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu initiated and created a new structure of relational 
obligations which elevated the functional, commercial forms of transactions economics.
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Chapter 8: Industrial organisation
The preceding chapters have established cultural capital as a key dimension in the 
society-specificity of knowledge economy and consequent economic organisation. 
Contrary to the assumptions of those who pursue classical economic theories, that the 
road to economic growth is about a linear departure from culture-based industries 
towards culture-less mechanised ones, I have shown that the producers of specialised 
garments have survived the demise of the Nepalese homogenised garment industry 
through the use of their dense cultural knowledge and skills in order to adapt to the 
transformations in the international garment trade regime. The current chapter is an 
extension of the culture-specificity argument: here I show, in addition to divergence in 
cultural knowledge, how the different patterns of social organisation and networks are 
relevant to the evolution of business organisation, especially in the context of the 
inherent desegregation of local politics against the background of a converging global 
market.
I address the three issues raised by Whitley (1999) in his influential comparative- 
business-systems approach on the society-specific divergence of capitalisms. First, to 
what extent are competition and cooperation between and within firms embedded in 
broader social and cultural authority and hierarchies? Second, what is the relationship 
between the new competitions100 and the different forms of industrial organisation? And 
finally, what is the manner in which grassroots level political institutions have developed 
interdependently to the workings of industrial institutions? Indeed, the mental maps that 
guide the factory owners are crucial in determining their use of physical, social and 
business spaces, which in turn give rise to distinct organisational patterns within the 
readymade garment industry in Nepal. And this leads us to a scenario where industrial 
modernisation has less to do with a movement from character- to process-based and 
finally institutionalised trust, as Moore (1999) has cautioned, but more to do with further 
scrutinisation and contexualisation of trust perse. This is mirrored in the rise of a series 
of identity-based transactions in the wake of the new competition in the industry (Zivetz, 
1992). While the organisation of homogenous producers does show a linear shift from 
character-based to institutionalised trust and contracting, except in a few contexts -  for 
example, that of labour control -  the organisation of niche market producers shows finer
100 By ‘new’ competition, I mean the intensifying demands from the international market, some o f  
which is for products arising from the processes o f flexible specialisation while the rest is for products 
arising from mass manufacturing.
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selectivity within character-based trust. Moreover, each factory within the industry 
operates within the broader context of who the owners and the workers are, both 
economically and culturally; and how they relate to the political and industrial structures 
within which they operate. This situation, involving the pragmatic reworking of political 
and cultural institutions in the engagement with the new competitions is a new and 
unexplored phenomenon derived from local-global convergence at one level and 
industry-politics embeddedness at another. This is my point of departure from the last 
chapter, and here I go on to explore several chosen themes: if cultural capital reinforced 
the factory owners’ competitiveness in a global market -  as I claim in the previous 
chapter -  what new organisational changes has this new local-global dimension ushered 
in on the factory shop floors? And now that the State is becoming less protectionist and 
global market demands more dominant in local economic arenas, what kinds of inter­
firm relations are emerging between rivals and within supply chains? How do old notions 
reinstitute and what does such reinstitution mean for the redeployment of local political 
and cultural networks?
1. Organisation within the factory 
la . Owners
Arya-Nepal3 produced homogenous garments and catered to an international market that 
emerged out of the global economics of quota politics and the local economics of 
democratisation and liberalisation. This was reflected in the organisational structure of 
the Arya Group which was highly formalised: a board of directors, consisting of both 
youngsters and elders of the investor Jain family, a pool of ‘chairmen’ who were 
essentially the three Jain brothers or the heads of each family and finally the other 
managers who were outsiders recruited with clear job descriptions, designations and 
remunerations.
The Arya Group consisted of four garment and textile manufacturing plants supplying 
thirty-five trading houses all over India. In addition, they also supplied global buyers 
such as GAP, Wal-Mart, Marks and Spencer, etc. Arya-Nepal3, a satellite plant under 
the Arya Group, was managed by Navin Sharma, a Nepali CEO. How much and for how 
long Arya-India continued to fund Arya-Nepal3 depended on the extent to which Navin 
could keep Arya-Nepal operations financially afloat. In this, although Navin was a 
salaried employee, he was treated by both owners and workers as if he was a quasi­
owner. Some of the respect shown him might also have come from the fact that Navin
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was one of the owners and managers of its predecessor, Arya-Nepal2 (see Section 1 of 
Chapter 4 for details). Under Navin’s direct supervision worked Sameer, the Production 
Manager, who in turn oversaw six floor supervisors and their junior assistants. Sameer 
also managed overall production and day-to-day business and took care of the 
merchandise supply chain as well as overall quality assurance. Sameer could take care of 
such a diverse range of tasks because Arya-Nepal3 produced cheap and homogenous 
garments, and unlike Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu, none of the tasks in Arya-Nepal3 
required specialised knowledge or attention to detail. Even quality assurance was simply 
about measuring the accuracy of plain stitching.
The fact that workers paid more attention to Navin and Sameer than to the real owners 
from Punjab, the Jain brothers, might also have to do with the fact that the Jains only 
rarely ventured to Kathmandu. They kept track of their business in Nepal through virtual 
means. There were formal and informal channels. Navin and Sameer formally sent 
periodic reports to the Jain brothers which presented the facts and figures which were the 
main bases on which important business decisions were made. Informally, the Jains kept 
themselves informed of the ins and outs in Arya-Nepal3 through the Punjabi junior 
managers who occasionally travelled back and forth between Ludhiana and Kathmandu 
for personal and business reasons carrying with them gossip and opinions. Although the 
Punjabi employees had the ear of the owners, they were not the ones who took real 
decisions in Arya-NepaB. They did not speak Nepali and spoke very little with the 
Nepali employees below the ranks of Navin, Sameer and a few chosen others. I have 
described in Chapter 4 how the Punjabi vice chairman, originally deputed to Kathmandu 
when the factory was established, and who was expected to oversee Navin’s work, was 
ousted through labour unionism over his faux pas against the Nepalis. After his 
departure, a Punjabi couple -  Kul, the buyer liaison officer, and his wife Sonu, the 
merchandiser -  were the sole confidants of the Jain brothers. Still, they were not the 
channels of official business. Since Navin, Sameer and the other Nepali supervisors did 
not get along very well with Kul and Sonu, their accounts of factory events were often 
contested and dismissed by others. Over time, the periodic reports and briefing notes 
prepared by Navin and Sameer formed the basis on which important decisions were 
taken by the owners. When it was deemed necessary, the frequency and formats of these 
reports were revised, and additional meetings or telephone conversations were arranged 
to go over factory business in a systematic fashion.
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Such an organisational clarity did not exist in Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu: What was 
more pronounced was the direct authority of the owners over the entire production 
process. Both Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu were registered as sole proprietorships of 
one of the family members although other family members and kin had large stakes in 
them. Gaj Rauniyar was the proprietor of Rongoli although his wife Sabitri had been an 
informal business partner from its origin and still worked as full-time Production 
Manager without any salary. Swakan-Chhemu was registered under the sole 
proprietorship of the wife of the older Shakya brother who had no role whatsoever in 
factory operations. Other than the year-end ritual that calculated the annual profits and 
divided it equally within the family, the factory accounts showed no clear record of the 
division of resources between the two Shakya brothers who jointly managed operations.
Unlike Arya-Nepal3, the owners were also the managers in the specialised garment 
factories. The owners in specialised factories controlled factory resources more 
stringently and asserted stronger authority over the workers. For example, the owners 
had a direct role in hiring and firing each worker, and they enjoyed unlimited discretion 
in determination of their remuneration; accounting practices were primitive and ad hoc; 
and every node of the supply chain was tightly controlled by the owners. The Rauniyars 
in Rongoli almost lived in the factory; their family cook often cooked in the factory and 
the factory cook was summoned home from time to time to cook for the owners’ family 
and guests; photographs of their key employees and buyers hung on the walls of their 
house alongside those of family members. It is true that the Shakyas in Swakan-Chhemu 
did not spend all their time in the factory like the Rongoli owners, nevertheless they 
spent a significant amount of time nurturing their identities as scholars of Tibetan 
Buddhism, which was, after all, the basis on which their buyers chose to do business 
with them (see Chapters 5 and 6).
The most important distinction between homogenised and specialised factories lay, 
however, in the roles of their owners in knowledge production. Arya-Nepal did not 
create its own designs and hence in this company, production was more about 
quantitative replication and standardisation of the sample. The owners need not have a 
role in it. In contrast, Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu did create new designs and this part 
of the production was owned and managed by the owners. The Rauniyars’ in-depth 
knowledge of the makes and colours of fabrics was something they inherited from their 
fathers and grandfathers who had been the textile traders of northern India and southern
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Nepal. The Shakyas were not the specialists of cloths, but the Buddhist semiotics with 
which they distinguished their products from the rest in the market was again something 
they inherited from their ancestors who exchanged Buddhist artefacts and philosophies 
with Tibet. Both the Rauniyars and the Shakyas went out of their way to jealously guard 
their business secrets from leaking outside family boundaries—be it by forming kin-like 
relations with their key employees as in the case of Rongoli or by keeping the key 
creative positions within their tightly monitored kin circles as in the case of Swakan- 
Chhemu.
lb . Workers
Arya-Nepal 1 and Arya-Nepal2 had used the ethnicity-based juwadi system where 
brokers mobilised their kin and friends to stitch garments and kept jobs within the khal 
by controlling the working and learning processes (see Section 1 of Chapter 4 for 
details). Arya-NepaB, however, gradually mechanised its production process after a 
Taylorist model, where tasks were standardised, codified and divided among the units of 
machinery and labour such that the task, the actor and the product became anonymous. 
Instead of seeking the loyalty of a small group of workers, as Rongoli and Swakan- 
Chhemu did, Arya-NepaB increasingly relied on a large pool of migrant labourers, who 
they hired and fired in hundreds at a time, as was necessary for production. Because it 
was illegal to deny workers a regular employment contract, Arya-Nepal went on to 
sabotage the labour unions and pre-empt possible labour resistance (see Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 9). Not only local labour laws, but also international labour standards which the 
global buyers heeded better, were against operation of factory floors at weekends and 
outside regular hours. The buyers, however, were pleased when producers offered them 
cheaper rates even if it was as a result of compromising their previously stated positions. 
Accordingly, all homogeneous manufacturers vied to outdo each other in running the 
longest hours of operation, and by doing so, achieving the cheapest production 
overheads. To do this, they had to offer appropriate incentives to workers. Piece-rate 
wages was their answer. Workers were rewarded for the number of pieces produced per 
month, rather than the number of hours or days worked. Although such a system was 
technically illegal and against the corporate business ethics of their buyers, it was 
popular among the manufacturers simply because it pre-empted labour shirking. The 
drawback of this system, however, was that the extreme emphasis on quantity made it 
very difficult to ensure quality of product through worker discipline. In mass- 
manufacturing quality was assured through machinery upgrading rather than by instilling
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quality-consciousness among the workers. Such a linear mechanisation seemed to work 
well as long as the factory had purchase orders but when the MFA crisis put an end to 
these kinds of orders, Arya-NepaB could not mobilise its workers to manufacture 
something different that would help it approach a different clientele.
Such a Taylorist labour organisation stood in sharp contrast to the models employed by 
specialised producers like Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu. Especially for the former, 
labour organisation was something that had to be checked and balanced by a great deal of 
coercion and cooperation. For example, in Rongoli, Gaj’s office was located right next to 
the main staircase on the first floor so the owners could keep a close eye on the 
movements of the tailors sitting on the ground floor, as well as the designers and 
administrators sitting on the floors above. The majority of Rongoli workers had been 
full-time employees for more than a decade during which time they had contributed to 
and drawn from the work organisation in Rongoli. Shukra, who Gaj had recruited to start 
his workshop in 1986, recalled how he, along with four or five of his co-workers, once 
decided to quit Rongoli and join one of its rivals. One morning, all five of them 
collected their wages and quietly went off to the other factory, only to be amazed when 
the very next day Gaj came over, with a former minister friend of his, to fetch them back. 
Their new employer resisted, but the minister mediated the heated argument between the 
two factory owners, and in the end, all the workers were sent back to work for Gaj. 
While Shukra held a secret grudge against the Rauniyars for the incident, his wife 
thought it was for the better. She thought that although they earned less at Rongoli than 
elsewhere, it was ‘better for them’ because Gaj and Sabitri were her only confidants far 
from village and kin and whose support she could count on at times when Shukra 
wandered off to drinking and merry-making. Shukra himself was significantly subdued 
when his only brother, a healthy young man, was killed in a village fight on the 
peripheries of Kathmandu. Although the police case never really came to a conclusion, 
they spent countless weeks and months following up with the police and trying to find 
the murderer. Fatigued by the burdens of life, Shukra eventually resigned himself to the 
situation that it was at least comfortable to have their own ‘Damai room’ in Rongoli 
where he was free to work jointly with his family, children and fellow caste-members. 
He was also grateful that Gaj had supported him at times when he had to spend long 
hours in the police station, or was too depressed to work, and that despite everything, he 
could count on a fair degree of job stability as opposed to the rapidly changing labour 
environments seen in other garment factories. He certainly was appreciative of the fact
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that this way his wife did not have to put up with the stares of the ‘loud and women-less’ 
Madheshi migrant workers.
The Shakyas in Swakan-Chhemu, for better or for worse, did not have such personalised 
connections with their workers although they had also stayed with them for decades. 
Such long-term loyalties had been achieved through ihekka (contracts) with selected 
naikes and village heads from Terai who took care of the logistics of bringing the fellow 
villagers as juwadis to Kathmandu when the purchase orders came in and returning them 
to their villages when complete. Although the employment was irregular, the workers 
were happy because wages were higher in Swakan-Chhemu than elsewhere. In turn, the 
tailors had such low status in Swakan-Chhemu that they were all stationed on the chheli 
(ground floor) which had the lowest ritual status in the Newar spatial order (see Chapter 
6 on norms of ritual purity among Newars). It was not that there was a formal law 
forbidding the tailors to climb the stairs to the higher floors, but it was implicitly 
understood by all that chheli was where the workers belonged and wandering elsewhere 
would be seen as inappropriate.101 The higher floors housed the cutting masters, 
merchandisers and administrative workers. The owners’ and designers’ rooms were on 
the top floor even though this left them virtually oblivious to what was going on the 
lower floors.
It did appear that the order of caste, ethnicity and kinship played important roles in 
labour organisation in the modem garment factories producing specialised garments for 
the high-end market. In this interpretation, caste and kinship were more than the 
bowling-club type social capital that Putnam (2000) claimed it to be, in that these 
networks were not de facto aids to policy inadequacies. In fact, as Whitley (1999) 
showed, at some times social norms and networks could be a tangible cultural aid to 
industrial deficiencies, but at others it could act as an intangible obstacle to industrial 
rationalisation, depending on the specific contexts it operated in. The cultural order of 
caste and kinship was virtually absent on the factory floors of most of the Taylorised 
mass manufacturers.102 On the other hand, caste and ethnicity were used as tools of
101 I have discussed in Chapter 6 how this sense o f inappropriateness was in turn used to air their 
dissatisfaction when the tailors felt their wages were inadequate for the complexity o f the task they 
handled. Only when ‘talking straight’ went unheeded, did the tailor naikes climb the stairs all the way 
to the fourth floor to ‘have a dialogue’ with the owners. This was done only very rarely, and since this 
would truly rock the boat, was seen by the naikes as the last resort o f  labour resistance.
102 In this regard, Arya-Nepal3 came almost as an exception among the mass manufacturers. It was 
only here that workers were aligned into the two clear groups o f  Indians (Madheshis) and Nepalis
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coercion to achieve business thrift by the specialised factories. In Rongoli, the owners’ 
role in recreating the surrounding caste order on the factory floors was obvious; in 
Swakan-Chhemu, it was the spatial connection which united the workers and eventually 
helped establish a ritual order between the owners and workers still keeping their 
respective worlds distinct from each other.
It would be counter-intuitive for many economists that in the case of Nepal, it was not 
the Taylorised mass manufacturers who were coping better with the new market 
demands, but the specialised or niche producers who stubbornly clung on to the old 
cultural institutions of caste and kinship to organise their factory floors. The idea of 
‘new’ competition refers to two types of competition that came to affect the garment 
industry. First, the end of the MFA in 2004 meant that Nepal lost its quota privileges in 
the American market, which now had to be compensated for by added competitiveness in 
product design and could be achieved only through specialised garment production. 
Second, the Maoist labour campaign in late 2004 which disturbed labour harmony in 
these factories could be offset only through a higher degree of personalised trust that 
seems to have been achieved only in those factories which maintained ethnic clustering 
on their shop floors. More than mechanisation or systematisation of factory organisation, 
ethnicisation seems to have been the factory owners’ answer to new competition on both 
fronts.
Among the specialised garment factories who easily overcame the labour and market 
crises, further caste/ethnic dimensions can be seen at the higher end of the labour 
hierarchy. Junior managers were often of the same caste/ethnicity as the workforce and 
this position was an immediate promotion that workers aimed for and a way in which the 
owners could efficiently use their peer networks within the factory. Senior managers, 
however, were often of the same or harmonising caste/ethnicity as the company owners. 
Which caste or ethnicity harmonised with which was highly context-specific. A good 
case in point is Rana, a Chhetri from Kangra, in the foothills of the Himalayas across the 
western border of Nepal. He first worked for Swakan-Chhemu as a knitwear specialist 
helping them start their knitwear plant. The managers and later the owners of Swakan- 
Chhemu regarded him with great deal of suspicion. He particularly did not get along
(Pahades). This might be a somewhat unique situation in that the capital in Arya-NepaB came from 
the Indians while the senior management positions were controlled by the Pahade Nepalis, and the 
latter had to keep the ethnic rifts going in order to rule the factory. Other mass manufacturing 
factories did not necessarily have such internal conflicts.
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well with his rival manager of the leather plant who was a Sarki (a leather-worker by 
caste and an untouchable). While there were pros and cons of this rivalry to the way the 
Shakyas operated their business, the Shakyas maintained that it was ‘dangerous’ to rely 
on a Chhetri and an Indian. Rana was subsequently fired, and his plant handed over to 
the Sarki manager who was allowed to recruit a large number of his kin from the Sarki 
and other low castes. The Shakyas, who have been particularly suspicious of the Bahun- 
Chhetris, dismissed possibilities of building alliances with the Indians who were ranked 
equally with the Bahun-Chhetris; yet they approved the appointment of low caste 
managers and workers without hesitation. It was considered even better that a lot of the 
low-caste workers had denounced Hinduism and formally converted to Christianity. On 
the other hand, Rana subsequently joined Arya-Nepal where he was absorbed with ease 
as a fellowpahade (hill-dweller) and eventually re-emerged as a close ally of Navin and 
Sameer in resisting the influences being exerted by their Indian counterparts from 
Ludhiana.
While mass manufacturers like Arya-Nepal3 perceived caste and kinship to be obstacles 
to labour organisation103 that needed to be corrected in order to achieve global market 
standards of quantity and quality, specialised producers like Rongoli and Swakan- 
Chhemu derived loyalty and thrift from these very old institutions. Indeed, the mass 
manufacturers ‘discovered’ the new chain system that uprooted the old juwadi system 
and dismantled the old norms of how workers got hired and fired. This was not the case 
with the specialised producers. Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu both exploited the caste 
and kinship ties of their workers for their hereditary artisan skills as well as their caste- 
based loyalties. Swakan-Chhemu did pay their workers higher wages to keep them 
within the factory, but an arbitrary distinction between who were ‘their workers’ and 
who were not was something they could realistically maintain only if  there was a strong 
sense of clanship amongst them. Such a sense of belonging, reinforced by their kin- 
based loyalty to the naike (in this case also the head of the villages that juwadis came 
from), was essentially what prevented random entries and exits of workers into Swakan- 
Chhemu. Rongoli, on the other hand, actively participated in the personal worlds of their 
workers to evoke individual loyalties (e.g. in Shukra’s case). It also recreated a social 
and cultural hierarchy on the factory floors (e.g. the caste order of artisan and tailor
103 But not necessarily organisation o f ownership and management as we can see from Navin and 
Sameer’s relationship with the Jains and other Indian managers.
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castes) to justify wage and status differentiation among workers which they used to cut 
their overall costs.
2. Organisation of non-factory components
2a. Buyers
The fact that Nepal exported over 90 per cent of its garments to the North American 
market, but that these exports made up less than 0.01 per cent of the latter’s total garment 
imports, is a good reflection of the power disparity between producer and buyer. Owing 
to this disparity, most of the garment factories remained largely buyer-dominated in their 
transactions and this was clearly reflected in their terms of trade. Most of the smaller 
factories manufactured on cut-make-price (CMP) provision where the buyer was 
responsible for most of the risks and subsequently walked away with the higher chunk of 
the profit. Arya-Nepal, being a larger factory, fared slightly better but not much. It 
acquired a letter of credit (L/C) based on cut-make-trim-price (CMTP) conditions, where 
the producer had greater flexibility in input acquisition. A regular L/C could be cashed 
only after delivery of the shipment, but garment exporters could draw back-to-back L/Cs 
of up to half of the original L/C value for the purchase of fabrics and accessories.104 The 
L/Cs often offered ‘free-on-board’ facilities,105 but these did not cover insurance for 
delays, which meant the producer paid for all additional costs if things went wrong in 
any one of the myriad of ways possible. For example, labour strikes and road jams often 
delayed shipments and the producers often ended up paying for expedited shipping or air 
transfer. Or, when there were quality issues, buyers hastily cancelled L/Cs and the 
producers were left with no money and a factory load of garments they could not sell. 
Such incident would easily make entire operations insolvent. For example, Arya-Nepal2 
had closed down because the buyer rejected a large consignment over quality disputes. 
Arya-NepaB closed down because it was forced to airfreight three consecutive 
consignments to Kolkata owing to labour disruptions instigated by various political crises 
in the country.
Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli were exempt from such vulnerabilities because they 
produced specialised garments for niche markets which their buyers could not get from 
other suppliers. The uniqueness of their products was qualified either by the complexity
104 In other words, they would use the L/C as collateral and take loans from local banks to finance their 
merchandising.
105 In this agreement, the buyer would bear all transportation costs once the merchandise was uploaded 
at the designated port.
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of the designs created and sophistication of materials used or the authenticity of the 
cultural claims associated with production. For example, Swakan-Chhemu regularly 
received an advance payment of up to fifty per cent of the consignment value before the 
merchandise was shipped. The buyer also paid as much as seventy per cent of the 
sampling costs in addition to fully financing the stay of a European designer in 
Kathmandu during the sampling phase. This had much to do with the fact that in order to 
secure a global niche market, Swakan-Chhemu’s buyer had to capitalise on the 
authenticity of the Shakyas’ ethnic identity as well as on their traditional knowledge and 
networks. In Rongoli, pricing was consensual between buyer and producer, and the 
producer regularly received full advance payment before the production process had even 
started. Although Rongoli’s niche market was not contingent upon the authenticity of 
the owners’ ethnicity, the buyers were dependent on the Rauniyars for their rich
knowledge and networks related to the traditional Indian textile industry that was
accessible only to a few select families in this Nepali context.
2b. Actors in the supply chain
Arya-Nepal followed what Knorringa (1996:59) called a ‘direct-control regime’ which 
was a clear-cut manifestation of a hierarchical organisation for smooth functioning of the 
supply chain. Buyers and financiers enforced some aspects of Arya-Nepal3’s 
compliance to merchandising and finishing terms through payment mechanisms. This 
was suitable for the Taylorist production method that Arya-NepaB followed, where there 
was little performance ambiguity; and any possibilities of moral hazards were best dealt 
with by financial checks and balances. In contrast, Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli 
maintained their supply chains in what Knorringa (1996: 59) called a ‘network regime’ 
which marked a kind of relationship between firms and institutions that lay somewhere 
between the perfect market system of interchange and the completely integrated giant 
corporation. The features of the network regime were derivatives of the broader social 
order, and hence it varied between Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli as it reflected the 
difference in the characteristics of their broader social organisations and trust patterns. I 
will substantiate this argument in the following paragraphs.
Arya-Nepal3 had little control over its fabrics supply. I have described in Chapter 4 how 
it was forced to source all of its fabrics from the textile arm of Arya-India, its sole 
financier, with payment in US dollars although the preferred mode of transaction was the 
Indian rupee (with which Nepali currency is fully convertible). Such unrealistic terms of
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trade were imposed on Arya-Nepal3 because of its awkward position in that it was 
neither fully integrated nor fully independent of its giant Indian counterpart, Arya-India. 
Arya-India claimed all of the profits generated by Nepal’s privileged status on MFA 
quotas and it also pocketed large sums of fiscal incentives on offer from the government 
of India (see Section 3 of Chapter 4). A similar awkwardness dominated Arya-NepaB’s 
garment finishing106 task and freight forwarding services which were also franchised 
outside the factory: Large multinational brands such as Gap and Wal-Mart had their 
preferred service providers for freight and finishing services, which manufacturers like 
Arya-Nepal were obliged to use. Lesser and no-name brands did not have such 
preferences, in which case manufacturers instigated a chain of self-defeating competition 
among the local service providers. There was no floor pricing in this sub-sector, nor was 
there a clear legal remedy or arbitration procedure, should disputes arise between 
manufacturers and service-providers. Opportunism was bound to be rampant in these 
zero-sum adversarial contracting arrangements.
Swakan-Chhemu, on the other hand, maintained a steady alliance coordination of its 
fabric supply and was a regular buyer of certain types of fabrics from certain suppliers. 
Although it initially experimented with fashion designing on cotton and leather, later on 
it focused exclusively on organic hemp knitwear. Which fabrics Swakan-Chhemu chose 
or did not choose to use over time depended not only on the way the market developed 
but also how the Shakyas’ own business preferences developed. The first knitwear 
specialist in Swakan-Chhemu was Rana from Kangra who sourced fabrics from 
Chandigarh. Because the Shakyas believed that the Bahun-Chhetri employees and 
suppliers were not to be trusted, they eventually gave the job to Sarki Mohan who 
worked with the Shakyas to figure out how to switch the source of fabrics supply from 
Chandigarh to Shanghai. Once they identified a new and reliable (Chinese) supplier, 
their alliance with it was strengthened through continuity of business over the years. The 
two factories even exchanged staff to educate each other in their workings and doings. 
Mani’s son participated in this training from Swakan-Chhemu’s side. Such nurturing of 
obligational contracting could also be seen in with Swakan-Chhemu’s service-provider 
for embroidery and screen-printing. The regular service-provider was a very young (and 
orphaned) Nepali Muslim from the western Terai. He was a skilled artisan but since he 
did not have a guiding hand, he apprenticed to his uncle who paid him only nominally.
106 Garment finishing for Ayra-Nepal3 included the work on embroidery and screen-printing. 
Although finishing also involved washing and pressing o f the garment, these were usually done within 
the factory and hence not subject to buyers’ discretions.
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Swakan-Chhemu took him under its wing and his business prospects improved 
significantly. For example, he now employed nine other artisans and made five times as 
much money as before. In return, he had to stop working for his other patrons because 
Swakan-Chhemu was concerned that its business secrets might not be safe if other 
customers walked in and out of their service workshops. Abandoning his other clientele 
was not a major problem for the service-provider because Swakan-Chhemu paid him 
higher than market rates. In addition to secretism and loyalty, it was also expected of the 
service provider that he would act swiftly and creatively when there was a wave of 
fashion change in the market and designs had to be altered overnight. In a high-end 
fashion world that Swakan-Chhemu operated in, this did happen occasionally and the 
service-providers worked day and night along with everybody else involved in the chain 
of production to ensure that the buyers ultimately got what they had asked for.
As for Swakan-Chhemu, the waves of market change were frequent for Rongoli also, and 
the ability to continuously adapt and improvise remained the key to success in ensuring 
that its supply chain did not fail them. Rongoli nurtured obligational contracting in its 
fabric acquisition since its products required quilt-like combinations of strikingly 
different materials. This meant that Rongoli could not rely on one supplier but had to 
juggle various options to keep a steady supply of diverse fabrics available at all times. 
Gaj worked very closely with his merchandiser, Smita, a young Indian woman from 
Delhi, in order to coordinate his trips to the weaving villages in various Indian states. I 
have discussed in length the complexity inherent within the informal segment of the 
weaving industry in India from where the fabrics came. For example, in Benares, 
Rongoli navigated endlessly through the complex connections between the established 
gaddis and the individual workers who were only loosely linked to them. In Karnataka, 
it turned down more the straightforward options of rokdas and sattas to engage with the 
complex and risky mungada system where the buyer provided all inputs and individually 
chased each weaver until the latter turned in the fabrics and collected their wages.
After Gaj had approved the samples and negotiated prices, Smita worked closely with the 
weavers to ensure the smooth logistics of payments, fabrics collection, quality 
maintenance and transportation to Kathmandu. As I have described in Chapter 5, the 
relationship between Gaj and Smita was a very close one. That they spoke at least once a 
day and that Smita was with Gaj every minute during his trips to India, caused serious 
tension between him and his friends and family. At times, this relationship even
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threatened the stability of Gaj’s own marriage to the extent that friends had to mediate 
between them. This followed a solemn agreement that Smita would never return to 
Kathmandu but instead would continue to work as the sole merchandiser based in Delhi. 
She was now married, but the Rauniyars continued to exert enormous demands on her 
day-to-day life. This might have been the only way Gaj could maintain full control over 
the otherwise loosely connected supply chain which was at the heart of his business.
While fabric supply was an autonomous component directly preceding garment 
production, embroidery, which was almost always subcontracted, was a subcomponent 
within production. In these paragraphs I will describe some of the ways in which 
Rongoli exerted control over its subcontractors. As I have discussed above, in Swakan- 
Chhemu, the subcontractors were independent firms but they were all strategically allied 
with the lead firm. The alliance was much more pronounced in Rongoli. Each of their 
embroiders must make several trips to Rongoli every week -  to collect work pieces and 
discuss embroidery requirements with the designers; to get initial approval and Gaj’s 
approval for the first piece; and to note any changes in plans the designer deemed 
necessary. If there was a shortage of tailors, as often was the case during festival season, 
embroiderers had to be prepared to switch roles and fill in for the tailors. Above all, they 
had to keep the utmost secrecy about Rongoli’s designs -  two of Rongoli’s 
administrative staff had been especially asked to keep an eye on them which they did by 
socialising with the embroiderers’ landlords, neighbours and friends.
Rongoli regularly subcontracted its embroidery work to three subcontractors: Rajeev 
from Kashmir, Sonu from Rautahat in western Terai and Raju from Kolkata. Rajeev and 
Sonu had worked exclusively for Rongoli for the past fifteen years. In June 2003 when I 
started my fieldwork, Rajeev was undergoing a personal crisis. He was a widower in his 
fifties and was keen to remarry, but this was vehemently opposed by his adult children 
from his first marriage. Among others, Rajeev’s daughter, who was also an employee in 
Rongoli, complained about this to the Rauniyars. Gaj tried to persuade Rajeev to refrain 
from the new marriage for the sake of his ijjat (social reputation) but Rajeev did not heed 
the advice and went ahead with the wedding. Over the months, the issue escalated such 
that the Rauniyars stopped giving him work and he had to let go eighteen of his twenty- 
one artisans and his family went into disarray.
179
Like Rajeev, Sonu had also been with Rongoli for almost two decades, and had seen the 
rapid expansion and increasing sophistication of production in Rongoli. Sonu’s family 
was originally from the embroidery district of Lucknow which was famous for India’s 
traditional chikenkery embroidery. His family migrated to Rautahat, the western Terai 
district in Nepal when he was young. Sonu used to be a tailor in Rongoli until Gaj 
discovered his hidden embroidery skills, gave him a loan to buy his own machine and 
took him on as a subcontractor. Sonu paid back his loan within six months, and then 
took another to buy two more machines and employ more workers. After about ten 
years, he now owned twenty-five embroidery machines and employed thirty-two 
artisans, most of whom were his kin from Rautahat and Lucknow. Although Rongoli 
paid him more or less the same rates as other producers paid their embroiderers, Sonu did 
not consider taking work from other producers because he felt indebted to Rongoli for 
his career growth.
After reducing the amount of work given to Rajeev, Rongoli still had unmet embroidery 
needs, which it began to subcontract to Raju, a shy artisan from Kolkata. He was 
working for retail clients before being approached by the Rauniyars who had heard of 
him through one of its trusted tailors. Gaj not only offered him work right away and 
rates that were mage bhanda badhi (more-than-was-asked), he even made the effort to 
personally visit him in his workshop a couple of times. Gaj’s personally making the trip 
all the way to a shabby comer of town obviously made a big impression on Raju and his 
fellow artisans. Of course, before showering him with such favours, Gaj had carried out 
a rigorous background check on his kinship and business networks in the market. He had 
also sought feedback from his buyer on Raju’s iman-jaman-saman (character and 
performance). He had also introduced Raju and Sonu to each other to make sure that 
Raju was fully aware of Rongoli’s ability and willingness to reward loyalty.
Although Rongoli’s piece-rates were the same for all three of its artisans, payment 
methods were different. For example, Raju received full advance payment on the 
grounds that he was only just starting his business and hence had more need of the 
money. Rajeev rarely got his payment on time and this worsened rapidly after his refusal 
to take Gaj’s advice on his remarriage. Sonu’s payments were regular when there was an 
urgent need to buy or fix machinery. At other times, payments were often delayed. It 
was common that, in addition to submitting the invoices, artisans would come to see the 
Rauniyars with increasingly compelling reasons why they should be paid sooner.
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3. The factories’ relationship with the State
In this section, I will describe how State industrial policies and regulations have affected 
the operations of the garment factories. In my historical reconstruction of the garment 
industry in Chapter 2 ,1 have shown the slow process of internalisation of this industry by 
the Nepali entrepreneurs as well as the Nepali State. Shifted to Nepal from India in the 
1980s to serve the function of a satellite industry, garment making was acknowledged by 
the Nepali State only in the late 1980s. It was only after Nepal underwent a massive 
industrial reform in 1992 that the State issued policies and provisions specific to the 
readymade garment business. Although most of the garment industry policies were 
meant to be objective and universal, they were often inadequately pronounced and 
weakly enforced. Hence they were subject to context-specific interpretations and 
applications. Depending on the nature of the relationship different caste entrepreneurs 
had with the State and the ruling elites, these policies and provisions were bound to have 
different interpretations and applications. In the following section, I will outline some of 
the examples I noted during my ethnography.
3a. Subsidies on imported fabrics: the duty drawback
In 1994, the government introduced a duty drawback System, which made provision for 
the tariffs paid on fabrics imported for the manufacture of exportable garments to be 
reimbursed. The average import duty on these fabrics was 19.5 per cent,107 and when 
reimbursed, this made Nepali exporters more competitive in the global market. The 
problem however was that every reimbursement required a long trail of complicated 
paperwork. To correct this, the duty drawback system was integrated into what was 
called the Bank Guarantee System in 1996, whereby duty would not be paid and 
reimbursed, but would be counted against a bank guarantee from the exporter in an 
automated process. The new provision made this incentive highly attractive to the 
garment exporters.
It is important to note two important features of the duty drawback system. First, duty 
was only charged on 85 per cent of the fabrics export volume; the remaining 15 per cent 
being considered wastage. Second, the production cycle had to be completed within 
eleven months for the duty to be drawn back. In other words, imported fabrics had to be 
converted into exportable garments and loaded to an international consignment for the 
bank guarantee on duty to be released. Both of these provisions were designed with the
107 This included 12% import duty + 6% ‘other’ charges + 1.5% VAT.
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production schedules of the homogeneous mass manufacturers in mind. Neither of them 
were suitable for manufacturers of specialised garments: They ‘wasted’ (or consumed) 
far more fabric than was allowed under the State provision and their turn-around time 
between import of fabrics and export of garments was much longer than those of the 
mass manufacturers. The two specialised producers -  Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli -  
both suffered under this system, but the way they handled it was markedly different. 
How much each of the specialised producers benefited from the State duty drawback 
system depended a great deal on their overall relationship with the State and the ruling 
elites. I will describe this in the following paragraphs.
Between May and July 2003, Swakan-Chhemu’s fabric wastage ratio was 32 per cent, or 
17 per cent higher than was permitted by the duty drawback system. It reduced to 18 per 
cent in June and increased again to 27 per cent in July. In other words, there was little 
consistency in the wastage ratio except that it was consistently higher than was permitted 
under the government policy. It also took much longer -  sometimes years -  before its 
designs brought in any purchase orders. Swakan-Chhemu, first with the help of the local 
Newar politicians and then with the help of its limited contacts among the State 
bureaucrats, made endless efforts to seek some flexibility on this from the government 
but their endeavours went unheeded. ‘The khen (the mling Bahun-Chhetris) government 
never ever listens to us Newars. They especially brought in the Indian Marwaris to let 
the Newars down,’ the disillusioned owner of Swakan-Chhemu said when asked about 
his relations with State bureaucrats on duty drawback and other administrative issues 
(see Section 3a of Chapter 8). Eventually, in 1999, Swakan-Chhemu brought a 
processing firm, Speed Logistics Services, on board to oversee all administrative 
processes that required any interaction with State bureaucracy. Speed Logistics Services 
belonged to a retired civil servant from the Ministry of Commerce, and a Bahun. All of 
its employees were former employees of various Ministries and were Bahun-Chhetris. 
Their clients largely included non-Bahun-Chhetri and non-Marwari businessmen, 
including some expatriate investors, who owned profitable businesses in Nepal but 
lacked a good understanding of how the cumbersome State bureaucracy operated. Speed 
Logistics was considered efficient in most of its tasks, but initially they also failed to 
negotiate a concession on duty drawback system on behalf of Swakan-Chhemu until an 
opportune incident strengthened their position vis-a-vis the State.
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In 2001, the European Commission sent a team to Nepal to investigate the production 
mechanisms of EU-bound garment exporters in response to a scandal it had discovered 
where fake shipments which claimed to be Nepali were actually being imported from 
China to reap EU ‘derogation’ benefits.108 The investigation team audited production of 
all EU-bound exporters in Nepal. While a lesser known factory was convicted and 
penalised for misusing its registration, die investigation committee commended Swakan- 
Chhemu who had emerged during the auditing process as one of the few credible Nepali 
exporters to the EU. Speed Logistics took this opportunity to renew its negotiations with 
the State bureaucrats on flexibility for Swakan-Chhemu in the duty drawback System. As 
an exceptional goodwill gesture, the government approved an additional 5 per cent 
wastage, but the issue of the duration of the production cycle remained unsolved. After 
all this, Swakan-Chhemu estimated that less than half of its duty claims were reimbursed.
Rongoli had similar issues regarding fabric wastage and production cycles, but it 
successfully used both issues to its benefit. Rongoli’s average fabric wastage ratio was 
23 per cent, but unlike Swakan-Chhemu, it was very successful in negotiating large 
concessions from the government on this. In response to Gaj’s request, the Department 
of Industries (DOI) designated a section officer to work with Rongoli to exclusively 
ascertain a product-by-product fabrics wastage ratio (see Section 3 of Chapter 5 for 
details). Since the DOI official was not a design specialist, the negotiation was driven 
from Rongoli’s side, and Gaj agreed that they were happy with their handling of the duty 
drawback provision and that the amount of money involved in this was a significant part 
of their overall business profit. Gaj and his fabric administrator maintained close 
relationships with the designated section officer and other DOI employees. Almost all of 
the DOI employees, including the officer specially designated for Rongoli, were Bahun- 
Chhetris. The bureaucratic relations were formalised through socialised relations and 
cultural rituals were often used as tools to legitimise them. For example, the key 
employees in Rongoli, who were also Bahun-Chhetris, received tika from the DOI 
officials during the Dashain festival, the officials were invited to social events in the
108 European Union (EU) allowed duty-free entrance to garments from developing countries under an 
‘everything but arms’ (EBA) initiative. However, under the ‘rules of origin’ condition that dictated 
EBA, the exporters had to demonstrate that the goods being exported were made from inputs produced 
either within the exporting country or the EU. Only select few countries were exempt from this 
stringent rules o f origin requirements under an addition provision called ‘derogation,’ under which 
especially poor countries -  Nepal one o f them — were allowed to use inputs imported from a third 
country for production o f goods to be exported to the EU.
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factory and Gaj frequently brought token gifts for the DOI officials when he returned 
from his business trips abroad.
Although it took equally long before their samples started to yield purchase orders, the 
production cycle was not so much a constraint for Rongoli as it was for Swakan- 
Chhemu. When Gaj toured India to buy fabrics, he brought back only small quantities 
for use in designing and sampling. The rest of the fabrics were stored in his Delhi office 
under Smita’s supervision and were despatched to Kathmandu only after the samples 
were approved and purchase orders finalised. Although the village weavers were paid 
nominal prices in Indian currency, Smita’s firm quoted prices to Rongoli in US dollars 
and they were often inflated. Dollarisation of the transaction made Smita’s firm eligible 
for the export incentives offered by the Indian government. In reality, although Smita’s 
firm had formal registration documents, they were still Gaj’s properties and her own 
earnings depended largely on the discretion of the Rauniyars.
The formal State policies on duty and taxes as well as the regulations on business 
operations had different implications for garment factories and entrepreneurs depending 
on what they produced and who they were. Inasmuch as the worlds of specialised 
producers -  who were few and far between -  were beyond the direct comprehension of 
State policymakers, the focus of State policies was primarily on the mass manufacturers. 
How the specialised producers either turned these formal policies to their advantage or 
were constrained by them was something that depended on the broader (informal) social 
order under which they operated. A diverse range of things such as religiosity and the 
calendar of festivities, languages and behavioural preferences, global events and informal 
business cliques all contributed profoundly in determining how a given piece of formal 
State policy would be interpreted and applied under any given circumstances.
3b. Visa, customs clearance and transportation
The time, costs and transparency of custom logistics and transportation were significant 
components of business efficiency. Once a consignment was ready for despatch, 
factories had to obtain a ‘visa’ for each piece of garment being exported to the US so it 
could be tallied against the quota granted for Nepal (see Section 2 of Chapter 1 for 
details). If it was for the European market, they had to prepare documentation to meet 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and Derogation requirements so as to have the 
import duties waived. Once the documentation was complete, the goods were physically
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transported out of the country either by air or land to their final destinations. Industrial 
policies and procedures were as much the fronts where factories strategised for efficiency 
and profit, as were organisational norms and knowledge instruments. On the question of 
how such strategies were embedded into a broader social organisation, in the rest of this 
subsection I narrate and contextualise the choice of strategies in the three factories 
studied.
The pre-1992 garment industry essentially barred the non-elite businessmen from the 
quota access as well as the opportunity to register their business. Although the business 
registration process was made more transparent and accessible under the new industrial 
policy of 1992, the quota was still hedged on behalf of the elites through secretive 
channels for dissemination of information and a series of manipulative bureaucratic 
procedures. We know from the history of Arya-NepaB that Arya-Nepal 1 was an 
unregistered factory and had no access to quota and Arya-Nepal2 had only limited 
access, which was achieved only after a massive investment of time and effort. By the 
time Arya-NepaB was registered, the DOI had delegated quota management functions to 
the Garment Association of Nepal (GAN) and the quota monitoring and approval system 
was automated and synchronised with the US quota monitoring authority through real­
time connection online. The quota itself was distributed on a first-come-first-served basis 
although limited quota-holding was allowed for a few large manufacturers based on their 
previous performance. There was certainly no quota hoarding and black-marketing after 
quota validity was reduced to three days from issue. This must be acknowledged this as 
one of the rare examples of successful regulatory reform among the Nepalese industrial 
sectors.
Such efficiency was yet to be seen in the Land Customs Station (LCS) in Birganj which 
was the most frequently used point of customs for consignments being sent to Kolkata 
port. While it usually took Arya-Nepal two hours of a clerk’s time to get each clearance 
from GAN, customs-clearance in Birganj LCS took at least half a day. The LCSs were 
extremely political places and it was said that any civil appointment in customs was only 
possible for those who offered to pay heavy bribes to higher officials. The processing 
industry that dealt with customs clearance was also heavily regulated and accessible only 
to a small clique of agents. Most of the customs/consignment processing agencies were 
Marwaris, Biharis and other Indian migrants, who had to maintain very close relations 
with the civil bureaucrats on both sides of the border in addition to mastering a complex
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network among the transport operators on the route. Once customs was cleared, 
consignments were transferred to Indian trucks which offloaded them at Kolkata port 
from where they left for the final destinations in the US via the Pacific (see Section 4 of 
Chapter 4 for details).
Such a combination of land and sea routes was applicable only to the manufacturers of 
homogenous garments. Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu produced higher value products in 
smaller quantities which were transported by air, so their interface was largely with the 
airport customs office. This was staffed exclusively by Bahun-Chhetris during my 
fieldwork and was seen as one of the more lucrative postings for a civil servant. Rongoli 
nurtured social relations with the customs officials; Gaj used to look after customs issues 
himself since as early as the 1980s until 1993, when the customs building itself was 
extended and refurbished, and procedures radically restructured and automated. He then 
delegated it to Uttam, a Bahun from the Terai and a former government civil servant in 
the DOI. Uttam had detailed knowledge of government bureaucratic procedures and the 
power politics within the Customs office. Rongoli’s exports were non-quota items, but 
Uttam still had to produce a multitude of documentation including the certificate of 
origin from GAN, certificate of registration for Rongoli from the DOI, tax clearance 
status, a bank statement with adequate funds, the registration certificate of its buyer in 
the USA and a copy of the purchase order. In addition to these, Uttam also had to offer a 
cordial -  or almost sycophantic -  namaste to the Director and pass on Gaj’s personal 
regards before he proceeded with business. When the customs issues become 
complicated, Gaj paid a call on the Director in person for more detailed discussions. 
Rongoli was among very few exporters who had such privileged service and personalised 
access to the customs officials that they hardly faced any issues to complain about. 
Swakan-Chhemu did not have such privileged access to the customs office. Instead, they 
relied on their agent, Speed Logistics Services, for all the paperwork and administrative 
follow ups required for customs clearance. Swakan-Chhemu was quick to point out that 
it was a Bahun-Chhetri-Marwari clique in the civil bureaucracy which worked against 
other castes and ethnicities. Tej, who oversaw the work of Speed Logistics Services for 
Swakan-Chhemu, spoke fluent Nepali but with a strong Newar accent which was often 
ridiculed by non-Newars. During his telephone conversations with the customs office or 
DOI, he would often be heard repeating the sentences twice or thrice because the other 
party could not understand him well. Often, conversations would turn into arguments 
about how inconsistent and irrational some of the bureaucratic procedures were. It was
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not so surprising, then, that Swakan-Chhemu was increasingly dependent on Speed 
Services for its representation in government offices, not only on customs and duty 
drawback issues but a wide range of other matters such as tax regulations and finance.
My observation of how manufacturers responded to State directives on visa, customs 
clearance and transportation showed it to be not very different from how they responded 
to State policies on import and export subsidies. How businessmen coped with imperfect 
markets and policies was not a strictly rational issue but an outcome of complex 
negotiations that called on a wide array of economic and social phenomena. In the 
following subsections, I will give an account of the philanthropic practices followed in 
the factories to further develop my argument on culture-economy embeddedness in 
industrial organisation.
3c. Religious rituals and philanthropy in the factories
Be it towards the old causes of religious rituals or towards the new causes of political and 
social activism, philanthropy is a useful tool for studying how social and cultural values 
underpin business values. Clegg et al (1990) claim that post-Confucian value clusters 
underpinned the economic culture of East Asian societies. Timberg (1978), Singer 
(1972), Zivetz (1992) and Rudner (1994) have given examples of how social and cultural 
values, networks and rituals are embedded and interwoven into the differentiated 
business paths that different social groups pursue. Parry (1999) and Ong (1997) have 
demonstrated how a hybrid ritual order has emerged among the working class which 
works to resist the intensifying capitalist control on modem factory floors in India and 
Malaysia. Khan (1995) and Toye (1995) have extended this notion of society-business 
embeddedness to argue that State policies on business enterprises and the entrepreneurs’ 
relations with the State will depend on whether or not the broader societies are receptive 
to the core values or essence of capitalism. Such a social reception of values might be 
reflected not only in the way business ventures operate or the way the State directs them, 
but also in purely social and cultural exchanges such as festivities and other socialising 
rituals.
In this section, I will show that strictly cultural activities performed in the garment 
factories are also a function of the broader social and economic characteristics of the 
businessmen who perform them. As we will see from the cases I discuss at length, the 
world of philanthropy goes far beyond charity contributions and public relations stunts.
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At times, the otherwise modem factories undertook rituals to invoke the gods for better 
spiritual protection in coping with market and policy uncertainties; at other times rituals 
helped them strengthen their business networks and offered platforms on which factory 
owners validated their claims of cultural knowledge and skills as they capitalised on 
them.
Almost all factories in Kathmandu observed rituals that paid tribute to deities associated 
with wealth and craftsmanship. Hindu festivals were often also public holidays (e.g., 
Dashain and Tihar), but not many non-Hindu festivals merited such privilege (e.g., Eid 
for Muslims, Matsyendranath Puja for the Newars from Patan, and Bisket Jatra for the 
Newars from Bhaktapur). In addition to popular festivals, garment factories also 
observed rituals that celebrated Vishwokarma (god of craftsmanship), Bhimsen (god of 
business prosperity) and Laxmi (goddess of wealth). Among my case studies, the Patan 
Newars of Swakan-Chhemu celebrated festivals that were not recognised by the State, 
and so the Swakan-Chhemu workers did not get days off for them. Instead, the Muslim, 
Christian and Hindu workers in the factory were all offered an elaborate feast which they 
shared in the factory compound. A suitable celebration was made to mark the occasion 
when the hundred foot tall chariot of Matsyendranath completed its circumambulation of 
the town of Patan. On the day of Tsho Puja, Buddhist monks were invited for the recital 
of holy hymns in the factory. However, the factory carried on its operations with a lesser 
or greater degree of normalcy when Muslim workers went home to Terai to celebrate 
Eid, or the Sarki managers and supervisors -  most of whom were newly converted 
Christians -  took days off to celebrate Christmas.
In addition to religious rituals that offered the workers rare occasions to socialise and 
celebrate, Swakan-Chhemu also undertook a number of non-religious philanthropic 
activities. For example, it patronised a women weavers’ co-operative by regularly 
buying its raw cotton fabrics for its production even when it was higher in price and 
lower in quality. Swakan-Chhemu’s buyer, John Paso, had made a legal provision that 
he would donate five per cent of his profits from Swakan-Chhemu garments to the global 
Free Tibet campaign. Swakan-Chhemu periodically but not regularly matched the 
buyer’s contribution to offer charity to Tibetan monasteries and refugee centres in Nepal 
and Dharmashala. As seen from the time and money devoted, Tibeto-Buddhist 
philanthropy and regional festivals were much more important to Swakan-Chhemu than 
their observance of the major State festivals like Dashain, during which festival, the
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Shakyas either continued factory operations as usual or took a few days off to travel or 
relax with family but without paying attention to the festival itself.
Rongoli’s festivals coincided more with the State festivals than Swakan-Chhemu’s. For 
example, during Dashain, Gaj, Sabitri and other key Rongoli officials visited and 
received tika from government officials and prominent Hindu businessmen. Special care 
was taken that tika was received from the officials of the customs office, the DOI, the 
President of GAN, etc. Workers were given Dashain allowances and peshkis (advances). 
Gaj and Sabitri also observed Marwari festivals such as Chhath, but unlike the 
mainstream Nepali festivals like Dashain, Chhath was celebrated purely as a family 
event to which colleagues and business alliances were not invited. Gaj was deeply 
religious, and did not leave home in the morning without performing a lengthy worship 
at his family shrine. There were no shrines in the factory itself, which indicates that 
spiritual undertakings are personal for Gaj and Sabitri. Contrarily, rituals and festivals 
such as Dashain tika were public functions and strategically business-oriented. Beyond 
religion, other philanthropic activities in Rongoli revolved around the local environment. 
For example, Gaj not only paid for but also managed the actual task of cobbling the local 
streets, fixed the local sewerage system, renovated a local Ganesh shrine and also 
contributed seed money for their first ventures for some of the young people in the 
neighbourhood. In addition, Gaj was an elected president of the Rauniyar Samaj, a 
national association of all Rauniyars in Nepal, which among others provided financial 
and social support to needy Rauniyars.
Contrary to the hypothesis that Taylorism will bring deculturisation, Arya-Nepal3 
observed religious factory rituals more elaborately than any of the specialised garment 
manufacturers. For example, Arya-NepaB made several efforts to maintain ritual purity 
of food (i.e. sattvik ahaar) on its factory floors, cafeteria and workers’ lodging quarters. 
Although Nepali Bahun-Chhetris do eat goat meat, eggs, mushrooms and spices such as 
onions and garlic, Arya-NepaB formally prohibited consumption of such tamasik 
(ritually impure) food on the factory premises so as not to offend the Jains in Arya-India 
who were stricter pursuers of sattvik ahaar or purity of food. While the Nepali managers 
and workers were slightly critical of such stringent norms, the Punjabi managers thought 
sattvik ahaar to be of even greater importance in the context of the agghorpanthi sect of
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Pashupatinath109 dominant in Nepal which approved consumption of meat, eggs and 
spices. Another of its efforts to please the Jains was its adherence to vastu (North Indian 
architectural harmony) in all its constructions. Under the supervision of a priest sent 
from Ludhiana, Arya-Nepal observed a vastu and navagraha puja (prayer of construction 
and the planets) at the opening of its new production plant. The subtle negotiations that 
took place during this ritual, both between the Indian and Nepali owners as well as 
among various ‘high’ and ‘low’ Nepali Hindu castes reflected the broader social 
hierarchy that was ever-present on the factory floors. However, strictly ritualistic issues 
were substantially moderated in recognition of the fact that the factory rituals were more 
a means to harmony among the workers and mangers on the factory floors than purely 
religious events. This was reflected recurrently through considerations as to whether or 
not a Jain ritual of vastu puja could be combined with the Nepali ritual of navagraha 
puja\ whether a priest could also be a co-jajman (celebrant or patron); whether ‘low’ 
castes/ethnicities, widows and sterile women could be part of the ritual hand-in-hand 
with higher castes, especially if they were professional grades of workers and managers. 
Such contesting of the hegemonic ritual order seemed to open up avenues for ushering in 
progressivism within the hybrid cultural order evolving on the factory shop floors.
4. Conclusion
Markets are not only transactional spaces, but also social and cultural. The institutions of 
the market form a complex web that contains culture, society, politics and economic 
activity simultaneously. Markets then are bound to be divergent across societies. The 
same can be said about the State policies and regulations that govern the market: that 
they are not only directive forces but also the recipients of more nuanced social and 
cultural norms and negotiations. In this chapter, I have shown how, beyond the forces of 
State policies and markets, industrial organisation is embedded into the broader social 
organisation -  to a lesser degree in culturally anonymising factories (Arya-NepaB) and 
to a greater degree in culturally specialising factories (Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu). In 
fact, the varying degree of such melding of culture, transactional rationality and State 
directives into the making of industrial organisation, gives rise to what Whitley (1999) 
called ‘divergent capitalism’ across societies. He is right in pointing out the limitations
109 This is one o f the important Hindu sects which follows Shiva who is also known as agghor baba or 
the non-follower o f the rules o f ritual purity. Under this sect, none o f the Hindu rituals o f purity and 
pollution are to be observed. Since Shiva is believed to be a dweller o f the high Himalayas, Nepalis’ 
liberal attitude towards ritual purity and pollution was regarded by the Indians to be the results o f  the 
agghorpanthi principles.
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of the instrumental rationality assumption of both the market and the State, and thus, the 
need to contextualise rationality. In the case of the garment industry in Nepal where two 
different types of industrial subcultures exist side by side, the question of 
contextualisation seems to have as much to do with industrial demands as with the state 
of social organisation and businessmen’s interface with the State. In other words, how, 
when and where State regulations and market rationalities prevail, and where they are 
replaced by vernacular social considerations, are questions that have to be problematised 
in the context of both endogenous (culture and society) and exogenous (international 
market) factors.
This chapter is largely a case study on Whitley’s comparative-business-systems approach 
in studying modem capitalism or industrial organisation. I have tried to capture the 
divergence in capitalism on the three important fronts of internal factory organisation, 
organisation of the supply chain and interface with the State. On each of these levels, I 
have examined how and why organising principles differ, first, between manufacturers of 
homogenous and specialised garments, and second, between manufacturers from 
different caste and ethnic origins. Temporally, I have tried to take into consideration the 
factors at play during the old competition (market liberalisation and regular industrial 
challenges) and the new (MFA expiration and the Maoist insurgency). The divergence 
from the status-quo seems to have emerged out of a series of adaptive efforts in response 
to shifting opportunities and constraints. For example, a mass manufacturer like Arya- 
NepaB which emerged out of the somewhat orchestrated policy manoeuvres related to 
the MFA would understandably be dominated by procedural adaptations. The MFA-led 
market integration also prompted Nepali mass manufacturers to step out of their 
comfortable domains of ethnicity and kin-based internal organisation such as the juwadi 
system, and mechanise/anonymise their production process according to the principles of 
Taylorism. The mass manufacturers also formalised their supply chains and adhered to 
international norms of corporate governance but their departure from traditional norms 
was not always reiterated in their social activities. For example, instead of leaving 
behind their cultures and religious rituals, many mass manufacturers intensified their 
observance of religious rituals in the factories as their commercial futures looked more 
and more uncertain. On many occasions, the mass manufacturers seemed to 
compartmentalise their industrial and cultural practices such that a whole series of 
pragmatic rationalisation of production went hand in hand with particular adherence to 
less rational cultural norms. For instance, Arya-Nepal’s efforts at social capital building
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with its financiers was based on religious rituals and caste identities and its dealings in 
State policies and procedures including such items as duty drawback systems, taxation, 
customs-clearing, shipping, etc acknowledged and reinforced a clear ethnic preference. 
Although Arya-Nepal was a case supporting the theory of homogenisation of production 
and labour, as prophesied by the proponents of American capitalism (Chandler, 1977 and 
Hollingsworth, 1997), it is not in any way free from the socio-cultural order that 
surrounds it.
Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli also adapted to market changes, as is evident in the 
structural changes seen in their structures and products. From retailing souvenir 
garments to local tourists, they have now moved to large-scale manufacturing and export 
of specialised garments to worldwide markets. The only difference in the way they 
adapted to the market changes was that Arya-Nepal’s adaptation was procedural while 
Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli’s were product-based. Their organisational changes also 
reflected the difference in their adaptation. For example, the internal organisation in both 
Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu involved the old juwadi and caste-based systems; the 
supply chain was tightly controlled through character-specific trust rather than 
institutionalised trust that ensured competitive norms; and ownership structures put 
higher priority on the owners’ assertion of authority over principles of corporate 
governance. Where Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu varied was in the nature o f their 
product and their use of the culture-based identities and networks that underpinned it.
The Buddhist Newars have historically been marginalised since their defeat at the hands 
of the Hindu Bahun-Chhetris, and their position in the modem State is that of a 
‘displaced Nawab of Lucknow after the Loot,’ as K.P. Malla (1992: 24) put it. Not 
surprisingly then, Swakan-Chhemu dealt with the State as indirectly as possible and had 
lately came to employ a Bahun-Chhetri firm to represent it in all interactions with the 
State. The Shakyas did not take part in State festivities in the same way as the Arya- 
Nepal or Rongoli owners, and the old institutions of receiving Dashain tika and bearing 
loyalty to State officials was no longer relevant for the Shakyas. Instead, they built 
vocational alliances with other marginalised castes and ethnicities, e.g., the Dalits, 
Tibetan refugees and convert Christians, and nurtured a grudging suspicion of the Bahun- 
Chhetris and Indians. Their dealings with the institutions of popular political activism -  
which acted as a buffer zone between the State and society or formal policy and popular
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aspirations -  reflected the fact that they seemed to be caught between the capitalist 
pursuit of interests and ethical resistance to hegemony (see Chapter 9).
Such a conundrum did not exist for Rongoli whose owners belonged to the 
caste/ethnicity which the State had credited with the construction of the first industrial 
infrastructure in Nepal. They had excellent working relations with the State, as reflected 
in their ability to persuade the DOI to designate a special officer to evaluate their fabric 
consumption, and allow them personalised access to the customs office. Such well 
nurtured social capital was reinforced among others by the fact that the festivals and 
rituals that Rongoli celebrated were the ones acknowledged and practised by the State. 
For example, the receiving of Dashain tika from the DOI and customs officials as well as 
other State officials both reflected and contributed to its comfortable social standing with 
the State mechanism. The nature of its product allowed it to pursue caste/ethnicity-based 
labour organisation which was more organic and hedged from the risks related to new 
labour unionism. Rongoli did not seek support from political activists for its 
organisational and procedural problems; its engagements with these institutions were 
purely charitable and non-partisan.
Some social scientists have optimistically expressed their faith in the regenerative 
capacity of traditional institutions to counteract the effects of economic decline. Trust is 
one such institution which is critical in explaining the organisation of the garment 
industry. Zucker (1986) and Putnam (1993) have argued that societies might start out 
with informal and personalised trust that lubricates business transactions and alliance- 
building, but that such forms of trust will be replaced by institution-based trust and 
legally enforceable transactions as the societies become more industrialised. Others have 
taken a more cautious approach, re-emphasising that the kind of trust that will be 
deemed useful in the market will depend on whether or not such trust patterns fulfil 
market demand for production (Zivetz, 1992). A majority of trust scholars have chosen 
to deconstruct trust into various types and contexts (Moore, 1999; Timberg, 1978; 
Rudner, 1984; Zivetz, 1992). As Harriss (2002b) has argued, how fast new or 
institutionalised trust will grow will largely depend on how strong the old or selective 
trust is. Rudner has shown with regard to the Nattukottai Chettiars that selective trust 
can be the basis of great business enterprises. This has been possible with a unique mix 
of strong old trust and weak enforcement capacities of new trust. The same can be said 
to be true of the garment factory owners in Nepal. The new trust deriving from State
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policies and business regulations tends to be much weaker given the fact that the old 
institutions of religion, caste, ethnicity and kinship seem to influence the factory owners 
all the time. What is true, nevertheless, is that the old institutions are not static, but are 
continuously changing with every new dimension that is being added to the industrial 
scene -  be it shrinking and growing markets or changing political rules of the game.
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Chapter 9: Institutions and politics
In addition to the reliance on cultural knowledge, skills, networks (as shown in Chapter 
7) and organisational preferences (as shown in Chapter 8), the modem entrepreneurial set 
up is also characterised by localisation of politics. This has to do with the grounding of 
formal State policies and politics in the informal world of grassroots activities, which 
offers a platform on which the policies and politics will actually be interpreted. How 
grassroots-level norms facilitate collective action is a topic that has been partially 
addressed by new social capital theorists like Putnam (1993). However, the problem 
with Putnam’s version of social capital is that he approached it in a formalist way to 
equate social capital to social cohesiveness measured from the presence of horizontal and 
apolitical associations such as choirs and sports clubs. I disagree with this view; and 
instead argue that social capital and politics are not stand alone topics but individual 
threads inextricably interwoven in the fabrics of economic and social structures. Earlier 
theorisers o f social capital like Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1984) actually reinforce 
this view. In both their discourses, social capital refers to subjective relationships among 
people, which are at times drawn on to influence access to resources, but which are not 
entirely fungible. As Harriss (2002a: 254) correctly showcased, using Kerala as an 
example, social capital not only includes voluntary associations such as choirs and sports 
teams, but also politically charged class and mass organisations operating at State and 
grassroots levels. In this, social capital might be a public good, but it relates differently 
to individuals within a given society, and hence, cannot be added up into a ‘total score’ 
for a society as a whole.
I examine the relevance of power and politics within the discourse of social capital and 
its role in how economy and society function in Nepal. Drawing from my record 
keeping of the chain of grassroots level events that occurred in urban factories as part of 
the Maoist movement, I discuss the nature and behaviour of two mass organisations 
through which Maoist politics entered the world of industrial organisation. This is 
especially relevant to how businessmen handle the contradictory experiences of 
economic coercion of labour unions and political manipulation of factory ownership. 
Such a complex mix is explained to a large extent by the history of the evolution of 
labour unions and business associations amidst competing claims of political, labour and 
industrial interests. The arrival of new power holders (the Maoists) is another important
195
dimension that must be studied in order to understand how the modus operandi of these 
institutions underwent incremental power alterations at times.
1. The Maoists and the businessmen
The Maoist insurgency is not a new phenomenon for Nepal and it has regularly featured 
in all three of my case study chapters (Chapters 4,5 and 6). What does deserve a special 
mention is the fact that while the Maoist movement ubiquitously impacted all fronts of 
political and social structures, business enterprises were especially hard hit because of 
their capital-based functions. The overall business environment deteriorated drastically 
as the insurgency escalated, yet both the State and the rebels targeted business houses as 
an easy source of funding for their increasing expenditures. As early as May 2000, 
factories in Kathmandu had begun to receive letters from the Maoists asking for 
donations. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Maoists intensified their networks in urban 
areas following the second national convention in February 2001, and the adoption of the 
Prachanda Path, which specifically called for taking the war from the peripheries to the 
centre. The February Convention also renewed its denouncement of the so-called 
‘feudal’ and ‘imperial’ elements within Nepali society, and especially targeted the 
Bahun-Chhetri entrepreneurs for supposedly having better access to State resources than 
their lower caste compatriots. The Marwari entrepreneurs were also targeted for 
supposedly having deeper cultural ties with India than Nepal. The ‘indigenous’ business 
communities like the Newars and other Janajatis received softer treatment.
I have already discussed in Chapter 2 how Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba brokered 
a truce with the Maoists which lasted from July to November 2001. Although the 
government had been firm, and at times ruthless, in cracking down on Maoist activities 
on factory shop floors in Kathmandu, the State significantly softened its treatment of the 
Maoists during the truce. Treating this as a window of opportunity, the Maoists 
substantially strengthened their urban networks and intensified their labour 
proselytisation and capital extortion activities among urban factories. Increasingly, the 
factories in Kathmandu began to receive letters from the Maoists that stated the precise 
figures o f ‘donations’ expected from each, which the Maoist cadre clarified ‘were based 
on the factory income statements of individual factories’. Factories with a portfolio of 
five million rupees had to pay a ‘donation’ of ten to fifty thousand rupees. The Maoists 
used official signatures and letterheads to legitimise the letters, and their writings were 
often filled with communist jargon like ‘the people’s war’, ‘feudal exploitation,
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oppression, discrimination, corruption’ and ‘poverty and deprivation exerted by the anti­
nationalists and the imperialists.’ Although the factories had been aware of the 
expectations placed on them for political donations, it shocked them that this time they 
were increasingly made subject to a caste-based treatment. For example, the factories 
owned by the so-called feudal Hindu high castes and the ‘Indian imperialists’ including 
the Marwaris, had to pay more than their Janajati and lower caste counterparts. These so 
called feudal and Indian castes and ethnicities were treated especially harshly and were 
allowed no negotiations whatsoever, while their Janajati counterparts were often 
successful in significantly reducing the amounts demanded by counter-proselytising the 
Maoists on the importance of indigenous entrepreneurship. The Maoist representatives 
that the factory owners often met were almost always Janajatis.
One of the most effective ways that the Maoists materialised their financial extortion 
from the business houses was through labour unionism. Their infiltration into the 
garment labour force following the Maoist adaptation of the Prachanda Path, for 
example, had essentially left it incapacitated. The Prachanda Path echoed the slogan, 
‘Let us consolidate and expand our base areas and move forward towards a people’s 
government in the centre’ (CPN Maoist in Sharma, 2004: 53). One aspect of their 
mobilisation towards the centre, was their raising of the flags of patriotism (by voicing an 
anti-India rhetoric) and communism (by imposing anti-capitalist demands on behalf of 
the workers). On both counts, the Maoists targeted labour-intensive and ethnically 
diverse industries in Kathmandu, among which the garment industry, which enjoyed 
strong Indian investment and labour participation, was an attractive target. The Maoists 
covertly infiltrated the industrial labour unions in Kathmandu to displace the influence of 
conventional labour unions led by the Nepali Congress and the moderate United Marxist 
Leninist Party (UML).
In one sense, the Indian and Nepali workers had historically coexisted in the garment 
industry, if not in total harmony, at least without disrupting factory operations. But the 
fact that the Madheshi workers from the Nepal-India border had privileged access to the 
industry110 and the benefits that accrued meant that there had long been a simmering 
discontent between the Madheshi and hill workers. As the Maoists spelled out anti- 
Indian slogans, they also fuelled ethnic hostilities. The hill workers in the garment 
factories were particularly bitter about the way they had been treated as a less preferred
110 Except in rare case like Arya-NepaB and Rongoli.
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labour force within the industry for so many years, and about the discriminatory ways in 
which the Indian managers and factory owners had treated them. The higher level 
management in most of the Marwari-owned factories was staffed either by Indians or 
Madheshis who were less sensitive to hill culture and customs. During a bizarre political 
scandal about whether or not a Bollywood actor made derogatory remarks against Nepal, 
which resulted in the death of a man when the police tried to dismiss a demonstration of 
street agitators, the hill workers in garment factories where they had the majority, 
spontaneously confronted their Madheshi co-workers. Such strange incidents were early 
indicators that ethnic identities and a sense of groupism were deeply rooted among the 
people, and that, if strategised, could be manipulated for political purposes.
The problem of business extortions became worse during and after the months of truce 
(July-November, 2001). In the readymade garment industry, more than two thirds of the 
factories owned by Bahun-Chhetris and Marwaris had to suspend their operations owing 
to the worsening extortions. A Marwari businessman described his experience with the 
Maoists as particularly intimidating:
They sent me a letter that 1 should not create obstacles in the work o f the labour union leader in 
the factory. 1 agreed. The (union leader) guy had been working in my factory for about a year. 
They demanded that the labour wages needed to be doubled. 1 could not do that, but I 
increased my labour welfare fund, and spent a lot o f money raising overtime wages, adding 
health facilities in the factoiy, etc.
After a few months with no production orders, 1 had to let go some o f my workers who had 
been on temporary contracts. But still the labour union leader guy came and demanded that 
each laid off worker must be paid full severance as i f  they were permanent workers. This was 
not possible. And then I started getting telephone calls from the Maoists threatening to take 
me to their court. 1 had no choice. 1 paid them as much as I could. It cost me a lot.
On top o f everything else, the Maoists sent me another letter demanding one lakh rupees from 
me. How can I pay such a big ransom? And I still do not have any production order so the 
factory is not working. This is a desperate situation. What I have now done is that I have fired 
all workers except the very labour union leader. He wants me to fire him, but I am not going 
to. He will come to work every day, look at the empty factory, and realise what he has done to 
the factory, to his fellow workers, and to himself. He will have to see.
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In contrast, a handful of garment factories owned by Janajatis were still running 
smoothly, and although they made extortion payments, they were not harassed as badly 
as their Bahun-Chhetri and Marwari counterparts and the ‘donation rate’ they were given 
was significantly lower than those imposed on the others. One of the Newar owners of 
the garment factory gave the following account of his contacts with the Maoists:
I got the Maoist letter, and they followed up with a phone call. 1 asked to meet them, and they 
called me to one o f the teashops in the community. 1 was not at all frightened nor were they 
harsh, not visibly, at least. Two Magar-looking young fellows turned up. They spoke in 
English from time to time! I said to them, this is unfair; it is already so difficult to compete 
with the Indians in this business. There are hardly any locals, and they can see it for 
themselves. And I hardly have any labour problem in my factory -  they know it themselves. 
They have come and talked with my workers and my workers have told them they are not 
exploited, they get paid higher than anybody else working in garment industry. If the Maoists 
are fighting for the sarvahara (classless) workers and against the Bahun oppression, they better 
realise that they must make friends (mile juyema) with people like us. 1 told them this right to 
their face. I told them, they should tell me right to my face, if  they see any injustice, any 
corruption in my factory.
After the Maoist extortionism wreaked havoc in the industry, the Garment Association of 
Nepal (GAN) was called in to mediate between the entrepreneurs and the Maoists. How 
such a mediation would be achieved was a matter of vociferous debate among GAN 
members, but three clear preferences emerged: the first was to retain the status quo and 
continue dealing with the Maoists individually, which was what the Janajati 
businessmen’s preferred option ; second was for GAN to agree with the Maoists on a 
bulk amount which could later be shared among the individual members, which was the 
preference of liberal Bahun-Chhetris and the ‘old’ Marwari entrepreneurs; and third, was 
to take a hard position and lobby instead with the government for tightened security in 
the factories, which was the choice of the conservative Bahun-Chhetris and the ‘new’ 
Marwari entrepreneurs.
Among the Bahun-Chhetris, the greater elites who had enjoyed State protection during 
the Panchayat regime were more conservative and maintained their hard line against the 
Maoists, but the lesser elites who had received only marginal benefits from the old State 
were more open-minded. Staunchly against cooperating with the Maoists were the ‘new’ 
Marwaris, who had either only newly migrated to Nepal or still had their bases in India, 
and hence still had the option of going back if the situation deteriorated too much. The
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‘old’ Marwaris, who had lived in Nepal for generations, were less inclined to leave, and 
they -  just like those from other Nepali ethnicities -  openly came out in favour of 
brokering a peaceful deal with the Maoists.
Some civil society leaders were also called in to mediate the dialogue between GAN and 
the Maoists, and the talks brought mixed results: The ‘old’ Marwaris and the liberal 
Bahun-Chhetris agreed on a collective sum to be paid by GAN to the Maoists, which 
would be shared among individual GAN members afterwards. The Janajatis dropped out 
of the dialogue and went on to negotiate individually. The conservative Bahun-Chhetris 
and the ‘new’ Marwaris refused to participate in any dialogue. Soon after this deal, the 
Maoists planted a socket bomb in one of the garment factories owned by a new Marwari 
who was seen as being especially obstructive in the GAN-Maoist dialogue. Following 
this incident, and also owing to the fact that business operations in Nepal were already 
making huge losses, a large number of new Marwari entrepreneurs left Nepal to return to 
India and elsewhere.
2. The Garment Association of Nepal (GAN) in international trade politics
The Garment Association of Nepal (GAN) was established with less than thirty business 
members in 1987 but by 1995 membership had grown to over a thousand. The size of 
GAN can be seen as a reflection of the size of the garment industry, which in turn 
appears to be a reflection of the industrial policies that governed the industry at the time. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of enterprises functioned as informal businesses, 
which did not bother joining business associations such as GAN. It was only with the 
enactment of the 1992 industrial policy that enterprises began to take steps towards 
presenting themselves on formal platforms for business networking. With it, GAN 
ceased to be a club restricted to the local business elites and opened up to non-elite 
businessmen from all castes and classes.
Prior to this, the 1987 industrial policy had imposed a blanket prohibition on foreign 
investment in small-scale enterprises and had allowed only up to fifty per cent foreign 
investment in medium-scale enterprises. Even in large-scale enterprises, investors had to 
undergo lengthy and complicated bureaucratic procedures before being granted a permit. 
Foreign investors, therefore, often took business partners from the local business elites 
who would allow the use of their social and political connections to navigate through the 
bureaucratic maze involved, not only in obtaining permits to start the business, but also
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throughout its registration and operations. The local business partners, however, would 
have little managerial role in the day-to-day operations, nor would they have a high 
capital stake in the business and so were often referred to as sleeping partners. As there 
were only so many local business elites capable of and willing to engage in a business 
partnership with foreigners, especially in the relatively untested garment industry, the 
number of registered garment factories was also small.
The local non-elites also ran garment factories, often smaller ones, but they could not 
afford to register them formally. Nor did they see much value in formal registration 
especially given that the financial markets were so rudimentary that they could not rely 
on raising bank credits without personal connections in any case. The term ‘fabrication’ 
among the garment entrepreneurs, for example, referred to factories that were not 
registered but had a fully functioning production schedule. An important drawback for 
the ‘fabricators’, however, was that they could not enter the international market since 
they had no recourse to customs permits or the MFA quotas that were necessary for them 
to export their production to the United States. Instead, they worked as subcontractors to 
the registered factories who would resell the final products after some rent-seeking. 
Needless to say, the fabricators could not become members of GAN either.
Unregistered factories aside, not all registered factories necessarily sought membership 
of GAN. For example, GAN raised less than five per cent of its total income from 
membership dues until 1990; the remaining costs being met by government grants and 
philanthropic contributions from a few select members of the business elite. As the 1992 
industrial policy went on to restructure government procedures on enterprise supervision 
(see Section 3 of Chapter 2 for details): one important change introduced was that the 
DOI delegated to GAN the task of verifying and managing the complicated job of MFA 
quota distribution. In return, GAN was allowed to keep one percent of the quota amount 
for its capacity building. GAN did build its capacity significantly from this income: It 
constructed an office building within its premises where the DOI representatives 
responsible for approval of MFA quotas could be stationed. It also developed an 
automated e-tracking system that could keep record total exports, quota balance and 
government revenue earned from the industry. Both its physical proximity to the DOI as 
well as its access to detailed data on industrial revenues enabled it to emerge as an 
indispensable advocacy group on garment-related issues. Increasingly, garment factories 
began to take membership and be more involved in their Association. As business
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registration became easier after 1992, GAN’s membership dues increased by over sixty 
per cent.
Although the garment industry expanded considerably in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
dominance of a few select castes and ethnicities remained intact in this industry. In a 
small survey (of 36) that I carried out among a random sample of garment factories, I 
found that 54 per cent were owned by Bahun-Chhetris, 30 per cent by Marwaris, 11 per 
cent by Newars and only 5 per cent by other castes and ethnicities. The pattern one sees 
in the distribution of key positions within GAN echoes the broader caste/ethnic 
composition of the industry. Within the GAN Executive Committee (of 21), 50 per cent 
of the Committee members were Bahun-Chhetris, 29 per cent Marwaris and a further 9 
per cent Newars. There was only one Janajati member of the GAN Executive 
Committee. Most of the GAN members noted, without being prompted, that the majority 
of past and present Presidents of GAN were either Bahun-Chhetris or Marwaris with just 
two exceptions of Newars. On who would be the most suitable candidate for GAN 
presidency, one of the members said:
We need such kind o f man to lead the GAN, who has access to the ‘top level’ [of government].
1 think Bahun-Chhetris are needed for this kind o f leadership. We’ve had a number o f them 
who have led GAN well. They could call a minister and fix an appointment within one day. 
Let’s just compare GAN with the Carpet Association -  it takes them [the Carpet Association] 
weeks just to get an appointment, and then they cannot put their case convincingly when they 
do see Ministers. We [GAN] can see the Ministers when we want. That is why the garment
industry is doing as good as it is On the other hand, it is not enough that the GAN
President knows Ministers. So what if  he knows all the Ministers if  he is not willing to use that 
connection for the Association, to bring facilities for all o f us, to bail us out at the time o f  
crisis. The President should be willing to use his connection not only for his personal needs 
but for the entire Association.
Owing to the tasks being added to GAN’s portfolio every year, the Association 
promulgated new sets of guiding principles and policies in 1995. Page 2 of GAN’s new 
guiding principles stated GAN objectives as, ‘protection of the interests of the garment 
manufacturers; [to] support the industry through networking, facilitation, and information 
sharing among the manufacturers and with buyers; and lobbying with the Nepali 
government and other agents on garment-related issues as and when needs arise.’ Given 
the rapidity with which GAN expanded its scope in the late 1990s, it was only to be
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anticipated that the members’ expectations of the body would far exceed its officially 
stated objectives. Of these, I will discuss two specific cases where GAN led lobbying 
and negotiations with the State as well as international policymakers on behalf of its 
members. The first was on the design of policy incentives for garment exporters that 
encouraged a graduation from the MFA quotas; the second was regarding lobbying in the 
United States Senate for preferential treatment of Nepalese garments.
2a. Policy incentives for ending dependence on MFA quotas
Because the garment industry was seen to be excessively dependent on the MFA quota, 
the government introduced monetary incentives in the year 2000 for entrepreneurs who 
either exported non-quota garment items or exported to non-quota (i.e., non-US) markets. 
It was proposed that industrialists would receive a cash-back worth 0.1 per cent of total 
sales qualifying under either of the two provisions. GAN was tasked with designing and 
administering this incentive programme. In 2000 there were six factories which exported 
non-quota garments, including a wide range of men’s and women’s cotton and linen 
jackets (quota items #353/653/354/654), women’s dresses (#836), towels (#362) and bed 
linen (#363). Most of the owners of these factories were Bahun-Chhetris and Marwaris. 
In contrast, there were only three factories that exported to the non-quota markets of the 
United Kingdom, Europe and Japan. The owners of two of the three factories were 
Newars. GAN awarded cash incentives to exporters of both non-quota items and non­
quota markets in the first year (2000) but from 2001 onwards, it scrapped the incentives 
for exporters to non-quota markets whilst continuing them for non-quota garment items.
With only three entrepreneurs (and two of them Newars) victimised by such a policy 
change, and the fact that no transparent process was adopted to verify GAN’s data 
analysis and subsequent decisions, it was inevitable that the two Newar entrepreneurs 
looked upon this as ethnicity-based discrimination. One of them had only recently made 
a handsome donation to GAN with the money he had earned through the incentive, 
which he thought ‘went into shit’ as GAN scrapped his benefits the very next year. As I 
continued to do my fieldwork in GAN, both Newar exporters requested me to raise the 
issue one more time with the GAN General Secretary. They said, ‘this [was] precisely 
how the Brahmus (Newar for Bahun) have long made fools of the Newars’.
When I asked the GAN Secretary, a Bahun manufacturer of quota items for the quota 
market, he confirmed that export of non-quota items was gradually growing whilst
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exports to non-quota markets remained static despite the incentives granted. He also 
insisted that both incentives had been adopted on a trial basis, and since the government 
did not increase its funds for this incentive as had been earlier promised, GAN had had to 
discard one of them. He reacted negatively when I asked whether it did not make more 
sense to reduce the amount attached to each incentive; or even consider the removal of 
the incentive on non-quota items precisely because these were already on a rising trend 
and were a better candidate for weaning off of the subsidy:
‘There are various reasons for this [scrapping the non-quota market subsidy while retaining 
the non-quota item subsidies]. First, there are only three exporters to the non-quota markets 
and they are doing much better than average exporters even without the incentive. And 
second, the business know-how and the business networks needed for this kind of business is 
so tightly controlled by one or two entrepreneurs that the incentive alone would not enable 
new entrepreneurs to penetrate this enclosed territory.’
I was told that the incentive for exporters to non-quota markets might be reinstated if the 
factory owners concerned could persuade the government to raise the budget allocations. 
Otherwise, GAN might be able to afford this only after finishing the construction of its 
new building, which offered the possibility of increased revenue through renting out part 
of the building. This, of course, was not sufficient an assurance for the Newar 
entrepreneurs who continued to feel victimised, not only over this particular incident but 
also a series of other incidents similar to this. One example given was that while 
Marwaris easily got special treatment for import duty exemption, the Newar factories 
were refused such concessions even when equally entitled (see Section 3 a of Chapter 8 
detailed discussions on government discrimination between Newars and Bahun-Chhetris 
on the duty drawback system).
The policy inconsistencies as well as the bickering that followed between GAN and the 
members of various castes and ethnicities, show that the issue of caste and ethnicity 
remain at the core of policy-making even though GAN has become more ethnically 
diversified over the last decade or so. The distinct caste undertones felt in the coercion 
and negotiation among GAN officials and members on interpretation and implementation 
of industrial policies reveal the extent to which business associations are influenced 
bythe broader social and political hierarchies under which they operate.
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2b. Lobbying in the American Senate for a preferential trade bill
The scheduled transition to the time of the MFA expiration invoked a heightened sense 
of uncertainty among garment factory owners. It did not help that the key garment 
market (the United States) showed no flexibility towards reducing the effects of the MFA 
expiration on Nepal. Elsewhere, in 2001, the United States signed two regional treaties 
on preferential trade with Africa and the Caribbean, which effectively compensated these 
two regions for their loss of MFA privileges. The African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) formalised provisions 
that readymade garments manufactured in these two regions would be exempt from 
import duty in the United States as long as they could demonstrate adherence to rules of 
origin conditionalities. Given that the average American import duty on readymade 
garments is more or less equal to the average quota price, or somewhere in the range of 
15-30 per cent of the merchandise value, the African and the Caribbean countries were 
now free of MFA-related fears (Bimbaum, 2000).
The Nepalese garment industry received no such concessions from the United States. 
Fully aware of the challenges on the horizon, the Nepali garment factory owners referred 
to their businesses as a nibhna lageko diyo (lamp soon to extinguish) and were keen to 
develop a strategy that might give them a safe transition into a post-MFA context. The 
GAN Executive Committee decided that one way forward might be lobbying in the 
United States for preferential treatment. The GAN General Assembly discussed the 
possibility of commissioning a technical study through a reputed research institution 
which might help it develop a business case for negotiations with international trade 
partners. This proposition did not go too far because several GAN members felt that a 
‘hands-on* approach of aggressive lobbying would do the job more effectively than 
adhering to an ‘academic’ approach of getting the facts right and documenting the 
case.111 This might well have been prudent given the fact that Nepal’s garment exports 
to the US comprised less than 0.1 per cent of the latter’s total garment import, and US 
policymakers were hardly going to spend much time pondering such an insignificant
111 The garment industry had earlier suffered from some o f the left-leaning research that occasionally 
overstated the case o f labour abuse in the garment factories, sending wrong signals to potential buyers 
and consumers. The fact that Nepal received more interest from labour researchers than business 
researchers made GAN sceptical o f the whole research agenda. Since GAN did not support research, 
there were no confirmed statistics on the size o f labour employment in the garment industry. When 
they had to produce some statistics to back their policy lobbying, GAN simply glossed over the fact 
that it had only recently prevented the 1LO from undertaking a labour census, to hastily claim that the 
industry employed over 100,000 workers which was reduced to 50,000 within a few months, and then 
subsequently increased to 75,000 a few weeks later.
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market share. GAN then rightly assessed that they would have better access to US 
policymakers if the approach was made via diplomatic channels rather than purely 
commercial ones. The easiest link to the government was thought to be via its Party 
offices of which GAN had long been a grand patron.
The first step for GAN’s lobbying was to take the ruling and opposing parties into its 
confidence. Ujwal Mainali, GAN General-Secretary, met with the economic advisers of 
the Nepali Congress (NC) as well as the Communist Party of Nepal -  United Marxist- 
Leninist (UML). The so called economic advisers had graduate or masters training in 
economics, but little professional experience in economic issues since much of their 
career had revolved around party politics. These meetings did not entail technical 
presentations of the case nor formal briefing papers. They heard about the issue very 
informally, bringing up now and again cases of mutual co-operation between GAN and 
the parties, and promised to brief the Minister on the matter. With this assurance, GAN 
organised official delegations to the Ministry of Industries and Commerce (MOIC) as 
well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). A two-page briefing note was presented to 
both Ministries followed by formal and semi-technical discussions and based on this it 
was agreed that the government would send a delegation to the United States to meet 
policymakers there. The delegation left Nepal in April 2003, led by the Joint Secretary 
of MOFA and included the Joint Secretary of MOI, President and General Secretary of 
GAN, the Nepali Ambassador to the US and Nepal’s honorary Trade Representative for 
the US. The delegation met with several US trade officials and legislators. Among 
others, the delegation was successful in bringing on board one of the US Senators, Diane 
Feinstein, to sponsor and table a preferential trade bill for Nepal in the US Senate.
Senator Diane Feinstein, a Democratic Representative from California, had connections 
with Nepal through her husband Richard Blum, an investment banker and philanthropist 
interested in Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. In 1981, he had attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
climb Mount Everest from the Tibetan side with Sir Edmund Hillary. Thereafter, Blum 
founded the American Himalayan Foundation, which gave millions of dollars to build 
schools in Tibet and Nepal. Despite the fact that Blum’s key interest in Nepal lay in 
Tibetan Buddhism, his current connections there were confined to the ruling Hindu 
elites. For example, he rarely visited the country after 1981, and most o f his 
communications thereafter had been via Prabhakar Rana, the only Nepali Board Member 
of the American Himalayan Foundation, who was also managing the finances of King
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Gyanendra. It was clear that any lobbying efforts from GAN would have to have the 
royal blessing for them to be effective.
For the proposed trade bill to become law, it had to be seconded by another Senator. In 
addition, the bill also had to be proposed and seconded into the US House of Congress by 
two Congressmen. With the limited connections Nepal had in the United States and the 
limited capacity of the Nepali Embassy there, the delegation had to have a realistic 
strategy as to how to retain momentum in this effort. Hence, it was thought best to 
appoint an American lobbyist to push the case further after the delegation returned to 
Nepal. The delegation met with two registered lobbyists with similar experiences on 
such issues, only to learn that the lobbying fees were too high for GAN to be able to 
afford. The next best alternative was to find someone who would be willing to take on 
the task on a voluntary basis. The obvious candidate was Mary Carroll, Nepal’s 
honorary Trade Representative based in the US, who had regularly advised on a series of 
commercial issues. She was a founder of a Philadelphia-based business strategy 
company as well as a trustee of various charitable organisations including the YMCA of 
Philadelphia and the National Parks Mid-Atlantic Council. Her interests in Nepal had 
sprung from her trekking experience in the Nepalese high mountains in the 1970s. She 
returned to Nepal several times to trek and to lead high profile tours of businessmen and 
celebrities from the East Coast of the US. On the request of the Federation of the 
Nepalese Chambers of Commerce (FNCCI), she had also recently taken up the honorary 
designation of Nepal’s Trade Representative in the US.
When GAN requested Mary to volunteer as a lobbyist to work for the proposed 
preferential trade bill, she expressed several concerns. First, such lobbying would entail 
massive mobilisation of resources and networks in Washington DC, necessitating a rapid 
turn-around from GAN on the decisions required for each of the tasks involved. Second, 
her involvement in Nepal was more philanthropic than business: she felt that the GAN 
delegation had an overly capitalist undertone, and it did not, in her opinion, articulate 
how a preferential trade bill would help the garment workers and the poor. This left her 
unconvinced about the cause’s worth. Also, her primary contacts in Nepal had been 
trekking guides of Janajati origins from the remote villages in high mountains, whose 
charming personalities and cultures were what had drawn her to Nepal in the first place, 
and with whom she remained in touch to offer help when needed. Among others, she 
sponsored visas for many to come to the US, and when they came, she happily hosted
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them in her own home until they found jobs elsewhere. One of the grievances she had 
heard over and over from her Nepali (in this case Janajati) friends was that they felt 
unjustly oppressed by the Hindu upper castes and an evasive sense of Kathmandu- 
centrism in all walks of life. It did not help that the GAN delegation did not include a 
single non-Hindu, lower caste member or woman, nor were there any delegates from the 
rural villages. After consultation with her friends and acquaintances, almost all of whom 
were Janajatis, Mary turned down GAN’s request and said that she would take on the 
lobbying only at her regular business rates. This was again something GAN could not 
afford. Nevertheless, Mary did initiate some contact with the Nepali diaspora living in 
the US, encouraging them to write and campaign among the US policymakers.
The delegation’s initial success in having the trade bill proposed in the Senate was soon 
overshadowed by their inability to recruit a full-time lobbyist and carry out the necessary 
follow-up in time. The timing turned out to be especially bad. Even before a discussion 
could be initiated on the bill in the US Senate, it came under pressure from its opponents 
over two serious foreign policy mistakes made by the Nepali government. A 
longstanding dispute with a Texan hydropower company, Panda Energy International 
(PEI), over a compensation claim relating to its forced premature withdrawal from a 
project due to Maoist-induced security threats remained unsettled, and once they learned 
about Nepal’s preferential trade bill in the US Senate, PEI counter-lobbied Senator 
Feinstein. The second foreign policy blunder which in essence nipped the garment 
lobbying efforts in the bud concerned Tibet. In May 2003, as part of King Gyanendra’s 
efforts to win Chinese support for his assumption of State power, Nepal arrested and 
handed over to China eighteen Tibetan refugees who had just escaped and were on their 
way to Dharmashala to meet the Dalai Lama.112 This was a violation of international 
refugee law and provoked sharp criticism from the United Nations as well as from the 
world-wide network of the Tibetan diaspora and their global supporters. The pro-Tibet 
activists, who had a particularly powerful presence in California, approached Senator 
Feinstein and Richard Blum to voice criticism at their support for Nepal in the face of its 
persecution of the Tibetans. With protests brewing among people of her own 
constituency, Senator Feinstein withdrew her support for the Nepalese preferential trade 
bill, effectively annulling it even before it was officially reviewed.
112 In October, 2002, King Gyandendra had dismissed the elected government led by Sher Bahadur 
Deuba to appoint a royalist, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, as the new Prime Minister. The change o f  
regime also meant the intensification o f the royal campaign for Chinese and Indian support.
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Although the future of the trade bill looked uncertain in the US, GAN continued its 
efforts to keep the momentum going in Nepal. Taking stock of its past mistakes, the 
GAN President acknowledged in one of its town hall meetings:
We sometimes forget that when we lobby for garments from Nepal, we actually are lobbying 
for Nepal itself. This then means that we must acknowledge what people believe Nepal is: 
Nepal’s identity in front o f the international community is that it is the land o f the Himalayas, 
the land o f brave Gurkhas, the land o f Buddha and the land o f great ancient art and 
architecture. We should promote these images when we promote garments from Nepal.
GAN Executive Committee members approached several Tibetan organisations in Nepal 
and India, but were unable to bring them on board to support Nepal’s garment bill in the 
US. Among others, GAN approached the owners of Swakan-Chhemu whose business 
model had drawn successfully on their networks with Tibetans as well as celebrity 
followers of Tibetan Buddhism in the US and Europe. Swakan-Chhemu was not 
interested; in fact they sarcastically said:
These Bramhus (Newar for Bahuns) are very cunning. First, they voided our non-quota market 
subsidies for us (referring to the policy benefits described earlier), and now they want us to 
spend our time, which we do not have, to work for the quota market. Ok, we might do this, for 
once, as a favour to them. But one must never trust a Brahmu. They will use us now, and then 
when their interest is achieved, they will come and harass us later for producing garments with 
Tibetan symbols. They already poke this issue each time the Nepali Communists have their 
upper hand in the matter. One should never make friends with Brahmus.
A second delegation on Nepalese garments went to Washington DC in October 2003. 
This delegation offered a formal apology to Senator Feinstein on the Tibetan refugee 
issue and successfully persuaded her to re-sponsor the bill and re-table it in the US 
Senate. The same delegation also brought on board Republican Congressman James 
Walsh from Syracuse, who had spent two years in the Terai region between 1970 and 
1972 as an American Peace Corps Volunteer, to sponsor and introduce the bill in the US 
House of Congress. Although the bill was now formally tabled both in the Senate and 
Congress, it was incumbent on GAN to find two more US legislators who would second 
the bill in each of the Houses. The delegation was unable to do this during its short trip. 
After its return, the Nepali Embassy continued its lobbying efforts in Washington DC. 
Among those it approached were the Pritzker family who owned the global Hyatt hotel 
chain, had a house in Nepal and were interested in ancient Newar art and architecture.
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Others included leading anthropologists who had studied and taught about Nepal in 
renowned universities, the Nepali diaspora living in the US and other well wishers. 
Despite heroic efforts, the Embassy never succeeded in bringing on board the two other 
US legislators necessary for the proposed bill to be approved as a policy.
GAN revived its lobbying efforts, one more time, after nearly a year. This time, a multi­
national alliance was formed with Bangladesh, Cambodia, (post-tsunami) Sri Lanka and 
four other small island states from the Pacific. Despite the fact that Bangladesh and 
Cambodia had strong lobbying experience, the tsunami made a strong case for the 
inclusion of Sri Lanka and the remaining small island states invoking much sympathy in 
the US, the proposed bill was never approved.
3. Labour unionism
In addition to the politics of the State and capitalism that I have already discussed, an 
equally important precondition of industrial organisation among the garment factories is 
Nepal’s long history of labour politics. A brief analysis of this history is thus essential in 
order to explain current developments in the garment industry. As early as 1975, the 
labour cadre of the Nepali Congress party had led a historic labour ‘slow-down’113 at 
Biratnagar Jute Mills (the country’s oldest), at the time under the leadership of GP 
Koirala who later rose to preside over the ruling Nepali Congress and serve multiple 
terms as Prime Minister. Various streams of the moderate and radical communist parties 
that proliferate in the political scene in Nepal have historically also commanded strong 
support from modem factory workers. The tradition of formally registering as labour 
unions, however, came much later. Although the Nepal Factory Workers’ Act 1986 
made some provisions for labour rights, the Panchayat regime effectively maintained a 
ban on overall labour unionism to the effect that the first labour union of Nepal, the 
General Federation of Nepal Trade Union (GEFONT), was founded underground in 
1989. The labour wing of the Nepali Congress was consolidated into the Nepal Trade 
Union Congress (NTUC) only in 1991. Both these unions underwent cycles of mergers 
and splits following the trends in their base party politics. Although GEFONT divided 
into as many as four splinter groups at times, it recombined after the 1991 democratic 
movement. Within the NTUC, however, a splinter group went on to found the 
Democratic Confederation of Nepalese Trade Unions (DECONT) in January 2001 as the
113 A popular form of labour protest where workers reduce the pace of their work in a deliberate and 
coordinated fashion.
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so-called chhattise (thirty-six) dissident parliamentarians from within the Nepali 
Congress, implicitly led by former PM, KP Bhatterai, challenged GP Koirala’s 
leadership in parliament. On a different front, the Maoists had also already formed their 
own All Nepal Labour Union -  Revolutionary (ANLUR) in 1996 (Manandhar, 2001: 
62).
Although the labour union movement significantly strengthened in the early and mid- 
1990s, it remained shallow-rooted in the readymade garment industry. For example, out 
of over 400,000 fee-paying members the labour unions collectively had in 1997, only 
3000 of them came from the garment, textile and spinning industries. It is possible that 
their unexpected growth in the 1980s and 1990s might have caught labour unions by 
surprise. Also, the extreme seasonality of production and lack of predictability of 
business in the garment factories meant that owners had to maintain a high degree of 
labour movement across factories, which was only possible by avoiding the 
establishment of a permanent labour force. Initially this was achieved by recruiting 
migrant workers from Terai, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and later, by conditioning the hill 
workers to accept a productivity-based remuneration system in place of the conventional 
daily or monthly remuneration system (see Section 2 of Chapter 4 for details). Finally, a 
much publicised garment industry crisis caused by the Harkin bill in neighbouring 
Bangladesh might have particularly cautioned the garment manufacturers about potential 
threats coming from labour activism on the factory floors. Although the controversial 
Harkin bill on child labour in garment factories -  proposed by Senator Thomas Harkin in 
1994 -  was never approved in the US Senate, it wreaked havoc in Bangladesh, leading to 
the overnight dismissal of over ten thousand underage workers from Bangladeshi 
garment factories. Since this scandal, garment manufacturers all over Asia, including 
Nepal, had made special efforts to deter any form of labour activism. The extent of 
suspicion among the Nepali garment manufacturers is exemplified by the fact that when 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) set out simply to enumerate the number of 
garment workers, only one garment manufacturer gaveit access to his factory.
Because the garment industry lacked serious labour activism, some of the factory owners 
actually recruited labour unions to help with public relations. For example, Arya-Nepal 
actively mobilised the local Nepali Congress leader to arbitrate with local residents on 
disputes related to land acquisition and utility consumption, as well as to facilitate 
matters of local philanthropy. For such services, Arya-Nepal not only paid the NC leader
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regular ‘donations’ for his political activities and events but also agreed to recruit some 
of the NC political cadres into the Arya-Nepal workforce. Throughout the seven years of 
its operations, NTUC never once called a strike in Arya-Nepal. In fact, the NC leader 
(unsuccessfully) tried to mediate a truce between Indian and Nepali workers during the 
labour uprising following the ethnically charged statements allegedly made by the 
Bollywood actor Hritik Roshan. It worked with the managers to keep the factory 
operations ongoing when a local gang tried to disrupt factory operations to protest 
against Arya-Nepal’s late night shifts. Later when individual workers sought to 
manhandle the some of the managers on wage-related grievances, the NC leader and his 
cadres stepped in to intimidate the workers.
It should be remembered, however, that mobilisation of labour unions for managerial 
purposes was something only the Marwaris and Bahun-Chhetris could do. I regularly 
visited a number of Newar factories, all of which were located in Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, 
where local politics was more in the hands of the communist parties than the Nepali 
Congress. Likewise, the labour unions in these factories were dominated by GEFONT 
rather than NTUC. Even though the factory owners preferred their workers to choose the 
more pro-capitalist NTUC over the strictly communist GEFONT, they refrained from 
any political engineering against the locally dominant parties. I will give a broader 
background to the geographical concentration of GEFONT (and communist parties) in 
the following paragraphs.
It is said of the two districts of Lalitpur and Bhaktapur that ‘the [1990 movement] would 
not have succeeded if  the people of Bhaktapur and Lalitpur had not been willing to revolt 
and die in front of the soldiers’ bullets’ (Gellner, 2003:166). The political leadership of 
Bhaktapur had been unequivocally in the hands of the Nepal Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Party, a Bhaktapur-wide Communist party, which saw its own candidates successful in 
both local and national elections even before the Panchayat system was officially ousted. 
The 1991 election saw a clear Communist victory in both Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, and 
the consequent popular view painted all Newars as Communists. This reputation 
diminished for the Lalitpur Newars, however, as the 1992 local elections saw a Congress 
majority in 12 out of 22 city councils in Lalitpur. Subsequently it was said that the 
Newar elite had come to regret the Communist victory in the 1991 elections because it 
left them without any clear access to government.
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The peasants and workers from Lalitpur and Bhaktapur remained staunch Communist 
supporters. The class split in the political activism within Lalitpur was reflected clearly 
in industrial organisation -  the factory owners were supporters of the Nepali Congress 
(or the royalist Rastriya Prajatantra Party in one case). One of the Newar garment 
factory owners that I interviewed confessed that he had personally voted for the Nepali 
Congress but their factories still gave bigger donations to the Communist labour unions:
What to do? Located in a place like this, which is a Communist gadh (fort), we cannot afford 
to be seen close to other parties. So, I do not have long talks with the Congressis when they 
come to my factory. I make sure I give them smaller donations than what 1 give to the 
Communists. Otherwise, who knows what might happen tomorrow? When I have local 
issues, e.g., if  something is wrong with my utilities, or if I have a clash with the local 
community, etc., it is the local Communist leaders who 1 have to ask help from. On the other 
hand, everybody in the Garment Association is Congress. All industrialists are Congressis. If 
I want to stay an industrialist, Communism is not the way to go. The Communists are hard- 
headed; they will always put workers above us. But what are we to do?
It can be said that the sudden emergence of the Maoists in the garment industry after 
2000 was due to the fact that they were simply filling the vacuum left by conventional 
labour unionism. At least in the mass-manufacturing factories owned by the ruling elites, 
Maoist labour unionism effectively dismantled the capitalism-oriented mechanisms that 
had evolved in the hands of the conventional labour unions. Elsewhere, it penetrated the 
invisible wall factory owners had built to keep labour activism at bay. I have stated 
earlier that the second Maoist national plenum in February 2001 gave ideological 
backing to the Prachanda path, which called on its cadres to move their focus from the 
periphery to the centre. Some aspects of their advance to the centre were their raising the 
flags of patriotism (by voicing an anti-India rhetoric), indigenity (by setting the so-called 
Indian castes of Marwaris against the indigenous castes of Newars and other Janajatis), 
and communism (by setting the so-called feudal castes of Bahun-Chhetris against the 
lower castes and by imposing radically anti-capitalist demands on behalf of the workers). 
On all three counts, a labour-intensive and (at the time) profitable garment industry with 
close and messy connections with India was an easy scapegoat. The Maoists covertly 
seeped into the world of garment workers within the Kathmandu Valley weakening the 
labour bases of NTUC and GEFONT.
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The fissure that emerged within the ruling Nepali Congress party during June to 
November 2001 helped transform the covert Maoist operations into an overt offence. 
The Holeri assault114 was a landmark victory for the Maoists which not only soundly 
defeated the armed police force on duty but also exposed the more troubling question of 
constitutional control over the army -  which eventually forced GP Koirala to resign from 
his premiership.115 His successor Sher Bahadur Deuba, took a softer stance against the 
Maoists, calling for a unilateral ceasefire and sending them an invitation to peace talks 
within five days of taking office as Prime Minister. Taking advantage of the impunity 
granted by the State during the ceasefire, the Maoists flexed their muscles in two of the 
key industries, namely hotel management and garment manufacturing, where their 
proselytising had been especially successful. Public resistance committees were formed 
in almost all of the garment factories and frequent mass meetings were held openly in 
public places. By comparison with NTUC’s and GEFONT’s calls, the Maoists’ calls for 
a labour uprising were more sweeping, their demands were spelled out in detail, and 
were directly linked to the workers’ interests. They included: (i) raising wages for 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers by 50 per cent; (ii) doubling wages for floor 
supervisors; (iii) converting all the thousands of subcontracted workers into direct and 
permanent employees; (iv) ensuring that women workers were escorted right to their 
doors when they left factories late at night; and (v) ending the imposition of Indian 
religious practices, such as vegetarianism, within factory complexes among Nepali 
workers. NTUC and GEFONT occasionally made efforts to facilitate dialogues between 
the factory owners and Maoist labour unions but they did not succeed and in most cases, 
the factories suspended their operations. The only factories that could continue and keep 
Maoist labour unionism at bay, were the select few manufacturers of specialised 
garments who picked their workers very carefully, avoided fast labour turnover, and 
who, ironically, manipulated the family, kin and ethnic networks of their workers to 
maintain their loyalties (see discussions on labour organisation in Rongoli and Swakan- 
Chhemu, Chapters 5 and 6).
114 During 6-13 July, 2001, the Maoists attacked six police posts in the districts ofLamjung, Nuwakot, 
Ramechhap, Gulmi and Dailekh and abducted 69 police from the town of Holeri. The Maoists also 
formed a regional alliance called the Confederation o f Communist and Maoist Parties o f South Asia 
(CCOMPOSA) during the same days.
115 During the Holeri shoot out, the army, stationed only few kilometres away, declined to come to the 
aid o f the police under the civil (power) directive. This raised a serious question as to whether the 
Prime Minister or the king had ultimate control over the army and this badly shook the already fragile 
political balance in the country.
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In November 2001, the third round of peace talks between the government and the 
Maoists failed and the Maoists set up a thirty seven member Joint Revolutionary 
People’s Council headed by their ideologue Baburam Bhattarai. They also launched 
simultaneous attacks in Surkhet, Dang, Syangja and other parts of the country. Within a 
few days, King Gyanendra declared a national state of emergency, the Maoists terrorists 
and deployed the Nepali army to fight the insurgency. This was followed by a heavy 
crackdown on the Maoist labour and student unions functioning within the Kathmandu 
Valley. This had serious implications for the garment workers as several were arrested 
and the budding labour activism in the garment industry was checked. After a thorough 
‘cleansing’ of Maoist labour unionism, the garment factories returned to normal 
operations under heightened security measures within the Kathmandu Valley.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored the nature of economic and political embeddedness 
within a broader cultural configuration, which has deep implications for the dispositions 
of each social group within the national entrepreneurial order. In doing so, I have 
disagreed with some social scientists who optimistically argue that social capital, or 
informal connections, play an important part in the reproduction of classes to counteract 
the effects of economic stagnation. This debate, regenerated by Putnam’s notion of 
social capital, calls for the possibility and usefulness of (de)politicisation of economic 
and social movements. Following Bourdieu, Coleman and Harriss, I disagree with such 
a compartmentalised view of social capital. Instead, I emphasise that what each actor 
will make out of grassroots organisations will vary according to its own situation of 
power. As I have shown for the garment association and its labour unions in Nepal, the 
politics of the Maoists, GAN and labour unions mean something very different for each 
business house, and has to be qualified by its individual positioning within the local- 
global political order. The caste and ethnic identities of the entrepreneurs, spread out on 
the broader political constellation of power, is what allows each entrepreneur to benefit 
or lose from this mix of political and professional bodies.
The social capital scholars might claim that GAN and labour unions are successful cases 
of the regeneration of society-based resources, and that the fact that they are so 
influential in the functioning of the individual factories, provides the evidence that social 
co-operation fosters economic development. The reality is different. What my evidence 
suggests is that the roles of GAN and labour unions are not apolitical but political; and
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the role they play in the business of garment-making draws largely on the nature of their 
politics, which is not static but continuously contested. Where each caste/ethnic group 
stands within the domestic politics of civil war as well as the international politics of 
globalisation varies - and with it varies their contributions to and drawings from the local 
politics of GAN and labour unionism. What I further argue is that in sharp contrast to 
the compartmentalisation of politics and economy, there is a strong case for bringing the 
political back into the discussion of social capital, and its economic and cultural 
regenerations.
I have already shown in Chapter 8 that the relationship of individual entrepreneurs to the 
State was different depending on their caste and ethnicities. In this chapter, I have shown 
continuation of caste/ethnic differentiation in the way entrepreneurs dealt with GAN and 
labour unions. Both these associations, if anything, are peripheral extensions of the caste 
politics dominant in the centre. The Newar entrepreneurs who are marginal to State 
politics are also marginal to GAN and labour union politics. The Marwaris and the 
Bahun-Chhetris are better represented in GAN as they are in State-protected industries 
(see Chapter 2). In fact, as expressed openly by some GAN members of these castes and 
ethnicities, without such informal cultural overlapping with the State, it would be very 
difficult to ensure the smooth operation of both these institutions. The issue of caste- and 
ethnicity-based alliances are relevant not only within the local context, but also the 
global, as can be seen in GAN’s efforts to engage with foreigners and their responses to 
them. Not surprisingly then, to what extent these entities are available to factory owners 
as their tools and to what extent they are obstructions to pursuit of their business 
interests, is something that depends on where they stand within the power constellation 
of caste politics.
The exclusion of the politics and ethnicity debate from economics -  as suggested by the 
Putnam school of social capital -  only disguises the fact that the development of a 
politically and ethnically charged industry is a consequence of global politics on trade 
(e.g. the MFA) as well as local politics on philanthropy and labour unionism (e.g. Maoist 
insurgency). My account of how MFA and Maoist politics silently came into the picture 
of the garment world, only to create havoc within a decade, is also an account of how the 
roles of GAN and labour unions were transformed irrevocably through localisation of 
politics. Politics do bring in new opportunities and threats to economy and society as a 
whole. The extent to which these alter the fabric of mass organisations is a core element
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of the social capital debate as seen in the work of Bourdieu which claimed that local 
configurations of power might be path-dependent; yet, they are definitely not monolithic 
but assorted, and not static but dispositional.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
In this thesis, I have tried to show how cultural differences between the elite business 
communities of Nepal are reflected in their choices of economic vocations and industrial 
organisation, as well as in State-entrepreneur relationships, hence influencing the 
capacity of individuals, firms and societies to respond to changing circumstances. 
Following Bourdieu’s line of enquiry on cultural capital and North’s on institutions, I 
have highlighted the political, historical and cultural determinants of industrial 
development in Nepal in order to analyse the relationship between formal and informal 
economic processes and how are they transformed as the economy modernises. The 
centuries-old history of caste politics and the decades-old history of party politics have 
been materialised in the modem readymade garment industry in times of mounting 
global and local crises. What emerged in this industry in the late twentieth century was a 
broad cultural and entrepreneurial movement, whose foundations lay in the 1980s and 
1990s, linked in complex ways to economic policy, politics and socio-cultural 
configurations. This movement involved young people from elite families abandoning 
their traditional vocations to switch to modem and lucrative careers. Such a movement 
might only have been temporarily economically viable, at least in its original forms, but 
it lasted longer than expected because it happened at a time when Nepal was rapidly 
integrating with global culture, politics and market. The movement instigated a 
modification of the dominant cultural and political values of both industry and society. 
The irony was that the ‘modification’, at least over the long run, was much closer to the 
original values and realities of the social classes involved than their reverse.
In my analysis of the cultural capital within the otherwise mundane world of the 
readymade garment industry, I have shown the slow process through which the 
entrepreneurs abandoned their traditional vocations to seek space in a profoundly new 
garment industry. This is similar to a process Bourdieu described as the widening of the 
field. On the garment shop floors, elite entrepreneurship emerged from the gradual 
dismantling of the strict caste and ethnic vocational order alongside a parallel resurgence 
of old entrepreneurial, artisanal and social heritages in the context of economic 
modernisation. Beyond the shop floors, the emergence of new entrepreneurship was a 
result of complex and dynamic interconnections between the institutions of class and 
culture that became manifest in the alliances and hierarchies that developed. At one 
level, such widening of the field entailed deeper interdependence between culture-
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intensive and capital-intensive processes of production and exchange. At another, it 
required class and cultural restructuring among the agents involved so as to expedite the 
very process of widening. The emergence of Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu was a slow 
process of first dismantling, and then re-ordering, during which a deepening of several 
subjective and objective elements that were fused together in the mental models of the 
early entrepreneurial elites took place. The processes of designing and manufacturing 
products in Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu involved the convergence of cultural and 
economic spaces, houses and families coming together with factories and business 
alliances, in the context of the new competition that emerged as a result of economic 
modernisation and global integration. The final outcome of such negotiation and 
renegotiation is reflected in a remodelling of industrial organisation arising out of 
creative destruction of local culture on the one hand and substantial adaptation of global 
culture on the other.
Chapter 9 specifically focused on the caste-politics nexus in the formation of business 
alliances and in State-business relations to show that new capitalism is not only about 
mechanisation and rationalisation of the production process, but equally about 
reinvigoration of the old social order into business alliances which help entrepreneurs 
ride the rising waves of global competition. This is seen in entrepreneurs’ continued 
negotiation of identities constructed through centuries-old institutions of caste and 
politics. Especially from the point of view of State-level identity politics, the Rongoli 
owners are the Marwaris whose ancestors were once officially invited from India by the 
Nepali State to build the first cohort of modem industries in Nepal. In an essentially 
Hindu kingdom, the Marwaris have a large amount of overlap with the religious values 
and ritual norms of the ruling Hindu elites who govern the State. The rituals of Dashain 
tika, the regular practice of chakari, and their Indian connections, as well as their elite 
status within Nepali society, are used as tools to forge and strengthen informal 
relationships with State bureaucrats who have discretionary powers on whether or not to 
bestow State policy benefits on artisan factories. It is a paradox, however, that Rongoli 
has been equally successful in invoking an ‘indigenous’ Nepali identity before the 
Maoist rebels, even at a time they were waging a war against capitalism and ‘Indian 
imperialism’.
The Newar Shakyas of Swakan-Chhemu are struggling to keep their business 
relationship with the State from being displaced by the ‘old’ (Marwari) and ‘new’
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(Bahun-Chhetri) Hindu business elites who enjoy State privileges. Why they are less 
effective in their socialisation with the ruling elites, and as a result, remain outsiders 
when it comes to making use of State policy incentives for exports, involves a myriad of 
issues that come with identity politics including, but not limited to, language, values and 
history. One such issue is that the Newars’ monthly and annual festival calendar has 
little overlap with that of the State, which means the Newar entrepreneurs have a social 
circle that is virtually apart from that of the State bureaucrats, and so there is very limited 
opportunity for any social exchange between the two. Such disadvantages manifest 
themselves again when the Shakyas seek to forge alliances with the labour unions and 
entrepreneurs’ associations. Some of their shortcomings are compensated for by their 
successful capitalisation of entrepreneurial, artisan and political legacies from pre­
unification Nepal: For example, their market includes the consumers of medieval 
Buddhist art and philosophy, their suppliers are the Chinese rivals of the Indian (and 
Hindu) businessmen and their financiers are western patrons of their estranged Tibetan 
kin.
The Bahun-Chhetris of the mass manufacturing Arya-Nepal could not present more of a 
contrast with the Newars. As members of the de facto ruling castes that governed the 
country from its unification in 1769, their material wealth increased after political power 
was diffused from the royal family to a broader base of upper Hindu castes of Bahun- 
Chhetris. Although few of them considered entrepreneurship as a vocation before the 
dismantling of the caste-based penal code and modernisation of the State in 1951, they 
later increasingly dominated State-protected entrepreneurial areas. Interestingly, despite 
such privileges, there were no Bahun-Chhetri producers of cultural products; all of the 
Bahun-Chhetri garment entrepreneurs were manufacturers of homogenised products 
within the garment industry and elsewhere. The Bahun-Chhetris do not have access to 
the traditional knowledge, skills, networks -  and above all, the right cultural identities -  
that would have allowed them to develop a niche in specialised garment production. 
Instead, they are successful in making good use of State subsidies and organised enough 
to try their hands at policy lobbying and labour unionism. Such privileges, however, 
have been eroded as the Maoists have sought to extend their influence over this industry, 
aiming to uproot feudalism and caste elitism. The success of the Bahun-Chhetris in 
mechanising the production process and forming alliances with the State bureaucracy 
became the very Trojan horse that turned them into captive victims of the Maoist 
insurgency.
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The history of the readymade garment industry in Nepal, as I have shown, reveals the 
paradox of cultural anonymisation and polarisation as the industry made a partially 
successful transition from old to new entrepreneurship. Contrary to the myth that 
globalisation is about all pervasive homogenisation, we see that the cultural identities of 
both old and new entrepreneurs have become more pronounced in Nepal with 
globalisation. In fact, new entrepreneurship, like the old, relied on the interconnection 
between the strictly cultural and the strictly capital, and on its ability to shift between 
these two worlds throughout the transition. On one hand, there is a proliferation of 
business alliances where buyers and financiers are more interested in the cultural 
identities, knowledge and networks of their producers. On the other, business 
relationships that are forged purely on the grounds of cultural preference and 
convenience, without being anchored in commercial interests, are precarious and their 
transition from old to new entrepreneurship involve hurdles that are not always 
overcome.
Those business alliances that have emerged stable and sustainable in Nepal are the ones 
led by the old entrepreneurs who draw on their cultural capital for production of 
specialised garments. Relying on their family and social organisations, intergenerational 
knowledge transfer and a complex mix of inherited and improvised skills in industrial 
organisation, the old elite entrepreneurs have survived the new challenges of 
industrialisation. In times of industrial decline, these elite entrepreneurs improvised on 
their cultural capital but did not abandon it. In contrast, the new entrepreneurs -  all of 
whom were mass manufacturers out of necessity rather than choice -  were more 
dependent on their cultural habits, but were not successful in exploiting the core of these 
practices entrepreneurially so as to turn them into harvestable cultural capital. There is 
an implicit path dependency of cultural origin in the way individual entrepreneurs 
interpret the situation around them and the way they choose the substance and process of 
their business. From this point of view, I have modified Bourdieu’s discussion of the 
dynamism brought in by symbolic violence in the otherwise static concept of field. Not 
only through my individual case studies but also through my ethnography of the 
traditional markets of Boudha and Indra Chok, I have shown that the widening of the 
field is a nonlinear process consisting of introspective cultural knowledge and skills, 
semi-rational networks within families and kin, coercion and control over the production 
and transaction processes and a deep self-consciousness of entrepreneurship as part of
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their individual and collective identities. I will return to this in the conclusion o f this 
chapter.
In Chapter 8 ,1 used Whitley’s (1999) work as a framework for my own and showed how 
cultural factors influenced and brought about variations in industrial organisation 
between the three firms studied. The immediate shop floor organisations at the point of 
production in all three factories reflect the broader culture that surrounds them and they 
evolved in response to the incremental processes of economic and political liberalisation. 
In the case of Arya-Nepal, modernisation has been achieved through fragmentation 
between capital ownership and management, within and between tasks of production and 
between the family and business legacies across generations. Outside the factory floors, 
however, Arya-Nepal3 relied on integration of global and local skills while thriftily 
cutting transaction costs and craftily manipulating labour unionism. At an inter-factory 
level, they were opportunists engaged in a cut-throat competition on price, quantity and 
time while at a broader level, they were lobbyists working to influence international and 
national policies for their gains.
In the case of Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli, the rationalisation that dominated Arya- 
Nepal3 and other mass manufacturers, did not exist. Instead, they followed a culturally 
nuanced distinction o f ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ to separate activities that are material 
(and thus lower in status) from those that are symbolic (and thus higher in status). To a 
greater or lesser extent, only those workers whose skills and roles were at the heart of 
material production, and who were rewarded more in kind and less in cash, were 
regarded as insiders. In Swakan-Chhemu, unskilled thread-cutters and skilled tailors 
were outsiders and store keepers, cutting masters, fashion designers and embroiderers the 
insiders. The outsiders were all rewarded in cash wages higher than the market rates 
while the insiders often compromised on short term rewards in the expectation of better 
prospects in the long term. The insider-outsider dichotomy was similar in Rongoli, 
except that they had more insiders than outsiders with whom they did business. For 
example, everybody on the factory salary sheets, including the ‘untouchable’ Damai 
tailors and the unskilled thread-cutting women, were insiders who had served the 
Rauniyars for several decades.
A similar insider-outsider dichotomy can also be traced in the relationships between the 
garment buyers and producers. While long-term relational obligations were simply not
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feasible among the mass manufacturers, such a model evolved slowly over time among 
the specialised producers. Although this was not very different from the producer- 
worker relationship, the producers’ worlds seemed different than the workers’ in the 
sense that they were more exposed to the hegemony of their buyers hailing from distant 
comers of the world. This is consistent with what Ortner (1999) called counterculture -  
that old identities and orders change over time to adapt to the new demands of 
rationality, but the outcome of this change is a new order that is both different from and 
similar to, the original. In her own expression, the ‘virtual’ culture is neither a 
duplication nor independent of the ‘original’ culture. This is true for Nepal. At one 
level, the niche producers have sought to be the kinds of producers and to have the kind 
of cultural capital their global buyers and partners wanted. At another, they have also 
sought, with mixed success, to acculturate their buyers into their own culture and subtly 
usher in aspects of native values, norms and hierarchies into otherwise alien business 
worlds. The outcome is that the Marwari and Shakya garment entrepreneurs have 
become better conversant with global capitalist trends than their predecessors were, but 
equally, throughout this process, they have made efforts to present themselves to the 
global audience as the only authentic bearers of their culture.
Thus, with regard to the first question of my thesis, the garment entrepreneurs have 
different practices between mass manufacturers (as exemplified by Arya-Nepal) and 
niche producers (Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu). Their practices are distinctive not only 
on the factory shop floors but also in inter-factory transactions as well as in the factories’ 
negotiations with the State and international players. The multi-layered overlapping 
between the informal and formal economic processes has emerged largely as a result of 
the differentiated institutions inherited from the pre-industrial caste and ethnic 
configurations. The re-emergence of the culture-influenced economic practices and 
preferences reflect both adaptation to and compromise with the demands of the new 
market. I have shown in my work that the culture-driven alliances that gradually evolved 
overtime, and the cost-centric calculations that came as ad hoc responses to immediate 
needs, have always coexisted in Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu. My interest is in 
understanding the implications of this culture-economics nexus today, and whether it 
increases or decreases a company’s chances of survival in times of policy and political 
crises. Comparing Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu with Arya-Nepal, it seems that the 
enculturation of production knowledge has increased the odds in favour of Rongoli and 
Swakan-Chhemu, whereas the deculturation -  framed as Taylorisation as in the case of
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the shift from juwa to chain systems of production, and rationalisation as in the case of 
opportunistic business dealings with global buyers -  has been one of the factors that led 
to the defeat of Arya-Nepal by the local political crisis invoked by the Maoist insurgency 
as well as the global policy crisis invoked by the expiry of the MFA.
The owners of Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu are not only keepers of cultural knowledge 
but are themselves elite ‘old’ entrepreneurs whose excellence in the production and 
transaction process created the preconditions necessary for their successful transition into 
‘new’ entrepreneurship. They resist new practices with regard to how they manage their 
labour, machinery and buyers because they feel that they will only work for a short time. 
It is not worthwhile, therefore, to make big changes which will only have to be redone 
after a very short time, and they are determined to overcome this dilemma by 
outmanoeuvring the global market and buyers. In continuing this industrial tradition of 
what and how to produce, niche producers like Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu provide a 
counterbalancing force to mass manufacturers like Arya-Nepal who have radically 
transformed their industrial operations to suit the immediate market demands, and by 
doing so have made themselves increasingly susceptible to emerging political and 
economic problems. How this small segment of niche producers has coexisted with the 
mass-manufacturing industry and eventually outlasted it, offers an interesting reference 
point in explaining both the rise and demise of the readymade garment industry in Nepal.
The closure of Arya-Nepal and the resilience of Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu in the 
long run show that the renewed significance of cultural knowledge in modem industries 
is associated with a rise in global consumer taste for cultural distinction. Breaking away 
from price and quantity driven consumers, niche producers are attracting a higher end 
market who are willing and able to pay for the myths and symbolisms brought in from 
the far-flung civilisations at their disposal. My three case study chapters (4, 5 and 6) 
offered detailed discussions of the planned and actual business strategies of both mass 
and niche producers. The latter have long operated at the level of ‘greater’ cultural 
capital, and over time, they have come to dominate the industry such that every mass 
manufacturer in the late 1990s was looking for an opportunity to cross the line to join the 
(culture-based) niche production. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, there was a 
broad-based process of widening of the field at play, on a scale much greater than before. 
The modifications in taste and production among the local cultural elites were only minor 
factors in the structural changes that took place among the garment makers in Nepal,
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compared to the invasive changes in representations of cultures brought about by the 
integration of the Nepali garment market with the global.
The renewed representations of cultures that have undergone a process of what Ortner 
called counterculture formed the subject of Chapter 7. Although my observation of 
incidents in the individual factories (Chapters 4,5 and 6) occasionally touched upon the 
theme of counterculture, it was only in Chapter 7 that I substantiated this theme through 
my ethnographies of the two cultural markets -  Boudha and Indra Chok, which were the 
origins of the old entrepreneurs of Swakan-Chhemu and Rongoli. Through the past few 
decades, the integration of local cultural markets with the global has given rise to a new 
point of reference both for change and for continuity. Such a shift in the point of 
reference has instigated a process of counterculture that has modified norms, practices 
and values among the Nepali artisans and entrepreneurs. As Nepal opened up to tourism 
and NGOism in the 1970s, some entrepreneurs from these cultural markets came to 
realise that while they now had access to a whole range of new clientele from around the 
world, in order to serve them they needed to transform what and how they produced. As 
the rhythm of society and industry came into contact with outside agents -  buyers and 
financiers, designers and suppliers or allies and rivals -  entrepreneurs were increasingly 
under pressure to adapt to social and economic changes. The way the select few old 
business elites such as the Marwaris and Shakyas readily stepped up to the role of 
modem producers of ancient cultural goods was a good example. Their business 
strategies for the new market were neither entirely different nor similar to the business 
strategies they had pursued for the old. The Marwaris pragmatically drew on their 
expertise in fabrics and connections to weaving networks from all over South Asia in 
order to create more imaginative textile styles better suited to Western tastes. The 
Shakyas continued to emphasise high standards of artisanship, philosophy, history and 
knowledge over the needs of upgrading of raw materials and adapting to new market 
alliances. At some level, what the Marwaris and the Shakyas are seen to be successfully 
doing today carries nuances of what has been going on in these communities over 
centuries both on cultural and entrepreneurial fronts.
The Bahun-Chhetris, who disproportionately crowded the mass manufacturing segment 
of the modem ready garment industry, have never been cultural artisans or entrepreneurs 
in the past. Under the muluki ain, the Bahuns were practising priests and officials of the 
court whereas the Chhetris were warriors. Of course, money changed hands in these
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professions, but the norms and morality of exchange were very different to those in the 
worlds of artisanal patronage or business entrepreneurship. As caste-based occupational 
codes were formally and informally weakened after the popular democratic movement of 
1951, the Bahun-Chhetris in the villages increasingly engaged in farming, money- 
lending and rent-seeking while those in the cities took part in the civil service, office 
management, academia, activism and trade. Neither in the past nor in present is it 
possible to find an area of traditional art or culture-based enterprise where the Bahun- 
Chhetris have collectively prevailed. Such a vacuum of history reaffirms my original 
argument that the way the select few old business elites like Marwaris and the Newars -  
and not the Bahun-Chhetris -  readily stepped up to the role of cultural entrepreneurs in 
the new market has as much to do with their cultural backgrounds as their technical 
business skills and finances. The old business elites like the owners of Rongoli and 
Swakan-Chhemu have tried to, and with a varying degree of success, have actually 
obtained, the cultural and professional traits desired by their buyers and financiers. In 
contrast, new business elites like the owners of Arya-Nepal3 increasingly shied away 
from developing relational obligations with their buyers as it became clearer that cultural 
production was the only niche Nepal could realistically secure in the global market of 
readymade garments. This divergence in the roles taken by various business elites 
through the process of counterculture affected the local entrepreneurial order between the 
niche and mass manufacturers. Entrepreneurial differentiation helped the successful 
business elites, who were seen to be going against the ethos of mass manufacturing, to 
dominate a prosperous segment of the garment industry impenetrable to others.
A key question arising from the discussion on counterculture would be that of why then, 
could the twentieth century Bahun-Chhetris not follow a process of counterculture to 
acquire knowledge, skills and networks of cultural artisanship and entrepreneurship? 
Need the fact that they did not do so in the past necessarily stop them from doing so in 
the present or future? In part, the question of counterculture brings us back to 
Bourdieu’s differentiation of strictly cultural from strictly economic capital and his 
assertion that subjectively defined ‘interests’ lie at the centre of both. As Bourdieu 
showed, the conversion of one form of capital to the other requires more of the 
‘gratuitous’ expenditure of time, attention, care and concern than is required for 
conversions within the same form of capital. Attainment of cultural capital does not 
depend on innate capacities but emerges through the workings of an evolving social 
structure where knowledge exchange must be intricately combined with social
226
obligations and reciprocation. Within the assortment of rigid and fragmented social 
structures that has prevailed in Nepal for centuries, the flow of cultural knowledge, skills 
and networks has only rarely crossed boundaries of social hierarchies such as castes. It is 
only unfortunate from the perspectives of new entrepreneurs that the cultural capital that 
has remained the privilege of the old business elites has proven more powerful in the new 
market than the economic capital to which the new business elites had access.
Another important question arising is that of why Rongoli and Swakan-Chhemu were the 
only entrepreneurs among the old business elites who managed to break out of the 
conventional workshops and markets of Indra Chok and Boudha to join the new 
entrepreneurship that is nationally and globally integrated. I return to Bourdieu and his 
argument that habitus is not innate but a structured structure. The scope and depth of 
cultural knowledge, skills and networks that individuals accumulate is related to the array 
of experiences he or she undergoes in early life. This is similar to North’s mental 
models. By nature, these would be part society-specific but part individual. This speaks 
to the fact that as a young man, Gaj’s genuine friendship with expatriates and tourists 
gave him better insights into doing business with foreigners as his career matured. Heera 
Ratna’s rise to the position of mayor -  it was in this phase of his life that he developed 
the global alliances that would later help his family conceive the idea of Swakan- 
Chhemu -  was a reward for his political contributions to the new elites throughout the 
democratic movement of 1951.
My argument about the embeddedness of economic behaviour in social relations suggests 
that the hierarchies of caste and ethnicity play an active role in the economic 
modernisation process, determining the nature of new products, business alliances and 
market. What is the relationship between formal and informal, cultural and economic, 
and individual and collective? An anthropology for the twenty first century would attend 
to such overlaps in the constitution of the subjectivities of those involved. In our efforts 
to explain and forecast the trends of economic and cultural change, we cannot ignore the 
negotiated realities of the underlying institutions. For North, these institutions, or mental 
models, evolve through the blending of genetic predispositions and cultural imperatives 
in modelling ‘reality’ for interpretations. The varied responses of the old and new 
business elites in Nepal to common opportunities and crises can be satisfactorily 
explained by this idea of the mental model. This last statement brings Bourdieu at par 
with North. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus dismantles the arbitrary dichotomy created by
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the Althusserians between ideological and economic actions, and persuasively explains 
how an individual’s path specificity comes from calculation of interests and how it 
governs all walks of life. Bourdieu posits habitus within the discourse of cultural or 
symbolic resources, and by doing this, contextualises the rationality of action within 
social hierarchies. Why a business entrepreneur would choose a certain business 
response to a particular opportunity or crisis, then, has to do with his own habitus which 
in turn is situated within the caste hierarchy that has been all pervasive in Nepal’s 
history, culture and economics. By listening to such subtle tones challenging dominant 
themes, and paying attention to the individual lives and deeds of both successful and 
failed entrepreneurs, this discourse offers an intellectual framework that connects human 
actions to social and institutional hierarchies.
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Glossary
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
ANLUR All Nepal Labour Union -  Revolutionary
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
CBPTA The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
CMP Cut-Make-Price
CMTP Cut-Make-T rim-Price
CPN/UML Community Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist)
DECONT Democratic Confederation of Nepalese Trade Unions
DEPB Duty Entitlement Passbook
DFID Department of International Development (British)
DOI Department of Industries (Nepal)
EIC East India Company
FIT Fashion Institute of Technology -  New York
FNCCI Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce
GAN Garment Association of Nepal
GEFONT General Federation of the Nepalese Trade Unions
GSP Generalised System of Preferences
IFI International Financial institutions
ILO International Labour Organisation
L/C Letter of Credit
MFA Multi-Fibre Arrangement
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOIC Ministry of Industries and Commerce
NC Nepali Congress
NIDC Nepal Industrial Development Corporation
NIE New Institutional Economics
NIFIN Nepal Association of Indigenous Nationalities
NTUC Nepal Trade Union Congress
PEI Panda Energy International
WTO World Trade Organisation
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